多博弈和参与多个区域经济合作组织的决策机理——以中国为例

在区域经济一体化的背景下,一个国家可能会参与多个区域性国际经济组织。这是面对多个相似博弈时如何选择的问题。参与一个经济组织的博弈分析是参与多个经济组织的多博弈分析的基础。如果一个国家参与国际经济组织所能使用的资源是有限的,在后来加入其他经济组织时要求会越来越高。如果使用的资源不受限制,其参与多个经济组织时的行动不会相互影响,且加入新的经济组织后,最大化总效用的条件不变。

个体与群体之间的一类博弈问题分析

分析个体与群体之间的一类博弈问题,构造一对多博弈模型。其同时具有Stackelberg模型、演化博弈模仿者动态模型的特点:在博弈的第一阶段,有限理性的群体参与者采取模仿者动态行为;在博弈的第二阶段,完全理性的个体参与者根据群体参与者的策略分布,确定自己的反应函数。博弈达到稳定状态后,群体参与者采取演化稳定策略,而个体参与者的风险占优策略将收敛于Nash均衡策略。讨论模型的一些性质:有限理性的群体在模仿过程中存在收益损失;老练的个体参与者存在欺骗行为;在个体参与者完全理性决策的带引下,可以解决多重Nash均衡的选择问题。

Zero-determinant strategies in iterated multi-strategy games

Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.

MULTIOBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION OF EIGHT-DOF VEHICLE SUSPENSION BASED ON GAME THEORY

A systematic and effective optimization is proposed for the design of a three-dimensional （3-D） vehicle suspension model with eight degrees of freedom （DOF）, including vertical seat motion, vehicle suspension, pitching and rolling motions, and vertical wheel motions using the evolutionary game theory. A new design of the passive suspension is aided by game theory to attain the best compromise between ride quality and suspension deflections. Extensive simulations are performed on three type road surface models A, B, C pavement grades based on the guidelines provided by ISO-2631 with the Matlab/Simulink environment. The preliminary results show that, when the passive suspension is optimized via the proposed approach, a substantial improvement in the vertical ride quality is obtained while keeping the suspension deflections within their allowable clearance when the vehicle moves at a constant velocity v=20 m/s, and the comfort performance of a suspension seat can be enhanced by 20%-30%.

MULTI-OBJECTIVE SHAPE DESIGN IN AERODYNAMICS USING GAME STRATEGY

Multi-objective optimization for the optimum shape design is introduced in aerodynamics using the Game theory. Based on the control theory, the employed optimizer and the negative feedback are used to implement the constraints. All the constraints are satisfied implicitly and automatically in the design. Furthermore,the above methodology is combined with a formulation derived from the Game theory to treat multi-point airfoil optimization. Airfoil shapes are optimized according to various aerodynamics criteria. In the symmetric Nash game, each “player” is responsible for one criterion, and the Nash equilibrium provides a solution to the multipoint optimization. Design results confirm the efficiency of the method.

Evolution trend analysis of urban residents’ low-carbon travel development based on multidimensional game theory

In the travel process of urban residents,travelers will take a series of activities such as imitation and exclusion by observing other people’s travel modes,which affects their following trips.This process can be seen as a repeated game between members of the travelers.Based on the analysis of this game and its evolution trend,a multi-dimensional game model of low-carbon travel for residents is established.The two dimensional game strategies include whether to accept the low-carbon concept and whether to choose low-carbon travel.Combined with evolutionary game theory,the low-carbon travel choices of residents in different cities are simulated,and the evolutionary stability strategies are obtained.Finally,the influences of the main parameters of the model on the evolution process and stability strategies are discussed.The results show that travelers would develop towards two trends.Cities with more developed public traffic system have a higher proportion of receiving low-carbon concept and choosing low-carbon travel.Cities with underdeveloped public transport system could increase this proportion by some measures such as encouraging residents to choose slow transport and increasing the propaganda of low-carbon travel,but the positive effects of the measures like propaganda have a limited impact on the proportion.

Cooperative driving model for non-signalized intersections with cooperative games

Cooperative driving around intersections has aroused increasing interest in the last five years.Meanwhile,driving safety in non-signalized intersections has become an issue that has attracted attention globally.In view of the potential collision risk when more than three vehicles approach a non-signalized intersection from different directions,we propose a driving model using cooperative game theory.First,the characteristic functions of this model are primarily established on each vehicle’s profit function and include safety,rapidity and comfort indicators.Second,the Shapley theorem is adopted,and its group rationality,individual rationality,and uniqueness are proved to be suitable for the characteristic functions of the model.Following this,different drivers’characteristics are considered.In order to simplify the calculation process,a zero-mean normalization method is introduced.In addition,a genetic algorithm method is adopted to search an optimal strategy set in the constrained multi-objective optimization problem.Finally,the model is confirmed as valid after simulation with a series of initial conditions.

