Classical Indian Buddhist philosopher Nfigfirjuna is known for his philosophical interpretations of the central conception of Buddha＇s teachings, the philosophy of Middle Path （Mfidhyamika）. Notably he had introduc...Classical Indian Buddhist philosopher Nfigfirjuna is known for his philosophical interpretations of the central conception of Buddha＇s teachings, the philosophy of Middle Path （Mfidhyamika）. Notably he had introduced the unique concept of ＂emptiness＂ （gnyata） to explain the Middle Path philosophy： the philosophical meaning of ＂emptiness＂ is dependent co-arising of various elements that support the worldly experience. This study investigates how this concept is used in explaining the subjectivity of a human person and how it is used for interpreting the unique process of human existence. The discussions on subjectivity are imprecise in modern and contemporary philosophy. But Ngrjuna＇s philosophy enables us to explain subjectivity conclusively, without it having to be explained using metaphysical positions. Sunyata may introduce a new definition for the concept of non-self： not for negating the self but for caring self from the problems of life by making it centered in the Middle Path （madhyama-pratipat）, where one may naturally be able to use his wisdom （prajh） as the guiding principle： not mere knowledge （na）. Sanyat is understood using fourfold （catus.kot.i） logical analysis, not twofold analysis employed normally by other philosophers. Here, the Buddhist notion of self as the co-dependent evolution process of five aggregates （pahcaskandhas） is reinterpreted using the unique method of tetralemma （catus.kot. i）. This critique explores the Western philosophy＇s conceptions on ＂human reasoning, ＂logocentrism,＂ and the objective analytical method of modern science.＂ After careful cross examination of the rival philosophical positions, it reasons out why the ＂rationale of nature＂ is always superior to ＂human reasoning＂ and ＂logocentrism,＂展开更多
In this paper, I will focus on the debate between descriptivism and anti-descriptivism theory about proper names. In the introduction, l will propose an historical reconstruction of the debate, and focus in particular...In this paper, I will focus on the debate between descriptivism and anti-descriptivism theory about proper names. In the introduction, l will propose an historical reconstruction of the debate, and focus in particular on Russell and Kripke＇s treatments of proper names. Strong criticisms will be advanced against Kripke＇s hypothesis of rigid-designator and, more deafly, against the consequent distinction between the epistemic and metaphysical level that Kripke proposes to explain identity assertions between proper names. Furthermore, I will argue, that, pace Kripke, Russellian treatment of proper names allows to capture all our semantic intuitions, and also those semantic interpretations which concern context-belief sentences. I will close the introduction by focusing on a criticism that Kripke rightly points out against an example that Russell proposes in his On Denoting. Section 2 will be devoted to Russellian solution： I will show that not only Russell＇s logical treatment of proper names allows to answer to Kripke＇s criticism to Russell＇s example, but also that such treatment can disambiguate and express all our semantic intuitions about Frege＇s puzzle sentence ＂Hesperus is Phosphorus.＂ ! will then show that, contrarily, Quinian solution （discussed in section 3） and Kripkian one （see section 4） are not satisfactory to capture our semantic knowledge about Frege＇s sentence. Furthermore, in section 5, I will focus on Kripke＇s distinction between epistemic and metaphysical level to deal with identity assertions between proper names, and I will logically show that such distinction is not plausible. In section 5, then, I will show that Russellian solution allows to explain context-belief sentences, contrarily to what Kripke thinks. In Conclusions, I will summarize what 1 have argued in the text.展开更多
Every philosophical system of Aristotle is structured around different forms of rationalities. Each form of rationality, according to its method, object, and purpose, seeks to apprehend and to know a specific dimensio...Every philosophical system of Aristotle is structured around different forms of rationalities. Each form of rationality, according to its method, object, and purpose, seeks to apprehend and to know a specific dimension of being, because being manifests itself in many ways, that is, the totality of reality. Yet, each form of understanding the being has its epistemological and ontological status, always anchored in the logic criteria. In general, the aim of the paper is to characterize some aspects of the main forms of rationalities in the thought of Aristotle, i.e., demonstrative, dialectic, physics, metaphysics, productive, and practices. But before that, succinctly, it is necessary to talk about the different dimensions of being and teleology.展开更多
