Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic kno...Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.展开更多
In order to highlight and analyze the influence of heterogeneous knowledge flows to enterprises in the modern service industry,based on a review of the Colonel Blotto game,some presumptions such as the game's util...In order to highlight and analyze the influence of heterogeneous knowledge flows to enterprises in the modern service industry,based on a review of the Colonel Blotto game,some presumptions such as the game's utility function are modified,and a mechanism to change tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge is constructed to carry out an analysis of a two-player knowledge flow management.The characteristics of the players' optimal reactions of knowledge flow management are studied,and the results bear evidence of the facts that a gap always exists under the spillover effect.Meanwhile,tacit knowledge seems more important to the development of enterprises than explicit knowledge.So it implies that the foremost task for the development of the modern service industry is to strengthen the settings and institutions for the flux of tacit knowledge and enterprise knowledge management.展开更多
This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio (CR) trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the ...This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio (CR) trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the Quality of Service (QoS) standards for primary users is considered and a non-cooperative game power control model. Based on the proposed model, we developed a logical utility function based on the Signal-to-Interference-Noise Ratio (S/NR) and a novel algorithm network power control. that is suitable for CR Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) in our utility function are proved by the principle of game theory and the corresponding optimi- zations. Compared to traditional algorithms, the proposed one could converge to an NE in 3-5 iterative operations by setting an appropriate pricing factor. Finally, simulation results ver- ified the stability and superiority of the novel algorithm in flat-fading channel environments.展开更多
In cognitive radio networks(CRNs), through recruiting secondary user(SU) as friendly jammer, the secrecy rate obtained by primary user(PU) can be improved. Previous work only considered a simple scenario with a single...In cognitive radio networks(CRNs), through recruiting secondary user(SU) as friendly jammer, the secrecy rate obtained by primary user(PU) can be improved. Previous work only considered a simple scenario with a single PU in their frameworks. In this paper, we will consider a more complicated scenario with multiple PUs and try to investigate the cooperative jamming between multiple PUs and a single SU. When there are multiple PUs in CRN, in order to obtain more spectrum for data transmission, SU will cooperate with multiple PUs at the same time. Considering that both PU and SU are rational and selfish individuals, the interaction between PUs and SU is formulated as a multi-leaders and single-follower Stackelberg game, wherein PU is the leader and SU is the follower. And the Stackelberg Equilibrium(SE) is considered as the final decisions accepted by all PUs and SU. Furthermore, we also prove that when a specific condition is satisfied, the existence of SE can be guaranteed. And a Gauss-Jacobi iterative algorithm is proposed to compute a SE. Finally, simulation results are given to verify the performance and demonstrate that both of the PUs' secrecy rate and the SU's transmission rate can be improved through cooperation.展开更多
In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing,a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense.First,under the framework of the proposed non...In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing,a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense.First,under the framework of the proposed non-cooperative game theory,the pure Byzantine attack strategy and defense strategy in cooperative spectrum sensing are analyzed from the perspective of the Byzantine attacker and network administrator.The cost and benefit of the pure strategy on both sides are defined. Secondly,the mixed attack and defense strategy are also derived. The closed form Nash equilibrium is obtained by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Furthermore,the impact of the benefit ratio and penalty rate on the dynamic process of the noncooperative game is analyzed. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed game-theory approach can effectively defend against the Byzantine attack and save the defensive cost.展开更多
This paper is built on the study of one key blog-Wang Xiaofeng's No Guess (2006-2011) to explore how a Chinese intellectual uses his satirical skills in the blogosphere, how his blog reshapes the form of political ...This paper is built on the study of one key blog-Wang Xiaofeng's No Guess (2006-2011) to explore how a Chinese intellectual uses his satirical skills in the blogosphere, how his blog reshapes the form of political culture, and how the blogosphere through such interventions proceeds in the development of political communications in China. Two key issues are addressed in the paper. Firstly, drawing on the concept of "blogging culture", the author argues that blogging has potentially reconfigured political information around people's everyday lives, offering alternative modes of "public talk". The case of Wang Xiaofeng shows that satire can be used to make fun of the state, policies, and established ideologies, improving a previously restricted communicative environment toward more open. Secondly, the rise in the value placed on individualism in China, and the rise of peer-to-peer media mean that bloggers who pursue self-expression simultaneously through such self-expression. In other words, Wang Xiaofeng's No Guess blog demonstrates that individual opinions across the blogosphere have implicitly challenged political discourse; however, they always have to struggle with an ongoing censorship, negotiate an unstable discursive space and thus, can only enjoy a limited success.展开更多
