There is no patina of doubt that the central philosophical theories of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn concerning the nature, substance and method for acquiring scientific knowledge constitute milestones in 20th century p...There is no patina of doubt that the central philosophical theories of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn concerning the nature, substance and method for acquiring scientific knowledge constitute milestones in 20th century philosophy of science. Just as Popper＇s fundamental work on the subject, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, marked a decisive break with inductivist epistemologies, Kuhn＇s magnum opus, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （1962, enlarged ed. 1970）, inaugurated the coming of age of the historical turn in the philosophy of science. Some scholars seem to consider the main doctrines of both philosophers as irreconcilables or contradictories. This explains why, for example Popper and Popperians such as Imre Lakatos and John Watkins describe themselves as ＂critical rationalists＂, whereas they refer to Kuhn as an ＂irrationalist＂ or ＂relativist＂-appellations that the latter has consistently rejected. The debate between Popper and Kuhn, especially as contained in an important work, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge （1970）, highlights some of the knotty problems connected with philosophical appraisals of science. It also demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of logistic approaches in the philosophy of science, on the one hand, and of historically informed socio-psychological analysis of science, on the other. In this paper, we reexamine the Popper-Kuhn controversy from an experimentalist perspective. In other words, we argue that the ideas of testing and normal science can be systematically accommodated by fine-structure dissection of empirical research through which scientists learn about the world, based on the assumption that the progress of science is the growth of experimental knowledge-a fact often neglected in theory-dominated philosophies of science. Taking discovery of the cosmic background radiation by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson as example, the paper argues that important scientific discoveries have been accomplished even in the absence of theory in any obvious sense, a situation that conflicts with the theory-dominated models of Popper and Kuhn. Thus, it offers an account of how practicing scientists learn from research to control errors and avoid blind alleys. The paper affirms, in conclusion, that going beyond the theories of Popper and Kuhn requires that philosophers of science should take what scientists learn from experiments seriously when theorising about science, by taking into account normal testing or error detection and control strategies through which scientific knowledge is acquired and extended展开更多
文摘There is no patina of doubt that the central philosophical theories of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn concerning the nature, substance and method for acquiring scientific knowledge constitute milestones in 20th century philosophy of science. Just as Popper＇s fundamental work on the subject, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, marked a decisive break with inductivist epistemologies, Kuhn＇s magnum opus, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions （1962, enlarged ed. 1970）, inaugurated the coming of age of the historical turn in the philosophy of science. Some scholars seem to consider the main doctrines of both philosophers as irreconcilables or contradictories. This explains why, for example Popper and Popperians such as Imre Lakatos and John Watkins describe themselves as ＂critical rationalists＂, whereas they refer to Kuhn as an ＂irrationalist＂ or ＂relativist＂-appellations that the latter has consistently rejected. The debate between Popper and Kuhn, especially as contained in an important work, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge （1970）, highlights some of the knotty problems connected with philosophical appraisals of science. It also demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of logistic approaches in the philosophy of science, on the one hand, and of historically informed socio-psychological analysis of science, on the other. In this paper, we reexamine the Popper-Kuhn controversy from an experimentalist perspective. In other words, we argue that the ideas of testing and normal science can be systematically accommodated by fine-structure dissection of empirical research through which scientists learn about the world, based on the assumption that the progress of science is the growth of experimental knowledge-a fact often neglected in theory-dominated philosophies of science. Taking discovery of the cosmic background radiation by Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson as example, the paper argues that important scientific discoveries have been accomplished even in the absence of theory in any obvious sense, a situation that conflicts with the theory-dominated models of Popper and Kuhn. Thus, it offers an account of how practicing scientists learn from research to control errors and avoid blind alleys. The paper affirms, in conclusion, that going beyond the theories of Popper and Kuhn requires that philosophers of science should take what scientists learn from experiments seriously when theorising about science, by taking into account normal testing or error detection and control strategies through which scientific knowledge is acquired and extended