Often conceived as metaphysical approach, in the XX Century, philosophy is object of a crusade antimetaphysical in the movement of Logical Positivism. I will try to demonstrate that a philosophical perspective is conc...Often conceived as metaphysical approach, in the XX Century, philosophy is object of a crusade antimetaphysical in the movement of Logical Positivism. I will try to demonstrate that a philosophical perspective is conceivable even in the scientific conception of the world elaborated by the neopositivists. I discuss this point of view with attention to the turn represented by pragmatic philosophy of Neurath, which represents a crucial passage for the future of philosophy. In this vision, the science is not conceivable without philosophy, namely without an open and pluralist scientific philosophy. The philosophy--so--is not insufficient too for the perspective of scientific conception of the world.展开更多
Plato＇s lifelong confrontation with Parmenides and his metaphysical mire of believing that nothing （το μη ǒν） does not actually exist, gradually in the Sophist comes into finish, insofar as the philosopher a...Plato＇s lifelong confrontation with Parmenides and his metaphysical mire of believing that nothing （το μη ǒν） does not actually exist, gradually in the Sophist comes into finish, insofar as the philosopher after facing the foe and having the last laugh simmers down. In this paper after giving an interpretation of what Parmenides says, I shall present an analysis of Plato＇s drastic answer to him （Sophist, 259 e4-6） to see how Plato opens the impasse way created by the Eleatic philosopher. Here the intercommunion of Forms is regarded as the final answer by which Plato devastates Parmenides infamous thesis. Since hitherto no in-depth analysis is given by the scholars who are puzzled with the subject, I have tried to analyze the intercommunion of Forms philosophically. Plato＇s Eleatic challenge has always been crucial in Plato himself and philosophical development after him. As while as Parmenides thesis （Sph., 238 a8-9） provides the sophists opportunity to reject the falsehood, Plato＇s theory of Forms in contrast in order to cross off the extremely sly sophists tries to make Parmenides come down. In my opinion, the intercommunion of Forms, as the last step of the theory of Forms, basically determines Plato＇s late ontology tightly knitted with logic. Vindicating this proposal depends on true understanding of the intercommunion of Forms. Since Plato＇s late ontology, in my opinion, is closed to Frege＇s ontology and discussion of language, we are armed to interpret the intercommunion of Forms with recent recent logico-philosophicus achievements, I think. In this respect, this is what I have done in my paper： analyzing sentence from Plato＇s logico-metaphysical point of view. Ultimately, I have tried to show how the aim of the intercommunion of Forms, which Plato himself states, is demonstrating the possibility of dialogue and discourse. This statement explicitly sets forward that the discussion is bound up with several logical approaches, according to which finally full bright light is shed on different implications of the subject such as universals.展开更多
文摘Classical Indian Buddhist philosopher Nfigfirjuna is known for his philosophical interpretations of the central conception of Buddha＇s teachings, the philosophy of Middle Path （Mfidhyamika）. Notably he had introduced the unique concept of ＂emptiness＂ （gnyata） to explain the Middle Path philosophy： the philosophical meaning of ＂emptiness＂ is dependent co-arising of various elements that support the worldly experience. This study investigates how this concept is used in explaining the subjectivity of a human person and how it is used for interpreting the unique process of human existence. The discussions on subjectivity are imprecise in modern and contemporary philosophy. But Ngrjuna＇s philosophy enables us to explain subjectivity conclusively, without it having to be explained using metaphysical positions. Sunyata may introduce a new definition for the concept of non-self： not for negating the self but for caring self from the problems of life by making it centered in the Middle Path （madhyama-pratipat）, where one may naturally be able to use his wisdom （prajh） as the guiding principle： not mere knowledge （na）. Sanyat is understood using fourfold （catus.kot.i） logical analysis, not twofold analysis employed normally by other philosophers. Here, the Buddhist notion of self as the co-dependent evolution process of five aggregates （pahcaskandhas） is reinterpreted using the unique method of tetralemma （catus.kot. i）. This critique explores the Western philosophy＇s conceptions on ＂human reasoning, ＂logocentrism,＂ and the objective analytical method of modern science.＂ After careful cross examination of the rival philosophical positions, it reasons out why the ＂rationale of nature＂ is always superior to ＂human reasoning＂ and ＂logocentrism,＂
