The aim of this paper is to consider the problem of politicians＇ control of state-owned enterprises in a transforming economy. The control of a company can be treated as a choice of a strategy pursued by this company...The aim of this paper is to consider the problem of politicians＇ control of state-owned enterprises in a transforming economy. The control of a company can be treated as a choice of a strategy pursued by this company. In order to present politicians＇ influence on a company＇s strategy, we consider the case of a firm controlled by the State Treasury （i.e., by politicians） and a company outside politicians＇ control, both functioning in a favorable and an unfavorable state of the economy. We propose the option-to-switch valuation model as a method of measuring politicians＇ private benefits of control. We illustrate the considerations using data concerning Poland＇s printing industry.展开更多
Over the past 30 years, Chinese society has undergone an enormous social transition. Along with the rise of a private economy, private business owners have emerged as a new social stratum, which attracts academic atte...Over the past 30 years, Chinese society has undergone an enormous social transition. Along with the rise of a private economy, private business owners have emerged as a new social stratum, which attracts academic attention domestically and internationally. As for the social origins of the private business owners, some of the private business owners are former cadres and current members of the Chinese Communist Party（CCP）. A question rarely pursued is what effects these ties have on political participation of＂ private business owners. The paper explores this question on the basis of data gathered in a representative survey of private enterprises in 2006. The study shows that the Chinese private business owners have diverse social origins, and their behavior in terms of political participation is also distinct in some ways. When it comes to the patterns of political participation of the private business owners, CCP members and former officials among private business owners indeed have unique characteristics in their access to political resources, but the patterns of political participation vary between these two groups. Furthermore, there are also considerable differences between members of the CCP and democratic parties in China in these respects. These findings cast doubt on the common use of CCP membership and occupational experience as cadre as interchangeable indicators for the ＂political capital＂ of business owners. A more differentiated understanding of the nature of political capital and mechanisms by which it is put to use by private entrepreneurs in China is called for.展开更多
文摘The aim of this paper is to consider the problem of politicians＇ control of state-owned enterprises in a transforming economy. The control of a company can be treated as a choice of a strategy pursued by this company. In order to present politicians＇ influence on a company＇s strategy, we consider the case of a firm controlled by the State Treasury （i.e., by politicians） and a company outside politicians＇ control, both functioning in a favorable and an unfavorable state of the economy. We propose the option-to-switch valuation model as a method of measuring politicians＇ private benefits of control. We illustrate the considerations using data concerning Poland＇s printing industry.
文摘Over the past 30 years, Chinese society has undergone an enormous social transition. Along with the rise of a private economy, private business owners have emerged as a new social stratum, which attracts academic attention domestically and internationally. As for the social origins of the private business owners, some of the private business owners are former cadres and current members of the Chinese Communist Party（CCP）. A question rarely pursued is what effects these ties have on political participation of＂ private business owners. The paper explores this question on the basis of data gathered in a representative survey of private enterprises in 2006. The study shows that the Chinese private business owners have diverse social origins, and their behavior in terms of political participation is also distinct in some ways. When it comes to the patterns of political participation of the private business owners, CCP members and former officials among private business owners indeed have unique characteristics in their access to political resources, but the patterns of political participation vary between these two groups. Furthermore, there are also considerable differences between members of the CCP and democratic parties in China in these respects. These findings cast doubt on the common use of CCP membership and occupational experience as cadre as interchangeable indicators for the ＂political capital＂ of business owners. A more differentiated understanding of the nature of political capital and mechanisms by which it is put to use by private entrepreneurs in China is called for.
