环境税条件下项目可进入与退出期权博弈分析

环境税是解决当前日趋严重的环境与经济发展冲突问题的有效手段之一,研究其如何影响投资者进入与退出项目的竞争策略是更好地制定环境税收政策的前提。与现有文献不同,本文应用期权博弈理论,构建煤电项目双寡头期权博弈模型,分进入和退出两种情况分析项目最优转换策略,并且定量分析环境税税率对最优转换临界值的影响。结果表明:环境税税率与最优转换临界值呈正比关系,即环境税率越低,项目越容易进入,并且更加难以退出;当存在竞争威胁时,投资者会加速进入与退出项目,当环境税强度逐渐变大时,将超过项目相互竞争的影响并起主要作用;在进入情况时存在等待、抢先进入和同时进入均衡,在退出情况时存在不退出、抢先退出和同时退出均衡,最后,分别给出各个均衡条件下环境税政策及影响,为政府制定环境税政策提供一种分析思路。

产业生产过剩在竞争结构中的演变及其分析

产业生产过剩与市场的竞争结构有着很强的联系,市场的可进入性和可退出性是维系市场竞争结构的两大基石。我国目前有明显的生产过剩表现,要改善这种状况,需要完善我国市场的进入和退出机制,调整市场的竞争结构。

可进入与退出的不对称双寡头投资博弈模型

次贷危机告诫人们,对于项目整个生命周期过程,投资商拥有退出项目权利具有重要意义。针对已有双寡头博弈模型文献中未考虑退出情况的不足,假定项目的投资与经营成本不对称,提出了更具现实意义的可退出的不对称双寡头投资博弈模型,给出了不同情况下两投资商的进入与退出最优转换策略,最后结合案例进行计算得出最优转换点数值解,分析了经营成本、价格波动率、垄断优势水平和退出成本因素对前者的影响。

A mixed stochastic user equilibrium model considering influence of advanced traveller information systems in degradable transport network

Advanced traveler information systems （ATIS） can not only improve drivers＇ accessibility to the more accurate route travel time information, but also can improve drivers＇ adaptability to the stochastic network capacity degradations. In this paper, a mixed stochastic user equilibrium model was proposed to describe the interactive route choice behaviors between ATIS equipped and unequipped drivers on a degradable transport network. In the proposed model the information accessibility of equipped drivers was reflected by lower degree of uncertainty in their stochastic equilibrium flow distributions, and their behavioral adaptability was captured by multiple equilibrium behaviors over the stochastic network state set. The mixed equilibrium model was formulated as a fixed point problem defined in the mixed route flows, and its solution was achieved by executing an iterative algorithm. Numerical experiments were provided to verify the properties of the mixed network equilibrium model and the efficiency of the iterative algorithm.