The aim of this paper is to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. When players agree on the need to collaborate but are in c...The aim of this paper is to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. When players agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one player must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such circumstances, the players do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. However, this study shows that this belief is not always true if the players were able to revise the outcome of their negotiations later. The wide-ranging fields use game theories for their analysis frameworks to analyze the success or failure of coordination. However, comparing with the possibility of betrayal illustrated as a well-known Prisoner Dilemma, it has been rare to discuss conflict regarding the specific method of coordination, although such situations are often observed in today＇s interdependent real world. The repeated Battle of the Sexes games presented in this study would be a useful framework to analyze conflict regarding the specific method of coordination.展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
文摘The aim of this paper is to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in coordination where players agree in general but disagree on coordination methods. When players agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one player must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such circumstances, the players do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. However, this study shows that this belief is not always true if the players were able to revise the outcome of their negotiations later. The wide-ranging fields use game theories for their analysis frameworks to analyze the success or failure of coordination. However, comparing with the possibility of betrayal illustrated as a well-known Prisoner Dilemma, it has been rare to discuss conflict regarding the specific method of coordination, although such situations are often observed in today＇s interdependent real world. The repeated Battle of the Sexes games presented in this study would be a useful framework to analyze conflict regarding the specific method of coordination.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
