In this paper, I critically challenge the ability of legal reforms to recognize and integrate the way in which a rape victim sees rape. Current limitations to the law are mainly due to the accepted patriarchal view on...In this paper, I critically challenge the ability of legal reforms to recognize and integrate the way in which a rape victim sees rape. Current limitations to the law are mainly due to the accepted patriarchal view on law as a form of objective and rational knowledge, outside which there are only impracticable and irrational views. I investigate the case of marriage jurisprudence in the UK, as a prominent example, because it has long accepted marital rape as objectively and rationally part of a wife＇s duty. Even though changes have occurred which improve the marital rape jurisdiction and prejudicial disbelief concerning a woman＇s private life is still used in the courts to question the credibility of the victim. Over the past year, extensive efforts have been made to reform the management of rape cases. Whilst there is a need to acknowledge the seriousness of the accusation with rigorous legal principles which provide appropriate safeguards for the accused person as well as the complainant, especially bearing in mind the often ＂private＂ circumstances, with a concomitant lack of witnesses, it remains the case that the rate of attribution in attempts to secure successful prosecutions in rape case remains overwhelming. I show how a Wittgensteinian approach to law would take into consideration the shape ofgendered lives as they are experienced, and hence would not accept just one legal interpretation of marital law. The phenomenon of＂seeing-as＂ in Wittgenstein＇s philosophy can support the experience of being jolted into appreciating the feminist aspect of consent in marital sexual relationships.展开更多
文摘In this paper, I critically challenge the ability of legal reforms to recognize and integrate the way in which a rape victim sees rape. Current limitations to the law are mainly due to the accepted patriarchal view on law as a form of objective and rational knowledge, outside which there are only impracticable and irrational views. I investigate the case of marriage jurisprudence in the UK, as a prominent example, because it has long accepted marital rape as objectively and rationally part of a wife＇s duty. Even though changes have occurred which improve the marital rape jurisdiction and prejudicial disbelief concerning a woman＇s private life is still used in the courts to question the credibility of the victim. Over the past year, extensive efforts have been made to reform the management of rape cases. Whilst there is a need to acknowledge the seriousness of the accusation with rigorous legal principles which provide appropriate safeguards for the accused person as well as the complainant, especially bearing in mind the often ＂private＂ circumstances, with a concomitant lack of witnesses, it remains the case that the rate of attribution in attempts to secure successful prosecutions in rape case remains overwhelming. I show how a Wittgensteinian approach to law would take into consideration the shape ofgendered lives as they are experienced, and hence would not accept just one legal interpretation of marital law. The phenomenon of＂seeing-as＂ in Wittgenstein＇s philosophy can support the experience of being jolted into appreciating the feminist aspect of consent in marital sexual relationships.
