The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of corporate governance and disclosure policy on corporate financial performance by examining the combined effect of board characteristics and disclosure level on f...The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of corporate governance and disclosure policy on corporate financial performance by examining the combined effect of board characteristics and disclosure level on financing costs. The empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of 192 Canadian companies, generally shows the importance of board characteristics in determining the level of disclosure and firms＇ costs of financing. In particular, the results found indicate that boards whose characteristics meet the governance requirements that are associated with greater transparency in disclosure on governance attributes reduce the costs of financing of their companies by debt as well as by equity capital.展开更多
Property rights have multiple attributes, and these are correlated with national governance. In the West, property rights have the economic function of maximizing efficiency and the political function of rights protec...Property rights have multiple attributes, and these are correlated with national governance. In the West, property rights have the economic function of maximizing efficiency and the political function of rights protection, but in China, they also have a strong social character. With the modernization of national governance, these functions interact with and transform each other. When the state＇s ability to supply public goods is relatively weak, property rights take on more of a social character, meeting public demand for welfare at the grassroots level. When the state is better able to provide public goods, the social function of property rights lessens as their economic function grows. The social character of property rights was the institutional foundation for China, as a huge agrarian state, to realize ＂governance through inaction,＂ and at the same time was the secret key that could break the code to the millennial continuity of Chinese agrarian civilization. Reforms including the collectivization of rural property rights after 1949, the ＂separation of two rights＂ （to collective ownership and household contracted land, with a focus on the latter）, and the ＂separation of three rights,＂ （to collective ownership, household contracts and revitalized land management）. These changes constitute a process in which the economic function of property rights has been growing while their social character has lessened under conditions of national governance modernization.展开更多
文摘The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of corporate governance and disclosure policy on corporate financial performance by examining the combined effect of board characteristics and disclosure level on financing costs. The empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of 192 Canadian companies, generally shows the importance of board characteristics in determining the level of disclosure and firms＇ costs of financing. In particular, the results found indicate that boards whose characteristics meet the governance requirements that are associated with greater transparency in disclosure on governance attributes reduce the costs of financing of their companies by debt as well as by equity capital.
基金a phased result of the Major Program of the National Social Science Fund of China,"Research on Ways and Conditions for Effective Achievement of Self-government at Community Level"(16AZZ012)a Major Project in the Key Research Base for the Humanities and Social Sciences Fund,Ministry of Education,"Research on the Innovation of Villager Self-Government From the Perspective of‘Conditions-Forms’"(15JJDZONGHE001)
文摘Property rights have multiple attributes, and these are correlated with national governance. In the West, property rights have the economic function of maximizing efficiency and the political function of rights protection, but in China, they also have a strong social character. With the modernization of national governance, these functions interact with and transform each other. When the state＇s ability to supply public goods is relatively weak, property rights take on more of a social character, meeting public demand for welfare at the grassroots level. When the state is better able to provide public goods, the social function of property rights lessens as their economic function grows. The social character of property rights was the institutional foundation for China, as a huge agrarian state, to realize ＂governance through inaction,＂ and at the same time was the secret key that could break the code to the millennial continuity of Chinese agrarian civilization. Reforms including the collectivization of rural property rights after 1949, the ＂separation of two rights＂ （to collective ownership and household contracted land, with a focus on the latter）, and the ＂separation of three rights,＂ （to collective ownership, household contracts and revitalized land management）. These changes constitute a process in which the economic function of property rights has been growing while their social character has lessened under conditions of national governance modernization.