Hidden terminal problem in spectrum sensing is one of the most challenging problems in cognitive radio network(CRN).To tackle this problem,we propose a novel Cooperative Interference Game scheme in this paper.The sche...Hidden terminal problem in spectrum sensing is one of the most challenging problems in cognitive radio network(CRN).To tackle this problem,we propose a novel Cooperative Interference Game scheme in this paper.The scheme adopted full duplex(FD)mode to sense over multiple sub-bands in an iterative manner without extra sensing devices.The implementation algorithm of the proposed scheme is consisted of three modules:the formulation of the maximum transmit power limitation of second user(SU);the self-interference cancellation coefficient;and the optimal location of SU for an optimized low collision probability.Monte Carlo simulation proved that compared with cooperative spectrum sensing,the proposed scheme significantly improves the performance of spectrum detection and mitigates hidden terminal problem to a large extent with less energy consumption.展开更多
As one of the major contributions of biology to competitive decision making, evolutionary game theory provides a useful tool for studying the evolution of cooperation. To achieve the optimal solution for unmanned aeri...As one of the major contributions of biology to competitive decision making, evolutionary game theory provides a useful tool for studying the evolution of cooperation. To achieve the optimal solution for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are car- rying out a sensing task, this paper presents a Markov decision evolutionary game (MDEG) based learning algorithm. Each in- dividual in the algorithm follows a Markov decision strategy to maximize its payoff against the well known Tit-for-Tat strate- gy. Simulation results demonstrate that the MDEG theory based approach effectively improves the collective payoff of the roam. The proposed algorithm can not only obtain the best action sequence but also a sub-optimal Markov policy that is inde- pendent of the game duration. Furthermore, the paper also studies the emergence of cooperation in the evolution of self-regarded UAVs. The results show that it is the adaptive ability of the MDEG based approach as well as the perfect balance between revenge and forgiveness of the Tit-for-Tat strategy that the emergence of cooperation should be attributed to.展开更多
文摘Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.
基金The National Key Technology R&D Program of China during the 11th Five-Year Plan Period(No.2006BAH02A06)
文摘In order to highlight and analyze the influence of heterogeneous knowledge flows to enterprises in the modern service industry,based on a review of the Colonel Blotto game,some presumptions such as the game's utility function are modified,and a mechanism to change tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge is constructed to carry out an analysis of a two-player knowledge flow management.The characteristics of the players' optimal reactions of knowledge flow management are studied,and the results bear evidence of the facts that a gap always exists under the spillover effect.Meanwhile,tacit knowledge seems more important to the development of enterprises than explicit knowledge.So it implies that the foremost task for the development of the modern service industry is to strengthen the settings and institutions for the flux of tacit knowledge and enterprise knowledge management.
基金partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.61172073the Open Research Fund of National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory,Southeast University under Grant No.2012D19+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,Beijing Jiaotong University under Grant No.2013JBZ01the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University of Ministry of Education of China under Grant No.NCET-12-0766
文摘This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio (CR) trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the Quality of Service (QoS) standards for primary users is considered and a non-cooperative game power control model. Based on the proposed model, we developed a logical utility function based on the Signal-to-Interference-Noise Ratio (S/NR) and a novel algorithm network power control. that is suitable for CR Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) in our utility function are proved by the principle of game theory and the corresponding optimi- zations. Compared to traditional algorithms, the proposed one could converge to an NE in 3-5 iterative operations by setting an appropriate pricing factor. Finally, simulation results ver- ified the stability and superiority of the novel algorithm in flat-fading channel environments.
