Expressions of emotion in the media, especially in the context of news, are often criticized as promoting irrational attitudes. For supporters of this kind of criticism, rather than addressing such emotional sensitivi...Expressions of emotion in the media, especially in the context of news, are often criticized as promoting irrational attitudes. For supporters of this kind of criticism, rather than addressing such emotional sensitivity, journalism should be objective, appealing to the rationality of the public. Anger, indignation, enthusiasm, and expressions of joy or sadness should not have part in public debates. From this perspective, rationality and emotions are opposed, the former being fundamental for the constitution of the public sphere, while the latter falls into the category of inner impulses. While Kant denied any sort of rationality to emotions, Gustave Lebon attributed emotional attitudes to crowds rather than to a public. In a crowd, emotions spread like an epidemic through a kind of contagion. The present study is based on a contrasting perspective and focuses on the rationality of emotions＇, whether in philosophy （Nussbaum）, sociology （Paperman, Aranguren 2014; Livet 2002）, or psychology （Krant-Gruber）. Oddly enough, these different approaches do not seem to have affected media studies where, belief in the irrationality of emotions, still dominates analyses of media coverage of natural or industrial catastrophes, wars, or terrorist attacks. Instead of considering the nature of emotions, or the question of whether they actually corrupt the objectivity of journalism and the supposed rationality of public debates, I will seek to develop a pragmatist approach to the question of what, emotions actually do. In fact, the idea of emotions spreading contagiously had been disputed since the 18th century when Adam Smith asked how a British newspaper reader could be affected by an earthquake happening in China. Suffering from a distance, says Adam Smith, is not the product of some kind of contagion. If we want to understand this sort of feeling, we have to imagine an inner moral spectator inside of every human being Oddly enough, Adam Smith considers emotions to be moral feelings. To feel horrified by the consequences of an earthquake, or to feel indignant about the death of innocent victims, are moral attitudes. In this respect, they are rational, but the feelings of indignation or horror also include bodily reactions. We scream, put our hands over our mouths; we blush, have tears in our eyes; we feel our heartbeat accelerate etc. These bodily reactions seem impulsive and entirely subjective, but to what extent can we say that they are rational or moral？展开更多
文摘Expressions of emotion in the media, especially in the context of news, are often criticized as promoting irrational attitudes. For supporters of this kind of criticism, rather than addressing such emotional sensitivity, journalism should be objective, appealing to the rationality of the public. Anger, indignation, enthusiasm, and expressions of joy or sadness should not have part in public debates. From this perspective, rationality and emotions are opposed, the former being fundamental for the constitution of the public sphere, while the latter falls into the category of inner impulses. While Kant denied any sort of rationality to emotions, Gustave Lebon attributed emotional attitudes to crowds rather than to a public. In a crowd, emotions spread like an epidemic through a kind of contagion. The present study is based on a contrasting perspective and focuses on the rationality of emotions＇, whether in philosophy （Nussbaum）, sociology （Paperman, Aranguren 2014; Livet 2002）, or psychology （Krant-Gruber）. Oddly enough, these different approaches do not seem to have affected media studies where, belief in the irrationality of emotions, still dominates analyses of media coverage of natural or industrial catastrophes, wars, or terrorist attacks. Instead of considering the nature of emotions, or the question of whether they actually corrupt the objectivity of journalism and the supposed rationality of public debates, I will seek to develop a pragmatist approach to the question of what, emotions actually do. In fact, the idea of emotions spreading contagiously had been disputed since the 18th century when Adam Smith asked how a British newspaper reader could be affected by an earthquake happening in China. Suffering from a distance, says Adam Smith, is not the product of some kind of contagion. If we want to understand this sort of feeling, we have to imagine an inner moral spectator inside of every human being Oddly enough, Adam Smith considers emotions to be moral feelings. To feel horrified by the consequences of an earthquake, or to feel indignant about the death of innocent victims, are moral attitudes. In this respect, they are rational, but the feelings of indignation or horror also include bodily reactions. We scream, put our hands over our mouths; we blush, have tears in our eyes; we feel our heartbeat accelerate etc. These bodily reactions seem impulsive and entirely subjective, but to what extent can we say that they are rational or moral？
