A nested Stackelberg game among a provider of a product,a sender(existing customer),and a receiver(new customer)is developed to explore the optimal referral reward programs(RRPs)for innovative offerings.The results in...A nested Stackelberg game among a provider of a product,a sender(existing customer),and a receiver(new customer)is developed to explore the optimal referral reward programs(RRPs)for innovative offerings.The results indicate that the provider should forsake RRPs and purely rely on customers'organic word-of-mouth communication under certain conditions.In particular,when the innovativeness of the referred product is extremely high,the provider should forsake RRPs completely,even though few customers will make organic referrals for the product.When the innovativeness is on other levels,the provider should make optimal RRPs decision depending on both the sender's persuasion effectiveness and the tie-strength between the two customers.Moreover,the optimal rewards increase with the innovativeness of the referred product when the provider opts to use RRPs.These results seem contrary to the existing empirical finding to some extent,and it is due to the high referral cost for making a successful referral for the high innovative offerings.展开更多
基金The National Social Science Foundation of China(No.17BGL196)。
文摘A nested Stackelberg game among a provider of a product,a sender(existing customer),and a receiver(new customer)is developed to explore the optimal referral reward programs(RRPs)for innovative offerings.The results indicate that the provider should forsake RRPs and purely rely on customers'organic word-of-mouth communication under certain conditions.In particular,when the innovativeness of the referred product is extremely high,the provider should forsake RRPs completely,even though few customers will make organic referrals for the product.When the innovativeness is on other levels,the provider should make optimal RRPs decision depending on both the sender's persuasion effectiveness and the tie-strength between the two customers.Moreover,the optimal rewards increase with the innovativeness of the referred product when the provider opts to use RRPs.These results seem contrary to the existing empirical finding to some extent,and it is due to the high referral cost for making a successful referral for the high innovative offerings.
