In this work, we consider an evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a homogeneous random network with the richest-following strategy adoption rule. By constructing homogeneous random networks from a regular ring gra...In this work, we consider an evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a homogeneous random network with the richest-following strategy adoption rule. By constructing homogeneous random networks from a regular ring graph, we investigate the effects of topologicaJ randomness on cooperation. In contrast to the ordinary view that the presence of smaJ1 amount of shortcuts in ring graphs favors cooperation, we find the cooperation inhibition by weak topological randomness. The explanations on the observations are presented.展开更多
基金Supported by the Project of NECT-07-0112 the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 10775022 and 90921015
文摘In this work, we consider an evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on a homogeneous random network with the richest-following strategy adoption rule. By constructing homogeneous random networks from a regular ring graph, we investigate the effects of topologicaJ randomness on cooperation. In contrast to the ordinary view that the presence of smaJ1 amount of shortcuts in ring graphs favors cooperation, we find the cooperation inhibition by weak topological randomness. The explanations on the observations are presented.
