Enhanced Power Allocation Scheme in Ultra-Dense Small Cell Network

A feasible design of ultra-dense Small cell network involves an effective solution to the interference coordination especially in cell edge. In this paper, we propose a channel state and interference aware power allocation scheme(PAG) as an enhanced solution to improve the system performance, especially for the cell-edge users. Cournot model in Non-cooperative game is employed for power adjustment in Small cell clusters to increase cell-edge users' throughput by considering the power limitation and interference coordination. Additionally, we take iterative Water Filling scheme as a comparison to clarify that the PAG scheme has struck a favorable balance between system efficiency and fairness. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme contributes to the enhancement of edge users' throughput and cells' coverage. Moreover, the scheme is observed to show a stronger adaptability in denser Small cell networks.

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

Study on Development Process and Mechanism of Ecological Compensation in Beijing and Hebei Province

The problem of water resources has become a bottleneck for the sustainable development of Beijing and Hebei Province (the two regions together are called "Jingji Region" for short).It is imperative to establish an effective and equitable water resources ecological compensation (eco-compensation) mechanism.The three stages of water resources eco-compensation are expatiated here namely the eco-compensation missing stage,ecocompensation start stage and the eco-compensation development stage.Through the establishment of eco-compensation game model based on the game theory,the reasons of the formation for the three stages were analyzed,as well as the conversion conditions from non-cooperative game to cooperative game among the related stakeholders including the central government,the water recipient government and the water source government.Furthermore,this study pointed out that the water resources eco-compensation in Jingji Region was not established based on the institution,but formed and developed in coping with the challenges of water crisis.However,institution construction is quite essential in game process for the water recipient government and the water source government.Finally recommendations in four areas including legalization of eco-compensation mechanism,setting up compensation standards,leading industrial upgrading and developing related incentives and constraints were concluded.

Decoherence Effects on Multiplayer Cooperative Quantum Games

We study the behavior of cooperative multiplayer quantum games [Q. Chen, Y. Wang, J.T. Liu, and K.L. Wang, Phys. Lett. A 327 （2004） 98; A.P. Flitney and L.C.L. Hollenberg, Quantum Inf. Comput. 7 （2007） 111] in the presence of decoherence using different quantum channels such as amplitude damping, depolarizing and phase damping. It is seen that the outcomes of the games for the two damping channels with maximum values of decoherence reduce to same value. However, in comparison to phase damping channel, the payoffs of cooperators are strongly damped under the influence amplitude damping channel for the lower values of decoherence parameter. In the case of depolarizing channel, the game is a no-payoff game irrespective of the degree of entanglement in the initial state for the larger values of decoherence parameter. The deeoherenee gets the cooperators worse off.

The Power of Social Capital in Massive Multiplayer Online Games＂ Cooperation and Cronyism in World of Warcraft

The number of people playing Massive Multiplayer Online Games （MMOGs） is growing steadily, yet there are limited studies on the social impact that this online activity has. This research, using both quantitative and qualitative data, focused on whether users of the most popular MMOG, World of Warcraft （WOW）, exhibited behaviors of social capital in their online gaming activity and whether there was any correlation to offiine social capital. The findings indicated that cooperation provided the best indicator to make a correlation about a gamer＇s offiine social capital behaviors. One conclusion, stemming from this is that, in virtual worlds, the added social capital can lead to cronyism and help those in power maintain the status quo.

The Intensification of Sino-African Economic Cooperation： What Is the Role of the Congolese Economy in the Game of Equality and Mutual Benefit？

The main goal of this paper is to examine the economic relations of the Republic of Congo in its bilateral cooperation with China and to see its real implications in the Congolese economy. In other words, this paper is going to highlight the real status of the Republic of Congo in the recent intensification of cooperation with the Middle Kingdom. Indeed, China has always been criticized as a predator of African raw materials by its opponents （traditional partners of Africa）. Thus, in the Congolese context, the authors try to analyze and see whether this cooperation has corroborated that anti-thesis or not. After examining various facets of Chinese interventions in Congo, the authors conclude that： The cooperation between these two countries is a kind of cooperation for the modernization and industrialization of the Congo, which is now developing in a satisfactory way. It brings real benefits to people of both countries, and it is also welcomed by both of them. Congo and China are bound by a traditional friendship, they have cooperated with each other since 1964, and both countries must be determined to further strengthen this cooperation to achieve a common development. It should also be noted that China is first and foremost a strategic partner of development for the Congo because of the positive results recorded by its actions in different areas of its operations in that country. The authors have also noted some pitfalls and have made some suggestions accordingly, in order to enhance the performance of cooperation between the two countries. It is particularly in terms of the transfer of technology, compliance with the regulations in force in Congo by Chinese enterprises, the adjustments made by China concerning the training of Congolese students who receive scholarships from the Chinese government for their training in China and on Chinese language, and finally the area of diversification of production, it is worth pointing out that the Congo only exports its main raw materials to China, such as oil and wood, and moreover, those materials are exported in the raw state, thus reducing the incentives of diversification of its domestic production. The data used in this article cover the periods from 1995 to 2005, which are inadequate for this work, given the momentum taken by the development of cooperation between the two countries. Then, for future researchers, they have to refine the work concerning the next state of Sino-African cooperation.

