In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the m...In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the model of the principal-agent to analyze government procurement activity, and proposes some countermeasures to improve principal-agent in government procurement.展开更多
Based on agency theory, the importance of corporate governance is to reduce agency conflicts between those who control and those who own the residual claims in a firm. In other words, corporate governance as a mechani...Based on agency theory, the importance of corporate governance is to reduce agency conflicts between those who control and those who own the residual claims in a firm. In other words, corporate governance as a mechanism helps to align management＇s goals with those of the stakeholders that are to increase firm performance. Since, the value creation of corporate governance can be measured through the firm performance; the aim of this study is to answer this question： ＂is there any relationship between corporate governance and firm performance？＂ Therefore, the four board characteristics that are of interest in this study are board independency, CEO duality, ownership structure, and board size. Based on a randomly selected sample of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia and applying the linear multiple regression as the underlying statistical tests, it is found that CEO duality has a negative relationship with firm performance---Return on Equity （ROE） and Return on Asset （ROA）, but there is no significant relationship among board independency, board size, and ownership structure as independent variables and firm performance as dependent variable.展开更多
This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally h...This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.展开更多
文摘In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the model of the principal-agent to analyze government procurement activity, and proposes some countermeasures to improve principal-agent in government procurement.
文摘Based on agency theory, the importance of corporate governance is to reduce agency conflicts between those who control and those who own the residual claims in a firm. In other words, corporate governance as a mechanism helps to align management＇s goals with those of the stakeholders that are to increase firm performance. Since, the value creation of corporate governance can be measured through the firm performance; the aim of this study is to answer this question： ＂is there any relationship between corporate governance and firm performance？＂ Therefore, the four board characteristics that are of interest in this study are board independency, CEO duality, ownership structure, and board size. Based on a randomly selected sample of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia and applying the linear multiple regression as the underlying statistical tests, it is found that CEO duality has a negative relationship with firm performance---Return on Equity （ROE） and Return on Asset （ROA）, but there is no significant relationship among board independency, board size, and ownership structure as independent variables and firm performance as dependent variable.
文摘This paper develops a kind of generalized double-sided moral hazard model of contract choice with Cobb-Douglas technology in a frame of principal-agent theory. The two parties, the principal and the agent, generally have different levels of production efficiency, relative importance factor and are risk-averse or risk-neutral. Using this model, we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the disutility of both the parties and carry out some simulations exercise under two special cases which help explain the double-sided moral hazard issues. By focusing on production efficiency, relative importance factor and risk attitude respectively, this paper analyzes the properties of optimal contracts under three cases.
