库博标准集团近来在亚太区甚为繁忙。作为库博标准汽车的母公司,库博标准正在组建Cooper Standard Inoac Pte.Ltd.公司。这家与日本Inoac Corp.的合资企业,将扩大库博流体输送系统产品在亚太汽车市场的覆盖。组建工作有望在第三季度完...库博标准集团近来在亚太区甚为繁忙。作为库博标准汽车的母公司,库博标准正在组建Cooper Standard Inoac Pte.Ltd.公司。这家与日本Inoac Corp.的合资企业,将扩大库博流体输送系统产品在亚太汽车市场的覆盖。组建工作有望在第三季度完成。库博标准称其将控股51%,Inoac公司将持股49%。库博标准在上海新建的亚太区技术中心也已盛大开业。目前该公司正在将员工从江苏昆山的亚太总部迁至上海的新址。展开更多
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to de...Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.展开更多
文摘库博标准集团近来在亚太区甚为繁忙。作为库博标准汽车的母公司,库博标准正在组建Cooper Standard Inoac Pte.Ltd.公司。这家与日本Inoac Corp.的合资企业,将扩大库博流体输送系统产品在亚太汽车市场的覆盖。组建工作有望在第三季度完成。库博标准称其将控股51%,Inoac公司将持股49%。库博标准在上海新建的亚太区技术中心也已盛大开业。目前该公司正在将员工从江苏昆山的亚太总部迁至上海的新址。
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71071119 and 60574071
文摘Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright- Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player＇s rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner＇s dilemma games （PDG） and the snowdrift games （SG）. We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