Increasing Civics Learning Achievement by Applying Cooperative Learning： Team Game Tournament Method

The most important goal in civics education is to ensure that each citizen has a good understanding of ethics and moral behavior, and thus stresses the constant link between knowledge and practice. In this context, to increase understanding of civics education for being able to create the best generation and condition in the future life, study on this issue is becoming a very crucial manner. In general, methods like discussion and dialogue are used to allow students to express themselves. However, cooperative learning in particular addresses many of the needs and concerns facing by educational systems and Team Game Tournament （TGT） method is one of the preferable methods of cooperative learning. This study was aiming to increase civics learning achievements by using cooperative learning based on TGT method on secondary school students of Jatisari of Indonesia. The action research procedure was also used so as to be able to evaluate the influent, impact, and result of TGT. Accordingly, cooperative learning with TGT method has successfully given positive contribution to increasing student learning civics achievement.

全面抗战时期的北京演剧(1937—1945)——海派风靡及京朝派旧剧的回应

20世纪30年代,京剧名角挑班制的弊端逐步显现,戏曲艺人纷纷自立门户组班演出,剧团脚色体制不健全、班多园少的问题随之而来;在激烈的演剧市场中,以彩头戏、布景戏为代表的海派戏剧在北京剧坛兴起,并在抗战时期达到顶峰。彩头戏的风靡代表了市场的选择和观众审美趣味的变迁,对于北京剧坛的活跃起到了一定的积极作用,但也由此导致“纯粹旧剧”演出的受阻。戏曲演员一改名角挑班为群角合作演出,努力为京朝派旧剧寻求市场突破,同时积极地培养演剧人才、排演老戏,试图把戏曲艺术拉回到以唱念做打为核心的评价机制中。

Evolution of Cooperation in Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma Games on Barabasi-Albert Networks with Degree-Dependent Guilt Mechanism

This paper studies the continuous prisoner's dilemma games (CPDG) on Barabasi-Albert (BA) networks.In the model,each agent on a vertex of the networks makes an investment and interacts with all of his neighboring agents.Making an investment is costly,but which benefits its neighboring agents,where benefit and cost depend on the level of investment made.The payoff of each agent is given by the sum of payoffs it receives in its interactions with all its neighbors.Not only payoff,individual's guilty emotion in the games has also been considered.The negative guilty emotion produced in comparing with its neighbors can reduce the utility of individuals directly.We assume that the reduction amount depends on the individual's degree and a baseline level parameter.The group's cooperative level is characterized by the average investment of the population.Each player makes his investment in the next step based on a convex combination of the investment of his best neighbors in the last step,his best history strategies in the latest steps which number is controlled by a memory length parameter,and a uniformly distributed random number.Simulation results show that this degree-dependent guilt mechanism can promote the evolution of cooperation dramatically comparing with degree-independent guilt or no guilt cases.Imitation,memory,uncertainty coefficients and network structure also play determinant roles in the cooperation level of the population.All our results may shed some new light on studying the evolution of cooperation based on network reciprocity mechanisms.

A survey of static and dynamic potential games

Potential games are noncooperative games for which there exist auxiliary functions, called potentials,such that the maximizers of the potential are also Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. Some properties of Nash equilibria, such as existence or stability, can be derived from the potential, whenever it exists. We survey different classes of potential games in the static and dynamic cases, with a finite number of players, as well as in population games where a continuum of players is allowed. Likewise, theoretical concepts and applications are discussed by means of illustrative examples.

Evolution of Cooperation in Evolutionary Games for Heterogeneous Interactions

When a population structure is modelled as a square lattice,the cooperation may be improved for an evolutionary prisoner dilemma game or be inhibited for an evolutionary snowdrift game.In this work,we investigate cooperation in a population on a square lattice where the interaction among players contains both prisoner dilemma game and snowdrift game.The heterogeneity in interaction is introduced to the population in two different ways:the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every player(HCP) or the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every link between any two players(HCL).The resonant enhancement of cooperation in the case of HCP is observed while the resonant inhibition of cooperation in the case of HCL is prominent.The explanations on the enhancement or inhibition of cooperation are presented for these two cases.