The goal of the study was the development of a system to monitor the members of supervisory and management boards. The system currently covers 8,454 joint stock companies registered in Poland. The main purpose of the ...The goal of the study was the development of a system to monitor the members of supervisory and management boards. The system currently covers 8,454 joint stock companies registered in Poland. The main purpose of the system is to monitor every change in the composition of every board of every joint stock company, from March 2001 up to the present, and it is updated every month. This system, however, also enables us to confirm some of the theories from the field of corporate governance. A generation change has been identified in the boards of the joint stock companies which were examined. Women constitute a large, and continuously increasing, section of the board members. The number of family companies, and of family involvement in boards, is still increasing. Board members of financial institutions （and not just of banks） possess significantly more directorates than board members of non-financial institutions. The number of interlocking directorates is positively linked to the macroeconomic development indicator of the total investment as percentage of GDP for Poland.展开更多
This research is based on previous theory research of corporate governance from the internal mechanisms, ownership structure and board structure, and researched how these three aspects affect earnings management.
China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the A...China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the Anglo-American model since 2002. This paper aims to reveal the effectiveness of SBs in coordination with ACs in China. The regulations for Anglo-American and Chinese systems are compared and further evidence is provided through interviewing two governors of all listed companies in the SSE and of 79 investment corporations in Hangzhou. Both statements indicate that China still faces difficulties and problems in meeting the two indexes of independence and expertise of supervision to give effective supervisory functions. Both opinions differed in terms of the co-ordination of SBs and ACs in the future. The evidence presented forms a basis for proposals of how key characteristics of effectiveness and co-ordination can be improved to make supervisory functions in China more effective.展开更多
文摘The goal of the study was the development of a system to monitor the members of supervisory and management boards. The system currently covers 8,454 joint stock companies registered in Poland. The main purpose of the system is to monitor every change in the composition of every board of every joint stock company, from March 2001 up to the present, and it is updated every month. This system, however, also enables us to confirm some of the theories from the field of corporate governance. A generation change has been identified in the boards of the joint stock companies which were examined. Women constitute a large, and continuously increasing, section of the board members. The number of family companies, and of family involvement in boards, is still increasing. Board members of financial institutions （and not just of banks） possess significantly more directorates than board members of non-financial institutions. The number of interlocking directorates is positively linked to the macroeconomic development indicator of the total investment as percentage of GDP for Poland.
文摘This research is based on previous theory research of corporate governance from the internal mechanisms, ownership structure and board structure, and researched how these three aspects affect earnings management.
文摘China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the Anglo-American model since 2002. This paper aims to reveal the effectiveness of SBs in coordination with ACs in China. The regulations for Anglo-American and Chinese systems are compared and further evidence is provided through interviewing two governors of all listed companies in the SSE and of 79 investment corporations in Hangzhou. Both statements indicate that China still faces difficulties and problems in meeting the two indexes of independence and expertise of supervision to give effective supervisory functions. Both opinions differed in terms of the co-ordination of SBs and ACs in the future. The evidence presented forms a basis for proposals of how key characteristics of effectiveness and co-ordination can be improved to make supervisory functions in China more effective.
