国企改革与“国有民营”机制的引入

在国企改革中,引入“民营”机制,使国有资产在产权不变的情况下,形成有效的激 励与约束机制,极大地提高了劳动生产率,使企业脱困并进入快速发展阶段。

STUDY OF REENGINEERING THE STOCK EQUITY STRUCTURE IN CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM

In this paper,it is first briefly described the basic situation and current policies of state owned enterprise reform in China.Then the major issues in the reform process are identified,the possible solutions in terms of reengineering stock equity structure and state share circulation are discussed,and finally some suggestions are made for the further state owned enterprise reform.Basing on the theory on the modern corporation system,relevant experiences of market economy nations and the practice of Chinese enterprise system reform.The approaches to determine the proportion of state share in the future corporations are proposed.Since the public ownership is not ideologically appropriate,the establishment of social security fund and mutual fund investment companies are suggested as new and acceptable pattern of public ownership.It is believed that these companies will be the major institutional shareholders in the future corporations.Their stock equity structure would mainly consist of institutional shareholders,which will be both consistent with international norms of modern corporations and with socialist public ownership with Chinese characteristics.

Research on Institutional Innovation of Non-public Forestry

This article analyzes the form and the mechanism of non-public forestry＇s institution obstacles by classical economies, institution economics＇, legal economics and economic theories of modern forestry. Regarding the proprietary institution as the core, and cost-income as the main clewf-it defines the concept and eategory, of non-public forestry subsidy and compensation. And oecorrling to the relased control and efficiency principle of market econonf-this paper establishes a set of institution that accords with the development of non-public forestry, offers both theoretical supports and decision- making references to remove institution obstacles of nan-public forestry, and coordinates the policies of non-public forestry with those of the public-owned forestry.

Tasks and Priorities for Comprehensively Deepening Reform of China’s State Sector of Economy

The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee ushered in a new chapter of China＇s comprehensive deepening of reform. The basic objective of comprehensively deepening reform of the state sector of economy in the new chapter is to fully integrate this sector with a sophisticated market economic system with the market playing the decisive role in resource allocation. In order to achieve this objective, China is confronted with the four major priorities of adjusting the functions and layout of the state sector of economy according to national mandates, expediting the mixed ownership reform, creating a classified and multi- tiered new system for the administration of the sector, and developing a modern corporate system for SOEs to ensure an efficient micro-level governance mechanism for the sector. （1） The functions of the different types of SOEs should be accurately defined and SOEs should be divided into the three types of public policy SOEs, functional SOEs, and commercial SOEs. This classification forms the premises for reforming the state sector of economy. Based on the functions of the three types of SOEs, the directions and emphases for strategic adjustment should differ as well. （2） The mixed ownership reform should adhere to the methodological principles of combining top-down and bottom-up approaches, implementing pilot programs, and promoting coordinated progress. Practical implementation should ensure fair and standard reform procedures, reform programs consistent with laws and regulations, open and fair equity transfers, as well as fair and transparent internal distributions. The mixed ownership reform of SOEs should introduce the employee stock ownership system and adhere to the principles of compatible incentives, shared growth, and long-term development. Monopolistic sectors should be transformed into competitive market structures to create conditions for the implementation of mixed ownership for SOEs. （3） The new system for the administration of the state sector of economy should comprise three hierarchies： the Commission for the Administration of State Economy at the top level, state capital operation companies or state capital investment companies at the intermediate level and general for-profit enterprises at the bottom level, which administer public policy, functional SOEs, and commercial SOEs respectively. （4） Under the new system for the administration of the state sector of economy characterized by the three hierarchies and categories, the key for perfecting the modern corporate system of SOEs is to establish a differentiated, classified governance mechanism, i.e., different corporate governance mechanisms should be created for SOEs of different functions and roles.

Chinese Corporate Organizations Since 1978: A Journey of Explorations

The market economic system is an economic system of corporate organizations. China＇s sustained and rapid economic development over the past four decades of reform and opening-up was supported by the emergence of its business community. During this period, China＇s corporate organizations increased, expanded and developed from strength to strength, serving as a solid micro-level basis for the prosperity of the socialist market economic system. Having achieved significant progress, China＇s corporate ownership restructuring led to the common development of enterprises with various forms of ownership. An institutional factor that undergirded corporate prosperity was China＇s choice of a corporate system characterized by the interplay between market competition and government administration. How China＇s corporate organizational system will evolve in the future is determined by（1） how efficiency varies among firms with different ownership systems, and（2） external institutional pressures facing firms in their rapid internationalization process.

