In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing,a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense.First,under the framework of the proposed non...In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing,a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense.First,under the framework of the proposed non-cooperative game theory,the pure Byzantine attack strategy and defense strategy in cooperative spectrum sensing are analyzed from the perspective of the Byzantine attacker and network administrator.The cost and benefit of the pure strategy on both sides are defined. Secondly,the mixed attack and defense strategy are also derived. The closed form Nash equilibrium is obtained by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Furthermore,the impact of the benefit ratio and penalty rate on the dynamic process of the noncooperative game is analyzed. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed game-theory approach can effectively defend against the Byzantine attack and save the defensive cost.展开更多
The fifth generation （5G） networks have been envisioned to support the explosive growth of data demand caused by the increasing traditional high-rate mobile users and the expected rise of interconnections between hu...The fifth generation （5G） networks have been envisioned to support the explosive growth of data demand caused by the increasing traditional high-rate mobile users and the expected rise of interconnections between human and things. To accommodate the ever-growing data traffic with scarce spectrum resources, cognitive radio （CR） is considered a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization. We study the power control problem for secondary users in an underlay CR network. Unlike most existing studies which simplify the problem by considering only a single primary user or channel, we investigate a more realistic scenario where multiple primary users share multiple channels with secondary users. We formulate the power control problem as a non-cooperative game with coupled constraints, where the Pareto optimality and achievable total throughput can be obtained by a Nash equilibrium （NE） solution. To achieve NE of the game, we first propose a projected gradient based dynamic model whose equilibrium points are equivalent to the NE of the original game, and then derive a centralized algorithm to solve the problem. Simulation results show that the convergence and effectiveness of our proposed solution, emphasizing the proposed algorithm, are competitive. Moreover, we demonstrate the robustness of our proposed solution as the network size increases.展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
Potential games are noncooperative games for which there exist auxiliary functions, called potentials,such that the maximizers of the potential are also Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. Some properties of Na...Potential games are noncooperative games for which there exist auxiliary functions, called potentials,such that the maximizers of the potential are also Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. Some properties of Nash equilibria, such as existence or stability, can be derived from the potential, whenever it exists. We survey different classes of potential games in the static and dynamic cases, with a finite number of players, as well as in population games where a continuum of players is allowed. Likewise, theoretical concepts and applications are discussed by means of illustrative examples.展开更多
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61771126)
文摘In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing,a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense.First,under the framework of the proposed non-cooperative game theory,the pure Byzantine attack strategy and defense strategy in cooperative spectrum sensing are analyzed from the perspective of the Byzantine attacker and network administrator.The cost and benefit of the pure strategy on both sides are defined. Secondly,the mixed attack and defense strategy are also derived. The closed form Nash equilibrium is obtained by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Furthermore,the impact of the benefit ratio and penalty rate on the dynamic process of the noncooperative game is analyzed. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed game-theory approach can effectively defend against the Byzantine attack and save the defensive cost.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.61227801 and 61629101)Huawei Communications Technology Lab,Chinathe Open Research Foundation of Xi’an Jiaotong University,China(No.sklms2015015)
文摘The fifth generation （5G） networks have been envisioned to support the explosive growth of data demand caused by the increasing traditional high-rate mobile users and the expected rise of interconnections between human and things. To accommodate the ever-growing data traffic with scarce spectrum resources, cognitive radio （CR） is considered a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization. We study the power control problem for secondary users in an underlay CR network. Unlike most existing studies which simplify the problem by considering only a single primary user or channel, we investigate a more realistic scenario where multiple primary users share multiple channels with secondary users. We formulate the power control problem as a non-cooperative game with coupled constraints, where the Pareto optimality and achievable total throughput can be obtained by a Nash equilibrium （NE） solution. To achieve NE of the game, we first propose a projected gradient based dynamic model whose equilibrium points are equivalent to the NE of the original game, and then derive a centralized algorithm to solve the problem. Simulation results show that the convergence and effectiveness of our proposed solution, emphasizing the proposed algorithm, are competitive. Moreover, we demonstrate the robustness of our proposed solution as the network size increases.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
基金supported by Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología of Mexico (Grant No. 221291)
文摘Potential games are noncooperative games for which there exist auxiliary functions, called potentials,such that the maximizers of the potential are also Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. Some properties of Nash equilibria, such as existence or stability, can be derived from the potential, whenever it exists. We survey different classes of potential games in the static and dynamic cases, with a finite number of players, as well as in population games where a continuum of players is allowed. Likewise, theoretical concepts and applications are discussed by means of illustrative examples.
