The coordinating pricing strategies with asymmetric cost information under disruptions are investigated in a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain system.While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric informat...The coordinating pricing strategies with asymmetric cost information under disruptions are investigated in a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain system.While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information,supply chain pricing contract models(a wholesale price contract and an all-unit quantity discount contract)under asymmetric information are proposed by employing the principal-agent principle in a regular scenario.When the retailer's cost distribution is fluctuated by disruptions,we obtain the optimal emergency strategies of the supply chain under asymmetric information by considering deviation costs and show how to effectively handle the cost uncertainty.Using numerical methods,impacts of cost disruptions on the optimal wholesale price,the retailer price,the order quantity and the expected profits of the retailer,the supplier,as well as the total system are analyzed.It is found that the all-unit quantity discount policy can obtain better performance than the wholesale pricing policy.展开更多
A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymme...A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.展开更多
基金The National Key Technology R&D Program of China during the11th Five-Year Plan Period(No.2006BAH02A06)Jiangsu Postdoctoral Foundation(No.0601015C)
文摘The coordinating pricing strategies with asymmetric cost information under disruptions are investigated in a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain system.While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information,supply chain pricing contract models(a wholesale price contract and an all-unit quantity discount contract)under asymmetric information are proposed by employing the principal-agent principle in a regular scenario.When the retailer's cost distribution is fluctuated by disruptions,we obtain the optimal emergency strategies of the supply chain under asymmetric information by considering deviation costs and show how to effectively handle the cost uncertainty.Using numerical methods,impacts of cost disruptions on the optimal wholesale price,the retailer price,the order quantity and the expected profits of the retailer,the supplier,as well as the total system are analyzed.It is found that the all-unit quantity discount policy can obtain better performance than the wholesale pricing policy.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No70671021)Jiangsu Postdoctoral Foundation (No0601015C)
文摘A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.
