本文探讨企业异质性、市场进入成本和技术溢出与企业出口参与的关系。在企业最大化其出口未来回报的分析框架下,构建了企业最优出口参与模型,并通过参数化其出口回报函数建立了企业出口参与影响因素的计量模型。基于浙江省2001—2003年...本文探讨企业异质性、市场进入成本和技术溢出与企业出口参与的关系。在企业最大化其出口未来回报的分析框架下,构建了企业最优出口参与模型,并通过参数化其出口回报函数建立了企业出口参与影响因素的计量模型。基于浙江省2001—2003年的企业面板数据,本研究采用随机效应二项分Probit模型对企业出口参与的影响因素进行实证分析。研究结果表明,市场进入成本显著存在,因而生产率高、规模大的企业更容易出口。同时,产业特定的技术溢出和特定的区位优势都能够提高企业的出口意愿。本研究从实证的视角验证了Melitz(2003)和Bernard et al(2003)异质企业贸易模型的理论预见。展开更多
China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ B...China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ Based on our analysis on market entry, we discovered that reforming administrative approval will spur economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. Administrative approval may suppress social cost and propel China＇s economic growth; China＇s gradualist approval reforms may indeed propel economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. With the data of prefecture-level cities during 2000-2013 and data of companies listed on the SME board during 2010-2014, we tested the effects of approval reforms on economic growth and on transaction cost, and employed instrumental variable and PSM for the treatment of the endogeneity problem - all these tests led to robust and consistent results. Moreover, we discovered that difference in government policy implementation in the approval process is the root cause of corruption and rent seeking.展开更多
文摘本文探讨企业异质性、市场进入成本和技术溢出与企业出口参与的关系。在企业最大化其出口未来回报的分析框架下,构建了企业最优出口参与模型,并通过参数化其出口回报函数建立了企业出口参与影响因素的计量模型。基于浙江省2001—2003年的企业面板数据,本研究采用随机效应二项分Probit模型对企业出口参与的影响因素进行实证分析。研究结果表明,市场进入成本显著存在,因而生产率高、规模大的企业更容易出口。同时,产业特定的技术溢出和特定的区位优势都能够提高企业的出口意愿。本研究从实证的视角验证了Melitz(2003)和Bernard et al(2003)异质企业贸易模型的理论预见。
文摘China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ Based on our analysis on market entry, we discovered that reforming administrative approval will spur economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. Administrative approval may suppress social cost and propel China＇s economic growth; China＇s gradualist approval reforms may indeed propel economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. With the data of prefecture-level cities during 2000-2013 and data of companies listed on the SME board during 2010-2014, we tested the effects of approval reforms on economic growth and on transaction cost, and employed instrumental variable and PSM for the treatment of the endogeneity problem - all these tests led to robust and consistent results. Moreover, we discovered that difference in government policy implementation in the approval process is the root cause of corruption and rent seeking.
