In non-dedicated cooperative relay networks, each node is autonomous and selfish in nature, and thus spontaneous cooperation among nodes is challenged. To stimulate the selfish node to participate in cooperation, a pr...In non-dedicated cooperative relay networks, each node is autonomous and selfish in nature, and thus spontaneous cooperation among nodes is challenged. To stimulate the selfish node to participate in cooperation, a pricing-based cooperation engine using game theory was designed. Firstly, the feasible regions of the charge price and reimbursement price were deduced. Then, the non-cooperative and cooperative games were adopted to analyze the amount of bandwidth that initiating cooperation node(ICN) forwards data through participating cooperation node(PCN) and the amount of bandwidth that PCN helps ICN to relay data. Meanwhile, the Nash equilibrium solutions of cooperation bandwidth allocations(CBAs) were obtained through geometrical interpretation. Secondly, a pricing-based cooperation engine was proposed and a cooperative communication system model with cooperation engines was depicted. Finally, an algorithm based on game theory was proposed to realize the cooperation engine. The simulation results demonstrate that, compared with the system without pricing-based incentive, the proposed system can significantly improve the ICN's metric measured by bit-per-Joule and increase the PCN's revenue.展开更多
In cognitive radio networks(CRNs), through recruiting secondary user(SU) as friendly jammer, the secrecy rate obtained by primary user(PU) can be improved. Previous work only considered a simple scenario with a single...In cognitive radio networks(CRNs), through recruiting secondary user(SU) as friendly jammer, the secrecy rate obtained by primary user(PU) can be improved. Previous work only considered a simple scenario with a single PU in their frameworks. In this paper, we will consider a more complicated scenario with multiple PUs and try to investigate the cooperative jamming between multiple PUs and a single SU. When there are multiple PUs in CRN, in order to obtain more spectrum for data transmission, SU will cooperate with multiple PUs at the same time. Considering that both PU and SU are rational and selfish individuals, the interaction between PUs and SU is formulated as a multi-leaders and single-follower Stackelberg game, wherein PU is the leader and SU is the follower. And the Stackelberg Equilibrium(SE) is considered as the final decisions accepted by all PUs and SU. Furthermore, we also prove that when a specific condition is satisfied, the existence of SE can be guaranteed. And a Gauss-Jacobi iterative algorithm is proposed to compute a SE. Finally, simulation results are given to verify the performance and demonstrate that both of the PUs' secrecy rate and the SU's transmission rate can be improved through cooperation.展开更多
Accurate assessment of the probability of success in an aggressive confrontation with a conspecific is critical to the survival and fitness of the individuals. Various game theory models have examined these assessment...Accurate assessment of the probability of success in an aggressive confrontation with a conspecific is critical to the survival and fitness of the individuals. Various game theory models have examined these assessment strategies under the assumption that contests should favor the animal with the greater resource-holding potential （RHP）, body size typically being the proxy. Mutual assessment asserts that an individual can assess their own RHP relative to their opponent, allowing the inferior animal the chance to flee before incurring unnecessary costs. The model of self-determined persistence, however, assumes that an individual will fight to a set personal threshold, independ- ent of their opponent＇s RHP. Both models have been repeatedly tested using size as a proxy for RHP, with neither receiving unambiguous support. Here we present both morphological and neuro- physiological data from size-matched and mismatched stalk-eyed fly fights. We discovered differ- ing fighting strategies between winners and losers. Winners readily escalated encounters to higher intensity and physical contact and engaged in less low-intensity, posturing behaviors compared with losers. Although these fighting strategies were largely independent of size, they were associ- ated with elevated levels of 5-HT. Understanding the neurophysiological factors responsible for mediating the motivational state of opponents could help resolve the inconsistencies seen in cur- rent game theory models. Therefore, we contend that current studies using only size as a proxy for RHP may be inadequate in determining the intricacies of fighting ability and that future studies investigating assessment strategies and contest outcome should include neurophysiological data.展开更多
基金Project(61201143)supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China
文摘In non-dedicated cooperative relay networks, each node is autonomous and selfish in nature, and thus spontaneous cooperation among nodes is challenged. To stimulate the selfish node to participate in cooperation, a pricing-based cooperation engine using game theory was designed. Firstly, the feasible regions of the charge price and reimbursement price were deduced. Then, the non-cooperative and cooperative games were adopted to analyze the amount of bandwidth that initiating cooperation node(ICN) forwards data through participating cooperation node(PCN) and the amount of bandwidth that PCN helps ICN to relay data. Meanwhile, the Nash equilibrium solutions of cooperation bandwidth allocations(CBAs) were obtained through geometrical interpretation. Secondly, a pricing-based cooperation engine was proposed and a cooperative communication system model with cooperation engines was depicted. Finally, an algorithm based on game theory was proposed to realize the cooperation engine. The simulation results demonstrate that, compared with the system without pricing-based incentive, the proposed system can significantly improve the ICN's metric measured by bit-per-Joule and increase the PCN's revenue.
基金supported in part by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant 2016QY01W0204in part by Key Industrial Innovation Chain in Industrial Domain under Grant 2016KTZDGY-02in part by National High-Level TalentsSpecial Support Program of China under Grant CS31117200001
文摘In cognitive radio networks(CRNs), through recruiting secondary user(SU) as friendly jammer, the secrecy rate obtained by primary user(PU) can be improved. Previous work only considered a simple scenario with a single PU in their frameworks. In this paper, we will consider a more complicated scenario with multiple PUs and try to investigate the cooperative jamming between multiple PUs and a single SU. When there are multiple PUs in CRN, in order to obtain more spectrum for data transmission, SU will cooperate with multiple PUs at the same time. Considering that both PU and SU are rational and selfish individuals, the interaction between PUs and SU is formulated as a multi-leaders and single-follower Stackelberg game, wherein PU is the leader and SU is the follower. And the Stackelberg Equilibrium(SE) is considered as the final decisions accepted by all PUs and SU. Furthermore, we also prove that when a specific condition is satisfied, the existence of SE can be guaranteed. And a Gauss-Jacobi iterative algorithm is proposed to compute a SE. Finally, simulation results are given to verify the performance and demonstrate that both of the PUs' secrecy rate and the SU's transmission rate can be improved through cooperation.
文摘Accurate assessment of the probability of success in an aggressive confrontation with a conspecific is critical to the survival and fitness of the individuals. Various game theory models have examined these assessment strategies under the assumption that contests should favor the animal with the greater resource-holding potential （RHP）, body size typically being the proxy. Mutual assessment asserts that an individual can assess their own RHP relative to their opponent, allowing the inferior animal the chance to flee before incurring unnecessary costs. The model of self-determined persistence, however, assumes that an individual will fight to a set personal threshold, independ- ent of their opponent＇s RHP. Both models have been repeatedly tested using size as a proxy for RHP, with neither receiving unambiguous support. Here we present both morphological and neuro- physiological data from size-matched and mismatched stalk-eyed fly fights. We discovered differ- ing fighting strategies between winners and losers. Winners readily escalated encounters to higher intensity and physical contact and engaged in less low-intensity, posturing behaviors compared with losers. Although these fighting strategies were largely independent of size, they were associ- ated with elevated levels of 5-HT. Understanding the neurophysiological factors responsible for mediating the motivational state of opponents could help resolve the inconsistencies seen in cur- rent game theory models. Therefore, we contend that current studies using only size as a proxy for RHP may be inadequate in determining the intricacies of fighting ability and that future studies investigating assessment strategies and contest outcome should include neurophysiological data.