基金supported in part by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant 2016QY01W0204in part by Key Industrial Innovation Chain in Industrial Domain under Grant 2016KTZDGY-02in part by National High-Level TalentsSpecial Support Program of China under Grant CS31117200001
文摘In cognitive radio networks(CRNs), through recruiting secondary user(SU) as friendly jammer, the secrecy rate obtained by primary user(PU) can be improved. Previous work only considered a simple scenario with a single PU in their frameworks. In this paper, we will consider a more complicated scenario with multiple PUs and try to investigate the cooperative jamming between multiple PUs and a single SU. When there are multiple PUs in CRN, in order to obtain more spectrum for data transmission, SU will cooperate with multiple PUs at the same time. Considering that both PU and SU are rational and selfish individuals, the interaction between PUs and SU is formulated as a multi-leaders and single-follower Stackelberg game, wherein PU is the leader and SU is the follower. And the Stackelberg Equilibrium(SE) is considered as the final decisions accepted by all PUs and SU. Furthermore, we also prove that when a specific condition is satisfied, the existence of SE can be guaranteed. And a Gauss-Jacobi iterative algorithm is proposed to compute a SE. Finally, simulation results are given to verify the performance and demonstrate that both of the PUs' secrecy rate and the SU's transmission rate can be improved through cooperation.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61771126)
文摘In order to solve the Byzantine attack problem in cooperative spectrum sensing,a non-cooperative game-theory approach is proposed to realize an effective Byzantine defense.First,under the framework of the proposed non-cooperative game theory,the pure Byzantine attack strategy and defense strategy in cooperative spectrum sensing are analyzed from the perspective of the Byzantine attacker and network administrator.The cost and benefit of the pure strategy on both sides are defined. Secondly,the mixed attack and defense strategy are also derived. The closed form Nash equilibrium is obtained by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Furthermore,the impact of the benefit ratio and penalty rate on the dynamic process of the noncooperative game is analyzed. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed game-theory approach can effectively defend against the Byzantine attack and save the defensive cost.
文摘This paper is built on the study of one key blog-Wang Xiaofeng's No Guess (2006-2011) to explore how a Chinese intellectual uses his satirical skills in the blogosphere, how his blog reshapes the form of political culture, and how the blogosphere through such interventions proceeds in the development of political communications in China. Two key issues are addressed in the paper. Firstly, drawing on the concept of "blogging culture", the author argues that blogging has potentially reconfigured political information around people's everyday lives, offering alternative modes of "public talk". The case of Wang Xiaofeng shows that satire can be used to make fun of the state, policies, and established ideologies, improving a previously restricted communicative environment toward more open. Secondly, the rise in the value placed on individualism in China, and the rise of peer-to-peer media mean that bloggers who pursue self-expression simultaneously through such self-expression. In other words, Wang Xiaofeng's No Guess blog demonstrates that individual opinions across the blogosphere have implicitly challenged political discourse; however, they always have to struggle with an ongoing censorship, negotiate an unstable discursive space and thus, can only enjoy a limited success.
基金supported by National High-Tech R&D Program(863 Program 2014AA01A707, 2015AA01A705 )
文摘Hidden terminal problem in spectrum sensing is one of the most challenging problems in cognitive radio network(CRN).To tackle this problem,we propose a novel Cooperative Interference Game scheme in this paper.The scheme adopted full duplex(FD)mode to sense over multiple sub-bands in an iterative manner without extra sensing devices.The implementation algorithm of the proposed scheme is consisted of three modules:the formulation of the maximum transmit power limitation of second user(SU);the self-interference cancellation coefficient;and the optimal location of SU for an optimized low collision probability.Monte Carlo simulation proved that compared with cooperative spectrum sensing,the proposed scheme significantly improves the performance of spectrum detection and mitigates hidden terminal problem to a large extent with less energy consumption.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.61425008,61333004 and 61273054)Top-Notch Young Talents Program of China,and Aeronautical Foundation of China(Grant No.20135851042)
文摘As one of the major contributions of biology to competitive decision making, evolutionary game theory provides a useful tool for studying the evolution of cooperation. To achieve the optimal solution for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are car- rying out a sensing task, this paper presents a Markov decision evolutionary game (MDEG) based learning algorithm. Each in- dividual in the algorithm follows a Markov decision strategy to maximize its payoff against the well known Tit-for-Tat strate- gy. Simulation results demonstrate that the MDEG theory based approach effectively improves the collective payoff of the roam. The proposed algorithm can not only obtain the best action sequence but also a sub-optimal Markov policy that is inde- pendent of the game duration. Furthermore, the paper also studies the emergence of cooperation in the evolution of self-regarded UAVs. The results show that it is the adaptive ability of the MDEG based approach as well as the perfect balance between revenge and forgiveness of the Tit-for-Tat strategy that the emergence of cooperation should be attributed to.