In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote clien...In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent.展开更多
Distributed certification via threshold cryptography is much more secu re than other ways to protect certification authority (CA) 's private key,and c an tolerate some intrusions. As the original system such as IT...Distributed certification via threshold cryptography is much more secu re than other ways to protect certification authority (CA) 's private key,and c an tolerate some intrusions. As the original system such as ITTC,etc.,is unsaf e ,inefficient and impracitcal in actual network environment,this paper brings u p a new distributed certification scheme,which although it generates key shares concentratively,it updates key shares distributedly,and so,avoids single-po in t failure like ITTC. It not only enhances robustness with Feldman verification and SSL protocol,but can also change the threshold (t,k) flexibly and robu stly,and so,is much more practical. In this work,the authors implement the prototype sy stem of the new scheme and test and analyze its performance.展开更多
In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the m...In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the model of the principal-agent to analyze government procurement activity, and proposes some countermeasures to improve principal-agent in government procurement.展开更多
Corporate governance represents institutional structures and incentive mechanisms that are implemented in order to mitigate the principal-agent problem and to thus promote the long-term competitiveness of the firm. Th...Corporate governance represents institutional structures and incentive mechanisms that are implemented in order to mitigate the principal-agent problem and to thus promote the long-term competitiveness of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of corporate governance best practice and the new listing rules in Sri Lanka. The paper discusses the evolution of the corporate governance best practice giving special reference to the new listing rules in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan stock market overview and the importance of best practice governance for the developing economy of Sri Lanka. Corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka has made a progress towards best practice, but, this paper argues, that substantial reforms need to be implemented to effectively promote and sustain the accountability and transparency.展开更多
Based on agency theory, the importance of corporate governance is to reduce agency conflicts between those who control and those who own the residual claims in a firm. In other words, corporate governance as a mechani...Based on agency theory, the importance of corporate governance is to reduce agency conflicts between those who control and those who own the residual claims in a firm. In other words, corporate governance as a mechanism helps to align management＇s goals with those of the stakeholders that are to increase firm performance. Since, the value creation of corporate governance can be measured through the firm performance; the aim of this study is to answer this question： ＂is there any relationship between corporate governance and firm performance？＂ Therefore, the four board characteristics that are of interest in this study are board independency, CEO duality, ownership structure, and board size. Based on a randomly selected sample of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia and applying the linear multiple regression as the underlying statistical tests, it is found that CEO duality has a negative relationship with firm performance---Return on Equity （ROE） and Return on Asset （ROA）, but there is no significant relationship among board independency, board size, and ownership structure as independent variables and firm performance as dependent variable.展开更多
This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally h...This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.展开更多
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71071033)the Youth Foundation of Humanity and Social Scienceof Ministry of Education of China(No.11YJC630234)
文摘In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent.
文摘Distributed certification via threshold cryptography is much more secu re than other ways to protect certification authority (CA) 's private key,and c an tolerate some intrusions. As the original system such as ITTC,etc.,is unsaf e ,inefficient and impracitcal in actual network environment,this paper brings u p a new distributed certification scheme,which although it generates key shares concentratively,it updates key shares distributedly,and so,avoids single-po in t failure like ITTC. It not only enhances robustness with Feldman verification and SSL protocol,but can also change the threshold (t,k) flexibly and robu stly,and so,is much more practical. In this work,the authors implement the prototype sy stem of the new scheme and test and analyze its performance.
文摘In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the model of the principal-agent to analyze government procurement activity, and proposes some countermeasures to improve principal-agent in government procurement.
文摘Corporate governance represents institutional structures and incentive mechanisms that are implemented in order to mitigate the principal-agent problem and to thus promote the long-term competitiveness of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of corporate governance best practice and the new listing rules in Sri Lanka. The paper discusses the evolution of the corporate governance best practice giving special reference to the new listing rules in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan stock market overview and the importance of best practice governance for the developing economy of Sri Lanka. Corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka has made a progress towards best practice, but, this paper argues, that substantial reforms need to be implemented to effectively promote and sustain the accountability and transparency.
文摘Based on agency theory, the importance of corporate governance is to reduce agency conflicts between those who control and those who own the residual claims in a firm. In other words, corporate governance as a mechanism helps to align management＇s goals with those of the stakeholders that are to increase firm performance. Since, the value creation of corporate governance can be measured through the firm performance; the aim of this study is to answer this question： ＂is there any relationship between corporate governance and firm performance？＂ Therefore, the four board characteristics that are of interest in this study are board independency, CEO duality, ownership structure, and board size. Based on a randomly selected sample of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia and applying the linear multiple regression as the underlying statistical tests, it is found that CEO duality has a negative relationship with firm performance---Return on Equity （ROE） and Return on Asset （ROA）, but there is no significant relationship among board independency, board size, and ownership structure as independent variables and firm performance as dependent variable.
文摘This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.
