Fichte＇s various articulations of the Wissenschaftslehre （＂theory of scientific knowledge＂） are self-conscious attempts to systematize Kant＇s critical philosophy. Fichte＇s notion of the pure I （ieh） serves as...Fichte＇s various articulations of the Wissenschaftslehre （＂theory of scientific knowledge＂） are self-conscious attempts to systematize Kant＇s critical philosophy. Fichte＇s notion of the pure I （ieh） serves as the theoretical starting-point for his exposition of transcendental idealism, and in many ways this concept is analogous to Kant＇s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception explained in the Critique of Pure Reason. This paper argues that although Fichte and Kant agree on （1） the active nature of the pure I, （2） the distinction between pure and empirical apperception, and （3） skepticism concerning the possibility of theoretical knowledge of any positive （i.e., noumenal） content of the pure I, their respective notions of pure apperception differ in that Kant affirms the conceptual priority of the pure I to its objects while Fichte denies the same. Fichte＇s departure from Kant on this point foreshadows many later recognition theories of consciousness, e.g., those of Hegel and Marx.展开更多
The use of clicker technology as a tool for promoting learning, let along deep learning, is hotly debated and has its proponents and opponents. With the question still open, this paper examines the use of this technol...The use of clicker technology as a tool for promoting learning, let along deep learning, is hotly debated and has its proponents and opponents. With the question still open, this paper examines the use of this technology in fostering critical thinking and other higher-order learning and team-building skills, in the context of two entry-level psychology courses. The results obtained indicate that from the perspectives of both the student and the instructor, the integration of this technology was positively perceived to enhance the learning process and the acquisition of these skills. It would seem these concepts are, after all, not antithetical.展开更多
In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains his critical method ＂as an experiment＂ in metaphysics. The aim of that ＂experiment＂ is to establish ＂an entire revolution＂ in philosophical thinking, which was initiated...In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains his critical method ＂as an experiment＂ in metaphysics. The aim of that ＂experiment＂ is to establish ＂an entire revolution＂ in philosophical thinking, which was initiated by the Copernican revolution in cosmology in order to find the secure path, and its possibility application to metaphysics. Kant＇s aim in Critique of Pure Reason is to rescue metaphysics from a ＂blind groping＂ by undertaking a revolution in metaphysics as Copernicus has brought to cosmology. Kant＇s Copernican turn consists in the assertion that the possibility of knowledge requires that ＂the objects must conform to our cognition.＂ From Kant＇s view, we can know only what we ＂construct,＂ ＂make,＂ or ＂produce＂ as a necessary condition of knowledge, but we cannot know the mind--independent external world, i.e., the world which is independent of us. Kant＇s epistemological constructivism is the central point to his Copernican revolution.展开更多
文摘Fichte＇s various articulations of the Wissenschaftslehre （＂theory of scientific knowledge＂） are self-conscious attempts to systematize Kant＇s critical philosophy. Fichte＇s notion of the pure I （ieh） serves as the theoretical starting-point for his exposition of transcendental idealism, and in many ways this concept is analogous to Kant＇s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception explained in the Critique of Pure Reason. This paper argues that although Fichte and Kant agree on （1） the active nature of the pure I, （2） the distinction between pure and empirical apperception, and （3） skepticism concerning the possibility of theoretical knowledge of any positive （i.e., noumenal） content of the pure I, their respective notions of pure apperception differ in that Kant affirms the conceptual priority of the pure I to its objects while Fichte denies the same. Fichte＇s departure from Kant on this point foreshadows many later recognition theories of consciousness, e.g., those of Hegel and Marx.
文摘The use of clicker technology as a tool for promoting learning, let along deep learning, is hotly debated and has its proponents and opponents. With the question still open, this paper examines the use of this technology in fostering critical thinking and other higher-order learning and team-building skills, in the context of two entry-level psychology courses. The results obtained indicate that from the perspectives of both the student and the instructor, the integration of this technology was positively perceived to enhance the learning process and the acquisition of these skills. It would seem these concepts are, after all, not antithetical.
文摘In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains his critical method ＂as an experiment＂ in metaphysics. The aim of that ＂experiment＂ is to establish ＂an entire revolution＂ in philosophical thinking, which was initiated by the Copernican revolution in cosmology in order to find the secure path, and its possibility application to metaphysics. Kant＇s aim in Critique of Pure Reason is to rescue metaphysics from a ＂blind groping＂ by undertaking a revolution in metaphysics as Copernicus has brought to cosmology. Kant＇s Copernican turn consists in the assertion that the possibility of knowledge requires that ＂the objects must conform to our cognition.＂ From Kant＇s view, we can know only what we ＂construct,＂ ＂make,＂ or ＂produce＂ as a necessary condition of knowledge, but we cannot know the mind--independent external world, i.e., the world which is independent of us. Kant＇s epistemological constructivism is the central point to his Copernican revolution.
