职业教育的“博弈态”——一种理性的思考

职业教育的发展历史性地处于博弈中,首先表现为不同教育理念支配下的职业教育观的冲突与融合;其次是职业教育的代理人——职业学校与各办学主体(政府、企业等)以及职业学校内部各受益方之间的利益冲突。本文试图分析职业教育中存在的博弈关系,对职业教育如何健康地存在与发展进行理性思考。

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Elastic Control in Software-Defined Networking

Elastic control could balance the distributed control plane in Software-Defined Networking(SDN). Dynamic switch migration has been proposed to achieve it. However, existing schemes mainly focus on how to execute migration operation, but not why. This paper designs a decision-making mechanism based on zero-sum game theory to reelect a new controller as the master for migrated switches. It first chooses a switch for migration in the heavy controller which invites its neighbors as the game players to compete for the master role of this switch in the game-playing field(GPF) which is an occasional and loose domain for game-playing. Second, based on the concept of GPF, we design a decentralized strategy to play the game and determine which player as the final master. We implement it by extending the Open Flow protocol. Finally, numerical results demonstrate that our distributed strategy can approach elastic control plane with better performance.

An evolutionary game based security decision algorithm for wireless sensor networks

When using traditional game methods to study information security of the wireless sensor networks,players are mostly based on the assumption of completely rational.Based on bounded rationality,the evolutionary game theory is used to establish the attack-defense model,analyze the strategy selection process of players,solve the evolutionarily stable strategy and design the optimal strategy selection algorithm.Then,considering the strategy dependence,the incentive and punishment mechanism is introduced to improve the replicator dynamic equation.The simulation results show that the model is reasonable and the algorithm is effective,which provides new theoretical support for the security of wireless sensor networks.

Comparison Research on Anti-dumping Duty Rates between Administrative Review and Welfare Maximization under Dynamic Game of Perfect Information

Using economics and game theory, two kinds of models have been proposed in this paper under the assumption that foreign and domestic firms behave under the condition of dynamic game of perfect information. One model is for calculating Anti-dumping rate which is obtained according to current regulations of Anti-dumping, but it is not optimal. The other is an optimal model of Anti-dumping which is obtained according to the maximum principle of domestic social welfare. Then, through the comparison of this two models in detail, several shortages have been revealed about Anti-dumping rate model based on current regulations of Anti-dumping. Finally, a suggestion is indicated that WTO and China should use the optimal model to calculate Anti-dumping rate.

Dynamic Game in the Process of Infant Industry Protection

In the composition, we got A country gover nment. The A country infant industry and the B country industry three join body’ s facties set and pay off function, use thinking of opposite induction took out subjame perfect equlibium’s answer way and steps.

Constrained Dynamic Game and Symmetric Duality for Variational Problems

A certain constrained dynamic game is shown to be equivalent to a pair of symmetric dual variational problems which have more general formulation than those already existing in the literature. Various duality results are proved under convexity and generalized convexity assumptions on the appropriate functionals. The dynamic game is also viewed as equivalent to a pair of dual variational problems without the condition of fixed points. It is also indicated that the equivalent formulation of a pair of symmetric dual variational problems as dynamic generalization of those had been already studied in the literature. In essence, the purpose of the research is to establish that the solution of variational problems yields the solution of the dynamic game.

Behavior analysis of malicious sensor nodes based on optimal response dynamics

Wireless sensor networks are extremely vulnerable to various security threats.The intrusion detection method based on game theory can effectively balance the detection rate and energy consumption of the system.The accurate analysis of the attack behavior of malicious sensor nodes can help to configure intrusion detection system,reduce unnecessary system consumption and improve detection efficiency.However,the completely rational assumption of the traditional game model will cause the established model to be inconsistent with the actual attack and defense scenario.In order to formulate a reasonable and effective intrusion detection strategy,we introduce evolutionary game theory to establish an attack evolution game model based on optimal response dynamics,and then analyze the attack behavior of malicious sensor nodes.Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the evolution trend of attacks is closely related to the number of malicious sensors in the network and the initial state of the strategy,and the attacker can set the initial strategy so that all malicious sensor nodes will eventually launch attacks.Our work is of great significance to guide the development of defense strategies for intrusion detection systems.

A Novel Dynamic Decision Model in 2-player Symmetric Repeated Games

Considering the dynamic character of repeated games and Markov process, this paper presented a novel dynamic decision model for symmetric repeated games. In this model, players＇ actions were mapped to a Markov decision process with payoffs, and the Boltzmann distribution was intousluced. Our dynamic model is different from others＇ , we used this dynamic model to study the iterated prisoner＇ s dilemma, and the results show that this decision model can successfully be used in symmetric repeated games and has an ability of adaptive learning.

AN INVARIANCE PRINCIPLE IN LARGE POPULATION STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES

We study large population stochastic dynamic games where the so-called Nash certainty equivalence based control laws are implemented by the individual players. We first show a martingale property for the limiting control problem of a single agent and then perform averaging across the population; this procedure leads to a constant value for the martingale which shows an invariance property of the population behavior induced by the Nash strategies.

Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures

The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.

A survey of static and dynamic potential games

Potential games are noncooperative games for which there exist auxiliary functions, called potentials,such that the maximizers of the potential are also Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. Some properties of Nash equilibria, such as existence or stability, can be derived from the potential, whenever it exists. We survey different classes of potential games in the static and dynamic cases, with a finite number of players, as well as in population games where a continuum of players is allowed. Likewise, theoretical concepts and applications are discussed by means of illustrative examples.

Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Considering the inertia of individuals in real inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner＇s life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the dilemma game （PDG） on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia： with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society.