In order to evaluate the impact of green production introduced by the manufacturer and study the competitive strategy between two retailers,four strategic models among diverse retailers,i.e.,Cournot,Stackelberg and tw...In order to evaluate the impact of green production introduced by the manufacturer and study the competitive strategy between two retailers,four strategic models among diverse retailers,i.e.,Cournot,Stackelberg and two cases of collusion,are constructed.The optimal decision is obtained by the game theory and numerical analysis.The results indicate that the manufacturer's marginal profitability is no less than that of the two retailers.However,due to the manufacturer's green cost,the downstream profitability of the supply chain may exceed the upstream manufacturer's profitability.The retailers'Cournot behavior causes the manufacturer to acquire the highest profitability and set the highest green level.However,there is an opposite result in collusion.Two retailers will choose Cournot pricing when the consumer's green sensitivity is higher than a threshold.When consumers are more sensitive to the price difference of products,retailers prefer collusion,and then choose the Stackelberg behavior.Manufacturers'profitability will increase as competition among retailers intensifies.Proper competition allows two duopolistic retailers to acquire a higher profitability.展开更多
Considering the existence of the secondhand market and the implementation of trade-in program,the competition models between two manufacturers who produce the same products at various qualities are developed by the Na...Considering the existence of the secondhand market and the implementation of trade-in program,the competition models between two manufacturers who produce the same products at various qualities are developed by the Nash game,and the impacts of the trade-in program from the perspectives of the demands,profits,marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are investigated.It finds that the trade-in program has different impacts when it is implemented by different manufacturers.When the low-quality manufacturer implements the program,it is always beneficial to himself and consumers but harmful to the high-quality manufacturer.However,when the program is implemented by the high-quality manufacturer,it can be beneficial to the low-quality manufacturer as well as to the implementer but harmful to consumers if the transaction cost of the consumer selling the used product in the secondhand market is low enough.Furthermore,with the increase in transaction cost,it also becomes harmful to the low-quality manufacturer and beneficial to consumers,which is the same as in the case that the low-quality manufacturer implements the trade-in program.The impacts of related parameters on the demands,marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are also analyzed.展开更多
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.51875332)the Capacity Building Projects of Some Local Universities of Shanghai Science and Technology Commission(No.18040501600).
文摘In order to evaluate the impact of green production introduced by the manufacturer and study the competitive strategy between two retailers,four strategic models among diverse retailers,i.e.,Cournot,Stackelberg and two cases of collusion,are constructed.The optimal decision is obtained by the game theory and numerical analysis.The results indicate that the manufacturer's marginal profitability is no less than that of the two retailers.However,due to the manufacturer's green cost,the downstream profitability of the supply chain may exceed the upstream manufacturer's profitability.The retailers'Cournot behavior causes the manufacturer to acquire the highest profitability and set the highest green level.However,there is an opposite result in collusion.Two retailers will choose Cournot pricing when the consumer's green sensitivity is higher than a threshold.When consumers are more sensitive to the price difference of products,retailers prefer collusion,and then choose the Stackelberg behavior.Manufacturers'profitability will increase as competition among retailers intensifies.Proper competition allows two duopolistic retailers to acquire a higher profitability.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71871058,71531010)
文摘Considering the existence of the secondhand market and the implementation of trade-in program,the competition models between two manufacturers who produce the same products at various qualities are developed by the Nash game,and the impacts of the trade-in program from the perspectives of the demands,profits,marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are investigated.It finds that the trade-in program has different impacts when it is implemented by different manufacturers.When the low-quality manufacturer implements the program,it is always beneficial to himself and consumers but harmful to the high-quality manufacturer.However,when the program is implemented by the high-quality manufacturer,it can be beneficial to the low-quality manufacturer as well as to the implementer but harmful to consumers if the transaction cost of the consumer selling the used product in the secondhand market is low enough.Furthermore,with the increase in transaction cost,it also becomes harmful to the low-quality manufacturer and beneficial to consumers,which is the same as in the case that the low-quality manufacturer implements the trade-in program.The impacts of related parameters on the demands,marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are also analyzed.
