In 2011, Buhrman et al. proved that it is impossible to design an unconditionally secure quantum position verification(QPV)protocol if the adversaries are allowed to previously share unlimited entanglements. Afterward...In 2011, Buhrman et al. proved that it is impossible to design an unconditionally secure quantum position verification(QPV)protocol if the adversaries are allowed to previously share unlimited entanglements. Afterwards, people started to design secure QPV protocols in practical settings, e.g. the bounded-storage model, where the adversaries' pre-shared entangled resources are supposed to be limited. Here we focus on another practical factor that it is very difficult for the adversaries to perform attack operations with unlimitedly high frequency. Concretely, we present a new kind of QPV protocols, called non-simultaneous QPV.And we prove the security of a specific non-simultaneous QPV protocol with the assumption that the frequency of the adversaries' attack operations is bounded, but no assumptions on their pre-shared entanglements or quantum storage. Actually, in our nonsimultaneous protocol, the information whether there comes a signal at present time is also a piece of command. It renders the adversaries "blind", that is, they have to execute attack operations with unlimitedly high frequency no matter whether a signal arrives, which implies the non-simultaneous QPV is also secure in the bounded-storage model.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.61272057 and 61572081)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(Grant No.106112016CDJXY180001)
文摘In 2011, Buhrman et al. proved that it is impossible to design an unconditionally secure quantum position verification(QPV)protocol if the adversaries are allowed to previously share unlimited entanglements. Afterwards, people started to design secure QPV protocols in practical settings, e.g. the bounded-storage model, where the adversaries' pre-shared entangled resources are supposed to be limited. Here we focus on another practical factor that it is very difficult for the adversaries to perform attack operations with unlimitedly high frequency. Concretely, we present a new kind of QPV protocols, called non-simultaneous QPV.And we prove the security of a specific non-simultaneous QPV protocol with the assumption that the frequency of the adversaries' attack operations is bounded, but no assumptions on their pre-shared entanglements or quantum storage. Actually, in our nonsimultaneous protocol, the information whether there comes a signal at present time is also a piece of command. It renders the adversaries "blind", that is, they have to execute attack operations with unlimitedly high frequency no matter whether a signal arrives, which implies the non-simultaneous QPV is also secure in the bounded-storage model.