Private Benefits of Politicians and Delayed Privatization

The aim of this paper is to consider the problem of politicians＇ control of state-owned enterprises in a transforming economy. The control of a company can be treated as a choice of a strategy pursued by this company. In order to present politicians＇ influence on a company＇s strategy, we consider the case of a firm controlled by the State Treasury （i.e., by politicians） and a company outside politicians＇ control, both functioning in a favorable and an unfavorable state of the economy. We propose the option-to-switch valuation model as a method of measuring politicians＇ private benefits of control. We illustrate the considerations using data concerning Poland＇s printing industry.

Rent-Seeking and Firm Performance: From the Perspective of the EightPoint Regulation and Government Subsidies

With the implementation of the CPC＇s eight-point regulation as a natural experiment platform, this paper seeks to unravel the causality between rent-seeking and firm performance for SOEs and private firms respectively. Our empirical research has found that after the release of the ＂eight-point regulation ＂, investors responded negatively to private frms and positively to SOEs. Such market response is more significant for firms with a high degree of rent-seeking. Further research has found that rent-seeking helps both SOEs and private firms receive more subsidies from the government. While government subsidy from rent-seeking is conducive to the performance of private firms, it is not the case for SOEs. This implies that rent-seeking activities serve as a ＂lubricant＇for private firms but have a ＂stumbling block＂ effect for SOEs.

Comparison of Earnings Power between State Commercial Banks and Stock Banks

As earnings power is one of the primary capacities for commercial banks, by analyzing several indexes on banks' operation performance, this article compared the earnings power between the state banks and the stock banks in China. Through the analysis, some problems of domestic banks may be found and pointed out that the commercial bank should stress on the target of profit maximum to avoid the financial risks. With enough earnings power, the domestic banks can take the challenge with those foreign banks entering domestic money market.

Family Ownership Type and the Intemational Involvement of SMEs： Empirical Study of Agency Theory in East Java Indonesia

This paper briefly draws the dimension of small, micro and medium enterprises＇ （SMEs） behavior in terms of internationalization strategy based on the ownership structure among SMEs in East Java. The finding is very interesting when there is no ownership structure variation, so the decision to choose international involvement could not be supported. Also, the scale determination is not becoming constraint of SMEs in East Java to involve internationally, especially thought export strategy. However, several aspects are considered to control the export behavioral dimension which is research and development （R＆D） and sales, significantly. The result shows that there still are other elements except ownership type could impact internationalization strategy choices of SMEs in East Java.

Reference of retirement system in developed country from the Chinese pension system constitutes

The Chinese government attaches great importance to the social security system, and makes it as an important pillar of socialist market economic system. Especially in the last decade, we seize the sustained, rapid and healthy development of the favorable opportunity of the construction of social security system; we have made unremitting efforts and achieved important progress. After years of exploration and practice, we have a clear basic principles of the social security system and the overall objectives and major tasks, we also established social pooling and individual accounts of the basic old-age insurance, basic medical insurance system, covering pension, medical, unemployment, work injury and maternity insurance, the urban minimum living security system and the framework of the social security system basically forms. The coverage of social insurance continuously expands social security funds which are through nmltiple channels to raise the initial formation mechanism forms, the level of protection continuously improves, and management and service system also gradually improves. The social security system＇ s reform and development plays a very important role in ensuring the basic livelihood of the people, the state-owned enterprise reform, and the smooth progress of economic restructuring.

A Study on the Compensation Gap among Executives at Chinese Enterprises

Based on data for 2005 to 2012, an analysis of the compensation gap between top executives at different Chinese listed companies reveals the following conclusions. （1） The large compensation gap existing among executives at listed Chinese companies--in some years even larger than that between rank-and-file employees--is mainly caused by the exorbitant executive compensation at a minority of companies. （2） Between 2005 and 2012, the compensation gap first widened dramatically and then diminished gradually. The leading factor in this fluctuation was the drastic rise and fall in the level of executive compensation at a handful of financial enterprises. The main reason for the narrowing of the compensation gap is central government regulation, which has helped to curb the excessive growth of executive compensation in society as a whole. （3） Even in the same round of fluctuation, state-owned listed companies differ markedly from non-state-owned listed companies in the way their executive compensation is decided. （4） State-owned listed companies＇ executive compensation strategies and their internal governance structure have not played their due role in moderating the overly rapid growth of their executives＇ compensation or in reducing the compensation gap.