There are two opposing views over the necessity of privatization for SOEs. While some believe that privatization is the only solution to SOE inefficiency, others contend that privatization will lead to serious loss of...There are two opposing views over the necessity of privatization for SOEs. While some believe that privatization is the only solution to SOE inefficiency, others contend that privatization will lead to serious loss of state assets without resolving the problem. This paper examined how performance evaluation system contributed to the innovation and profitability of central SOEs after the implementation of the revised Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises in 2009. Using this revision as a natural experiment, this paper conducted a difference-indifference analysis and discovered a significant improvement in the innovation of central SOEs after the implementation of the new policy as compared with private firms not affected by this system. Moreover, the revised performance evaluation system significantly improved the marginal contribution of innovation to corporate value. The above test result indicates that SOEs may become more efficient solely by altering executive incentives without privatization. In this sense, privatization may not be the only solution to SOE inefficiency. This paper offers theoretical insights on the controversies regarding SOE privatization and helps enrich relevant literature on corporate incentives and innovation.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.:71172205,71372126,71502161,71572133 and 71672134)the Humanities and Social Science Project of the Ministry of Education(Grant No.:15YJA630057)
文摘There are two opposing views over the necessity of privatization for SOEs. While some believe that privatization is the only solution to SOE inefficiency, others contend that privatization will lead to serious loss of state assets without resolving the problem. This paper examined how performance evaluation system contributed to the innovation and profitability of central SOEs after the implementation of the revised Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational Performance of Persons in Charge of Central Enterprises in 2009. Using this revision as a natural experiment, this paper conducted a difference-indifference analysis and discovered a significant improvement in the innovation of central SOEs after the implementation of the new policy as compared with private firms not affected by this system. Moreover, the revised performance evaluation system significantly improved the marginal contribution of innovation to corporate value. The above test result indicates that SOEs may become more efficient solely by altering executive incentives without privatization. In this sense, privatization may not be the only solution to SOE inefficiency. This paper offers theoretical insights on the controversies regarding SOE privatization and helps enrich relevant literature on corporate incentives and innovation.
