代理决策中责任规避现象成因及对策

生活中个体为他人或者群体做决策的情况时有发生,这一过程中,一旦出现负面的决策结果,往往会引发委托人的不满与后续的问责。为了逃避可能的指责,代理人往往表现出责任规避的倾向,这将给委托人及群体利益带来诸多不利影响。本文将从代理决策的角度探讨导致责任规避的因素,并提出相应的应对措施。文章首先明确了代理决策中责任规避的含义并总结了责任规避现象的表现形式,包括不确定性偏好、采取保守选项、转移决策权和找借口等;其次,本文从委托–代理关系视角、代理人视角与组织制度视角分析了责任规避现象背后的成因;最后,文章从这三个层面出发提出应对措施,以期对预防责任规避行为和强化担当有所启示。Individuals often make decisions for others or groups in life. In the process, once there is a negative decision result, it will often lead to the dissatisfaction of the client and the subsequent accountability. In order to avoid potential blame, agents often show a tendency of buck-passing, which has many negative consequences for the interests of the principal and the group. This paper explores the factors that lead to buck-passing from the perspective of representative decision-making and proposes corresponding countermeasures. Firstly, the article defines buck-passing in representative decision-making and summarises the manifestations of the phenomenon of buck-passing, including uncertainty preference, adopting conservative options, transferring decision-making power and making excuses;Secondly, the article analyses the causes behind the phenomenon of buck-passing from the perspectives of the principal-agent relationship, the agent’s perspective and the organisational system;Lastly, the article proposes countermeasures from these three dimensions to shed light on the preventing buck-passing behaviour and the strengthening responsibility.

出行者向诱导转移的委托代理模型研究

交通诱导的关键在于确定诱导分流的最优路径,从而尽快分流拥堵车辆,减少拥堵所带来的损失和影响.目前面临的难题为交通系统的诱导接受率问题,路径诱导接受率指提供的路径规划是否满足出行者的出行需求.利用委托代理理论,将管理者作为委托人,出行者作为代理人,建立管理者出行者的委托代理模型,并对管理者实施政策的成本系数、激励系数、出行者的风险规避度、努力成本系数以及产出的不确定性对结果的影响进行数值实验,分析了其对路径诱导接受率的影响,研究表明管理者应尽可能以低成本有针对性的让区域内尽可能多的出行者接受路径诱导,实现政策的高效性,以提高诱导接受率.

Incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcing based on principal-agent model

In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent.

政府投资项目代建制的演化博弈模型

为促进政府投资项目代建制发展,提升政府投资项目管理水平,构建政府投资项目代建制的演化博弈模型。以政府投资项目代建制为研究对象,论述了实施代建制的三种模式和基本流程,分析了政府投资项目代建制中的委托–代理关系,利用演化博弈理论为工具建立了约束条件为零和约束条件不为零的两种情况下的演化博弈模型,并通过模型分析提出促进委托方与代建方长期合作的相应对策。本文的研究成果具有促进我国政府投资项目代建制的完善和代建制市场培育等理论和实践价值。

Distributed certification application via a trusted dealer

Distributed certification via threshold cryptography is much more secu re than other ways to protect certification authority (CA) 's private key,and c an tolerate some intrusions. As the original system such as ITTC,etc.,is unsaf e ,inefficient and impracitcal in actual network environment,this paper brings u p a new distributed certification scheme,which although it generates key shares concentratively,it updates key shares distributedly,and so,avoids single-po in t failure like ITTC. It not only enhances robustness with Feldman verification and SSL protocol,but can also change the threshold (t,k) flexibly and robu stly,and so,is much more practical. In this work,the authors implement the prototype sy stem of the new scheme and test and analyze its performance.

The analysis of government procurement in the frame of principal agent theory

In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the model of the principal-agent to analyze government procurement activity, and proposes some countermeasures to improve principal-agent in government procurement.

An Overview of the New Listing Rules and Corporate Governance Best Practice in Sri Lanka

Corporate governance represents institutional structures and incentive mechanisms that are implemented in order to mitigate the principal-agent problem and to thus promote the long-term competitiveness of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of corporate governance best practice and the new listing rules in Sri Lanka. The paper discusses the evolution of the corporate governance best practice giving special reference to the new listing rules in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan stock market overview and the importance of best practice governance for the developing economy of Sri Lanka. Corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka has made a progress towards best practice, but, this paper argues, that substantial reforms need to be implemented to effectively promote and sustain the accountability and transparency.

Board Characteristics and Firm Performance

Based on agency theory, the importance of corporate governance is to reduce agency conflicts between those who control and those who own the residual claims in a firm. In other words, corporate governance as a mechanism helps to align management＇s goals with those of the stakeholders that are to increase firm performance. Since, the value creation of corporate governance can be measured through the firm performance; the aim of this study is to answer this question： ＂is there any relationship between corporate governance and firm performance？＂ Therefore, the four board characteristics that are of interest in this study are board independency, CEO duality, ownership structure, and board size. Based on a randomly selected sample of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia and applying the linear multiple regression as the underlying statistical tests, it is found that CEO duality has a negative relationship with firm performance---Return on Equity （ROE） and Return on Asset （ROA）, but there is no significant relationship among board independency, board size, and ownership structure as independent variables and firm performance as dependent variable.

Research on a Kind of Double-sided Moral Hazard Problem

This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.