Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to de...Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.展开更多
Considering the dynamic character of repeated games and Markov process, this paper presented a novel dynamic decision model for symmetric repeated games. In this model, players＇ actions were mapped to a Markov decisi...Considering the dynamic character of repeated games and Markov process, this paper presented a novel dynamic decision model for symmetric repeated games. In this model, players＇ actions were mapped to a Markov decision process with payoffs, and the Boltzmann distribution was intousluced. Our dynamic model is different from others＇ , we used this dynamic model to study the iterated prisoner＇ s dilemma, and the results show that this decision model can successfully be used in symmetric repeated games and has an ability of adaptive learning.展开更多
As one of the major contributions of biology to competitive decision making, evolutionary game theory provides a useful tool for studying the evolution of cooperation. To achieve the optimal solution for unmanned aeri...As one of the major contributions of biology to competitive decision making, evolutionary game theory provides a useful tool for studying the evolution of cooperation. To achieve the optimal solution for unmanned aerial vehicles （UAVs） that are car- rying out a sensing task, this paper presents a Markov decision evolutionary game （MDEG） based learning algorithm. Each in- dividual in the algorithm follows a Markov decision strategy to maximize its payoff against the well known Tit-for-Tat strate- gy. Simulation results demonstrate that the MDEG theory based approach effectively improves the collective payoff of the roam. The proposed algorithm can not only obtain the best action sequence but also a sub-optimal Markov policy that is inde- pendent of the game duration. Furthermore, the paper also studies the emergence of cooperation in the evolution of self-regarded UAVs. The results show that it is the adaptive ability of the MDEG based approach as well as the perfect balance between revenge and forgiveness of the Tit-for-Tat strategy that the emergence of cooperation should be attributed to.展开更多
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71071119 and 60574071
文摘Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
基金We also acknowledge the support by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 60574071）.
文摘Considering the dynamic character of repeated games and Markov process, this paper presented a novel dynamic decision model for symmetric repeated games. In this model, players＇ actions were mapped to a Markov decision process with payoffs, and the Boltzmann distribution was intousluced. Our dynamic model is different from others＇ , we used this dynamic model to study the iterated prisoner＇ s dilemma, and the results show that this decision model can successfully be used in symmetric repeated games and has an ability of adaptive learning.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.61425008,61333004 and 61273054)Top-Notch Young Talents Program of China,and Aeronautical Foundation of China(Grant No.20135851042)
文摘As one of the major contributions of biology to competitive decision making, evolutionary game theory provides a useful tool for studying the evolution of cooperation. To achieve the optimal solution for unmanned aerial vehicles （UAVs） that are car- rying out a sensing task, this paper presents a Markov decision evolutionary game （MDEG） based learning algorithm. Each in- dividual in the algorithm follows a Markov decision strategy to maximize its payoff against the well known Tit-for-Tat strate- gy. Simulation results demonstrate that the MDEG theory based approach effectively improves the collective payoff of the roam. The proposed algorithm can not only obtain the best action sequence but also a sub-optimal Markov policy that is inde- pendent of the game duration. Furthermore, the paper also studies the emergence of cooperation in the evolution of self-regarded UAVs. The results show that it is the adaptive ability of the MDEG based approach as well as the perfect balance between revenge and forgiveness of the Tit-for-Tat strategy that the emergence of cooperation should be attributed to.
