治理结构视角下的基金合约优化设计

代理人道德风险问题是证券投资基金与身俱来的问题,固定的管理费模式根本不能对管理人形成有效的激励,为了遏制代理人的道德风险,国内外的学者对基金合约进行了一系列的研究,提出了固定管理费和业绩提成相结合的模式,再到持基激励模式,不断地把基金管理人的激励机制往前推进。本文在持基激励模式的基础上,将基金管理公司传统的股东-职业经理人式治理结构转化成优先股股东-普通股股东式治理结构,基金经理先承担风险,这一设计可以更加有效地解决基金管理运作过程中的管理人激励约束问题。

基金激励合约的经济学分析

基金投资者与基金管理者是一种委托代理关系。由于信息不对称,必须引入激励合约来最大限度地保证基金投资者利益的最大化。在最优激励合约中,管理人必须承担一定的风险。通过“标尺竞争”和引入监督机制可以提高激励强度,降低代理成本,增强激励的有效性。

Equity-Based Sukuk： Robust Performance of Musharakah and Mudharabah Contract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the robust performance of equity-based sukuk in Malaysia, that is, Musharakah and Mudharabah contract. Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions （AAOIFI）, as an international standard-setting organization for Islamic finance, raised an issue that 85% issuances of Musharakah and Mudharabah sukuk have breached the shariah rulings and do not comply with Islamic principles （AAOIFI, 2002）. Consequently, the performance of equity-based sukuk in Malaysia was affected. This study used a secondary data for size of issuances which are gathered from Bank Negara Malaysia （BNM）＇s Bond Info website and Securities Commission （SC） website. The performance of equity-based sukuk, either Musharakah or Mudarabah, is robust in the study year period of 2000-2012 as regards their sizes of issuances.