Many existing product family design methods assume a given platform, However, it is not an in-tuitive task to select the platform and unique variable within a product family. Meanwhile, most approaches are single-plat...Many existing product family design methods assume a given platform, However, it is not an in-tuitive task to select the platform and unique variable within a product family. Meanwhile, most approaches are single-platform methods, in which design variables are either shared across all product variants or not at all. While in multiple-platform design, platform variables can have special value with regard to a subset of product variants within the product family, and offer opportunities for superior overall design. An information theoretical approach incorporating fuzzy clustering and Shannon's entropy was proposed for platform variables selection in multiple-platform product family. A 2-level chromosome genetic algorithm (2LCGA) was proposed and developed for optimizing the corresponding product family in a single stage, simultaneously determining the optimal settings for the product platform and unique variables. The single-stage approach can yield im-provements in the overall performance of the product family compared with two-stage approaches, in which the first stage involves determining the best settings for the platform and values of unique variables are found for each product in the second stage. An example of design of a family of universal motors was used to verify the proposed method.展开更多
This paper investigates empirically the effect of different types of product market competition on levels of voluntary disclosure of proprietary information in financial markets. The author proposes that there are two...This paper investigates empirically the effect of different types of product market competition on levels of voluntary disclosure of proprietary information in financial markets. The author proposes that there are two types of strategic interaction settings relevant to disclosure： capacity competition and price competition. Capacity competition drives firms to disclose more information to attain financial market valuation-related benefits, while price competition drives them to disclose less to protect long-term product market advantages. The author finds that the type of product market competition affects the level of voluntary disclosure over and above the finn＇s external financing needs documented in the previous literature. That is, firms engaged in capacity competition disclose relatively more information than those in price competition. Further analysis shows that capacity competition firms disclose more information than no-strategic-interaction benchmark firms but that price competition firms do not disclose less information than the benchmark firms.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Founda-tion of China (No. 70471022)Joint Research Scheme ofthe National Natural Science Foundation of China andthe Hong Kong Research Grant Council (No. 70418013)
文摘Many existing product family design methods assume a given platform, However, it is not an in-tuitive task to select the platform and unique variable within a product family. Meanwhile, most approaches are single-platform methods, in which design variables are either shared across all product variants or not at all. While in multiple-platform design, platform variables can have special value with regard to a subset of product variants within the product family, and offer opportunities for superior overall design. An information theoretical approach incorporating fuzzy clustering and Shannon's entropy was proposed for platform variables selection in multiple-platform product family. A 2-level chromosome genetic algorithm (2LCGA) was proposed and developed for optimizing the corresponding product family in a single stage, simultaneously determining the optimal settings for the product platform and unique variables. The single-stage approach can yield im-provements in the overall performance of the product family compared with two-stage approaches, in which the first stage involves determining the best settings for the platform and values of unique variables are found for each product in the second stage. An example of design of a family of universal motors was used to verify the proposed method.
文摘This paper investigates empirically the effect of different types of product market competition on levels of voluntary disclosure of proprietary information in financial markets. The author proposes that there are two types of strategic interaction settings relevant to disclosure： capacity competition and price competition. Capacity competition drives firms to disclose more information to attain financial market valuation-related benefits, while price competition drives them to disclose less to protect long-term product market advantages. The author finds that the type of product market competition affects the level of voluntary disclosure over and above the finn＇s external financing needs documented in the previous literature. That is, firms engaged in capacity competition disclose relatively more information than those in price competition. Further analysis shows that capacity competition firms disclose more information than no-strategic-interaction benchmark firms but that price competition firms do not disclose less information than the benchmark firms.