文摘In this paper, I will focus on the debate between descriptivism and anti-descriptivism theory about proper names. In the introduction, l will propose an historical reconstruction of the debate, and focus in particular on Russell and Kripke＇s treatments of proper names. Strong criticisms will be advanced against Kripke＇s hypothesis of rigid-designator and, more deafly, against the consequent distinction between the epistemic and metaphysical level that Kripke proposes to explain identity assertions between proper names. Furthermore, I will argue, that, pace Kripke, Russellian treatment of proper names allows to capture all our semantic intuitions, and also those semantic interpretations which concern context-belief sentences. I will close the introduction by focusing on a criticism that Kripke rightly points out against an example that Russell proposes in his On Denoting. Section 2 will be devoted to Russellian solution： I will show that not only Russell＇s logical treatment of proper names allows to answer to Kripke＇s criticism to Russell＇s example, but also that such treatment can disambiguate and express all our semantic intuitions about Frege＇s puzzle sentence ＂Hesperus is Phosphorus.＂ ! will then show that, contrarily, Quinian solution （discussed in section 3） and Kripkian one （see section 4） are not satisfactory to capture our semantic knowledge about Frege＇s sentence. Furthermore, in section 5, I will focus on Kripke＇s distinction between epistemic and metaphysical level to deal with identity assertions between proper names, and I will logically show that such distinction is not plausible. In section 5, then, I will show that Russellian solution allows to explain context-belief sentences, contrarily to what Kripke thinks. In Conclusions, I will summarize what 1 have argued in the text.
文摘Every philosophical system of Aristotle is structured around different forms of rationalities. Each form of rationality, according to its method, object, and purpose, seeks to apprehend and to know a specific dimension of being, because being manifests itself in many ways, that is, the totality of reality. Yet, each form of understanding the being has its epistemological and ontological status, always anchored in the logic criteria. In general, the aim of the paper is to characterize some aspects of the main forms of rationalities in the thought of Aristotle, i.e., demonstrative, dialectic, physics, metaphysics, productive, and practices. But before that, succinctly, it is necessary to talk about the different dimensions of being and teleology.
文摘Often conceived as metaphysical approach, in the XX Century, philosophy is object of a crusade antimetaphysical in the movement of Logical Positivism. I will try to demonstrate that a philosophical perspective is conceivable even in the scientific conception of the world elaborated by the neopositivists. I discuss this point of view with attention to the turn represented by pragmatic philosophy of Neurath, which represents a crucial passage for the future of philosophy. In this vision, the science is not conceivable without philosophy, namely without an open and pluralist scientific philosophy. The philosophy--so--is not insufficient too for the perspective of scientific conception of the world.
文摘Plato＇s lifelong confrontation with Parmenides and his metaphysical mire of believing that nothing （το μη ǒν） does not actually exist, gradually in the Sophist comes into finish, insofar as the philosopher after facing the foe and having the last laugh simmers down. In this paper after giving an interpretation of what Parmenides says, I shall present an analysis of Plato＇s drastic answer to him （Sophist, 259 e4-6） to see how Plato opens the impasse way created by the Eleatic philosopher. Here the intercommunion of Forms is regarded as the final answer by which Plato devastates Parmenides infamous thesis. Since hitherto no in-depth analysis is given by the scholars who are puzzled with the subject, I have tried to analyze the intercommunion of Forms philosophically. Plato＇s Eleatic challenge has always been crucial in Plato himself and philosophical development after him. As while as Parmenides thesis （Sph., 238 a8-9） provides the sophists opportunity to reject the falsehood, Plato＇s theory of Forms in contrast in order to cross off the extremely sly sophists tries to make Parmenides come down. In my opinion, the intercommunion of Forms, as the last step of the theory of Forms, basically determines Plato＇s late ontology tightly knitted with logic. Vindicating this proposal depends on true understanding of the intercommunion of Forms. Since Plato＇s late ontology, in my opinion, is closed to Frege＇s ontology and discussion of language, we are armed to interpret the intercommunion of Forms with recent recent logico-philosophicus achievements, I think. In this respect, this is what I have done in my paper： analyzing sentence from Plato＇s logico-metaphysical point of view. Ultimately, I have tried to show how the aim of the intercommunion of Forms, which Plato himself states, is demonstrating the possibility of dialogue and discourse. This statement explicitly sets forward that the discussion is bound up with several logical approaches, according to which finally full bright light is shed on different implications of the subject such as universals.