ANALYSIS OF GROUP MULTIUSER DETECTION BASED ON COALITION GAME THEORY

Coalition game theory is introduced to investigate the performance,fairness and stability of decorrelating group multiuser detection receiver,not only from the perspective of individual nodes,but also various coalitions and the whole system as well. Firstly,to derive how the system scale with coalition size,a stochastic model with transferable payoffs (stochastic TU-model) is provided. Secondly,to find the most preferred coalition structures from the view point of individual nodes,a model with Non-Transferable payoffs (NTU-model) is presented. Theoretical analysis and simulation results suggest that stochasticaly the grand coalition is payoff maximizing for the system as a whole,while individual nodes with good-conditioned channels may prefer local "win-win coalitions".

A Comparison and Path Exploration for Oyster Shell Pollution Management Scenarios-Based on an Evolutionary Game Perspective

Different symbiotic scenarios were designed and combined with oyster shell pollution managementcases in two different counties(labeled A and H in this study)using symbiosis theory and a game simulation modelto investigate the conditions for realizing multiparty symbiosis in oyster shell pollution management.The resultsshow that the primary condition for achieving a virtuous cycle of tripartite governance is active governance by thegovernment.To realize such tripartite governance,it is necessary to reduce the cost of government regulation andchange the government's concept and value orientation;to reduce the cost of social capital contracted for participation in governance to improve the sustainability of social capital in the case of governance participation;and thevillagers’public,as the destroyer of the environment and the beneficiary of governance,should change their traditional concept of governance.Changing the traditional concept of the villagers would improve the benefits that thevillagers can obtain by participating in governance,and this should be supplemented with corresponding rewardand punishment mechanisms to increase the cost of the villagers’choice not to participate.If the conditions listedabove are met,the system will enter a virtuous cycle of tripartite governance.Based on this,we hope to seek asustainable and replicable oyster shell pollution management path through the experiences of oyster shell pollutionmanagement in both A County and H County,so that we can better promote the rural revitalization strategy andrealize the construction of a beautiful China.

The Game Theoretical Approach for Multi-phase Complex Systems in Chemical Engineering

This paper explores the application of noncooperative game theory together with the concept of Nash equilibrium to the investigation of some basic problems on multi-scale structure, especially the meso-scale structure in the multi-phase complex systems in chemical engineering. The basis of this work is the energy-minimization-multi-scale （EMMS） model proposed by Li and Kwauk （1994） and Li, et al. （2013） which identifies the multi-scale structure as a result of ＇compromise-in-competition between dominant mechanisms＇ and tries to solve a multi-objective optimization problem. However, the existing methods often integrate it into a problem of single objective optimization, which does not clearly reflect the ＇compromise-in-competition＇ mechanism and causes heavy computation burden as well as uncertainty in choosing suitable weighting factors. This paper will formulate the compromise in competition mechanism in EMMS model as a noncooperative game with constraints, and will describe the desired stable system state as a generalized Nash equilibrium. Then the authors will investigate the game theoretical approach for two typical systems in chemical engineering, the gas-solid fluidiza- tion （GSF） system and turbulent flow in pipe. Two different cases for generalized Nash equilibrinm in such systems will be well defined and distinguished. The generalize Nash equilibrium will be solved accurately for the GSF system and a feasible method will be given for turbulent flow in pipe. These results coincide with the existing computational results and show the feasibility of this approach, which overcomes the disadvantages of the existing methods and provides deep insight into the mechanisms of multi-scale structure in the multi-phase complex systems in chemical engineering.

QUANTUM FINANCIAL ECONOMICS——RISK AND RETURNS

Financial volatility risk and its relation to a business cycle-related intrinsic time is addressed through a multiple round evolutionary quantum game equilibrium leading to turbulence and multifractal signatures in the financial returns and in the risk dynamics.The model is simulated and the results are compared with actual financial volatility data.

A projected gradient based game theoretic approach for multi-user power control in cognitive radio network

The fifth generation （5G） networks have been envisioned to support the explosive growth of data demand caused by the increasing traditional high-rate mobile users and the expected rise of interconnections between human and things. To accommodate the ever-growing data traffic with scarce spectrum resources, cognitive radio （CR） is considered a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization. We study the power control problem for secondary users in an underlay CR network. Unlike most existing studies which simplify the problem by considering only a single primary user or channel, we investigate a more realistic scenario where multiple primary users share multiple channels with secondary users. We formulate the power control problem as a non-cooperative game with coupled constraints, where the Pareto optimality and achievable total throughput can be obtained by a Nash equilibrium （NE） solution. To achieve NE of the game, we first propose a projected gradient based dynamic model whose equilibrium points are equivalent to the NE of the original game, and then derive a centralized algorithm to solve the problem. Simulation results show that the convergence and effectiveness of our proposed solution, emphasizing the proposed algorithm, are competitive. Moreover, we demonstrate the robustness of our proposed solution as the network size increases.