Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no...Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.展开更多
In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of ...In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.展开更多
文摘Self-serving,rational agents sometimes cooperate to their mutual benefit.The two-player iterated prisoner′s dilemma game is a model for including the emergence of cooperation.It is generally believed that there is no simple ultimatum strategy which a player can control the return of the other participants.The zero-determinant strategy in the iterated prisoner′s dilemma dramatically expands our understanding of the classic game by uncovering strategies that provide a unilateral advantage to sentient players pitted against unwitting opponents.However,strategies in the prisoner′s dilemma game are only two strategies.Are there these results for general multi-strategy games?To address this question,the paper develops a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multi-strategy games,with any number of strategies.The analytical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-strategy games.The results are also applied to the Snowdrift game,the Hawk-Dove game and the Chicken game.
文摘In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.
