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博霍扎耶夫恒等式的推广与应用
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作者 欧乾忠 莫达隆 《贺州学院学报》 2014年第1期110-111,共2页
论文把经典的博霍扎耶夫恒等式推广到p-拉普拉斯算子的情形,并给出了它在一类拟线性偏微分方程问题不可解性上的应用。
关键词 霍扎耶恒等式 p-拉普拉斯算子 偏微分方程
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拉美解放神学教会学的演变与争论
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作者 高然 《世界近现代史研究》 2017年第1期219-246,共28页
教会学是宗教伦理介入社会生活的桥梁。拉美解放神学的教会学大致经历了三个发展阶段:(1)梵二会议前后的酝酿期(20世纪50年代至1968年);(2)以麦德林会议和古铁雷斯神学为代表的形成期(1968年至20世纪70年代中期);(3)以基层... 教会学是宗教伦理介入社会生活的桥梁。拉美解放神学的教会学大致经历了三个发展阶段:(1)梵二会议前后的酝酿期(20世纪50年代至1968年);(2)以麦德林会议和古铁雷斯神学为代表的形成期(1968年至20世纪70年代中期);(3)以基层团体运动的理论化为标志的成熟期(20世纪70年代中期至80年代中期)。通过对教会本质、使命和结构的重新阐述,特别是对基层教会团体的宗教意义和社会功能的强调,解放神学挑战了传统的教权模式。 展开更多
关键词 教会学 解放神学 古铁雷斯 基层教会团体 博夫
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Evolutionary Game Dynamics in a Fitness-Dependent Wright-Fisher Process with Noise 被引量:3
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作者 全吉 王先甲 《Communications in Theoretical Physics》 SCIE CAS CSCD 2011年第9期404-410,共7页
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to de... Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player's rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner's dilemma games (PDG) and the snowdrift games (SG). We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments. 展开更多
关键词 evolutionary games Wright-Fisher process evolutionary stable strategy noise
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A Novel Dynamic Decision Model in 2-player Symmetric Repeated Games
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作者 Liu Weibing Wang Xianjia Wang Guangmin 《Engineering Sciences》 EI 2008年第1期43-46,共4页
Considering the dynamic character of repeated games and Markov process, this paper presented a novel dynamic decision model for symmetric repeated games. In this model, players' actions were mapped to a Markov decisi... Considering the dynamic character of repeated games and Markov process, this paper presented a novel dynamic decision model for symmetric repeated games. In this model, players' actions were mapped to a Markov decision process with payoffs, and the Boltzmann distribution was intousluced. Our dynamic model is different from others' , we used this dynamic model to study the iterated prisoner' s dilemma, and the results show that this decision model can successfully be used in symmetric repeated games and has an ability of adaptive learning. 展开更多
关键词 game theory evolutionary game repeated game Markov process decision model
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