When more than one pedestrian want to move to the same site, conflicts appear and thus the involved pedestrians play a motion game. In order to describe the emergence of cooperation during the conflict resolving proce...When more than one pedestrian want to move to the same site, conflicts appear and thus the involved pedestrians play a motion game. In order to describe the emergence of cooperation during the conflict resolving process, an evolutionary cellular automation model is established considering the effect of aspiration and mean gain. In each game, pedestrian may be gentle cooperator or aggressive defector. We propose a set of win-stay-lose-shrift （WSLS） like rules for updating pedestrian＇s strategy. These rules prescribe that if the mean gain of current strategy between some given steps is larger than aspiration the strategy keeps, otherwise the strategy changes. The simulation results show that a high level aspiration will lead to more cooperation. With the increment of the statistic length, pedestrians will be more rational in decision making. It is also found that when the aspiration level is small enough and the statistic length is large enough ail the pedestrian will turn to defectors. We use the prisoner＇s dilernma rnodel to explain it. At last we discuss the effect of aspiration on fundamental diagram.展开更多
基金Supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant No.2013JBM048the China National Natural Science Foundation under Grant Nos.71103148,70901007+2 种基金the SKLFS Program(HZ2010-KF02)the Doctoral Fund of Ministry of Education of China under Grant Nos.20090009120014the State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety under Grant Nos.RCS2009K004,RCS2010ZT005,Beijing Jiaotong University
文摘When more than one pedestrian want to move to the same site, conflicts appear and thus the involved pedestrians play a motion game. In order to describe the emergence of cooperation during the conflict resolving process, an evolutionary cellular automation model is established considering the effect of aspiration and mean gain. In each game, pedestrian may be gentle cooperator or aggressive defector. We propose a set of win-stay-lose-shrift （WSLS） like rules for updating pedestrian＇s strategy. These rules prescribe that if the mean gain of current strategy between some given steps is larger than aspiration the strategy keeps, otherwise the strategy changes. The simulation results show that a high level aspiration will lead to more cooperation. With the increment of the statistic length, pedestrians will be more rational in decision making. It is also found that when the aspiration level is small enough and the statistic length is large enough ail the pedestrian will turn to defectors. We use the prisoner＇s dilernma rnodel to explain it. At last we discuss the effect of aspiration on fundamental diagram.
