We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate ...We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.展开更多
Climate protection is a problem of sustaining a public resource. All countries of the world should take action to deal with climate change. However, such an action is actually a game process where each country chooses...Climate protection is a problem of sustaining a public resource. All countries of the world should take action to deal with climate change. However, such an action is actually a game process where each country chooses to cooperate or defect under constrained condition. Here we study the group behavior of countries in dealing with climate change. In our study, the countries of the world are considered as players who are distributed on an assumed spatial network. A new evolution rule is proposed to model the game process among the players. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that under constrained condition, the local psychology of players possibly results in the formation of local group. Some local and global oscillations can be found where part or all of the players change their choices periodically.展开更多
基金Supported by National Nature Science Foundation under Grant No.60904063the Tianjin municipal Natural Science Foundation under Grant Nos.11JCYBJC06600,11ZCKF6X00900,11ZCKFGX00900
文摘We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.
基金Supported by the State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety under Grant Nos.RCS2008ZZ001 and RCS2010ZZ001,Beijing Jiaotong University
文摘Climate protection is a problem of sustaining a public resource. All countries of the world should take action to deal with climate change. However, such an action is actually a game process where each country chooses to cooperate or defect under constrained condition. Here we study the group behavior of countries in dealing with climate change. In our study, the countries of the world are considered as players who are distributed on an assumed spatial network. A new evolution rule is proposed to model the game process among the players. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that under constrained condition, the local psychology of players possibly results in the formation of local group. Some local and global oscillations can be found where part or all of the players change their choices periodically.
