After assuming the Chinese presidency in March 2013, Xi Jinping introduced the new political slogan ＂the Chinese Dream,＂ which he does not only address to the domestic audience but also aims to promote to the world....After assuming the Chinese presidency in March 2013, Xi Jinping introduced the new political slogan ＂the Chinese Dream,＂ which he does not only address to the domestic audience but also aims to promote to the world. Since his inaugural trip abroad, Xi has repeatedly speeches when addressing international catchphrase received as much appeal as used the term ＂Chinese Dream＂ in his audiences. However, nowhere has the in Africa. Simultaneously, African academics and other interested parties have observed the promotion of the idea of an African Dream by the Chinese Communist Party （CCP） with great suspicion as they view it simply as a projection of China＇s own foreign policy onto Africa. But what do the Chinese Dream and African Dream actually mean？ How can we make sense out of these terms？ In order to decode or demystify the meaning behind the Chinese Dream narrative in the context of China＇s foreign policy, this paper argues that it is essential to examine how it is constructed and projected to the international audience, in particular to Africa. The Chinese Dream is understood as a narrative which is strategically used by the CCP in order to shape perceptions and behavior of other international actors according to their own agenda. Moreover, the dynamic interactions between the media and politics and how they impinge on the formation and projection of the Chinese Dream and African Dream narrative will also be taken into account.展开更多
In the last few years, ＂the BRICS＂ or Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have been increasingly investing in developing their cooperation and seeking to exert joint global influence. BRICS＇ mobilization...In the last few years, ＂the BRICS＂ or Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have been increasingly investing in developing their cooperation and seeking to exert joint global influence. BRICS＇ mobilization has been visible in the cooperation of high-level officials, deeper policy coordination, and the creation of BRICS institutions. As the BRICS intensify their pursuit of multipolarity, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the ways in which the BRICS has been received in the United States （US）, which is a crucial stakeholder in creating a multipolar system. How is the BRICS represented in US foreign policy circles？ This article examines the state of the US debate on the BR/CS, drawing on the per- spectives from foreign policy officials, top think tanks, and academics. It argues that there is a considerable gap between BRICS＇ multipolar aspirations and the perceptions of the grouping＇s promise and potential in the US. The BRICS is often marginalized in the US as an entity, and---even if accepted as such--it is considered ineffective in terms of its results. However, the BRICS benefits US foreign policy development： it challenges US officials to clarify their message on multipolarity; it reframes the debate from bilateral China vs. US competition to multilateral processes of providing global public goods; it generates a subfield of BRICS studies, which internationalize the production and consumption of knowledge in the field of global politics.展开更多
China＇s insistence on the non-interference principle has been increasingly inconsistent. While China＇s concern with sovereignty, regime security, and legitimacy, as well as its developing country identity, have push...China＇s insistence on the non-interference principle has been increasingly inconsistent. While China＇s concern with sovereignty, regime security, and legitimacy, as well as its developing country identity, have pushed it to continue its insistence on the principle of non-interference, China＇s further adaptation to the international system, increasing engagement in intemational institutions, and new identity as a responsible power have led China to drag its feet on the same principle. To reconcile these competing forces, China has to make concessions, namely, setting preconditions to legitimize intervention, designing a sovereignty-first solution, and/or complementing the non-interference principle with alternative principles. China＇s application of the non-interference principle has thus been made contingent. It is more inflexible at one end of a spectrum and more flexible at the other end, with China＇s foreign policies shifting back and forth between them.展开更多
文摘After assuming the Chinese presidency in March 2013, Xi Jinping introduced the new political slogan ＂the Chinese Dream,＂ which he does not only address to the domestic audience but also aims to promote to the world. Since his inaugural trip abroad, Xi has repeatedly speeches when addressing international catchphrase received as much appeal as used the term ＂Chinese Dream＂ in his audiences. However, nowhere has the in Africa. Simultaneously, African academics and other interested parties have observed the promotion of the idea of an African Dream by the Chinese Communist Party （CCP） with great suspicion as they view it simply as a projection of China＇s own foreign policy onto Africa. But what do the Chinese Dream and African Dream actually mean？ How can we make sense out of these terms？ In order to decode or demystify the meaning behind the Chinese Dream narrative in the context of China＇s foreign policy, this paper argues that it is essential to examine how it is constructed and projected to the international audience, in particular to Africa. The Chinese Dream is understood as a narrative which is strategically used by the CCP in order to shape perceptions and behavior of other international actors according to their own agenda. Moreover, the dynamic interactions between the media and politics and how they impinge on the formation and projection of the Chinese Dream and African Dream narrative will also be taken into account.
文摘In the last few years, ＂the BRICS＂ or Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have been increasingly investing in developing their cooperation and seeking to exert joint global influence. BRICS＇ mobilization has been visible in the cooperation of high-level officials, deeper policy coordination, and the creation of BRICS institutions. As the BRICS intensify their pursuit of multipolarity, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the ways in which the BRICS has been received in the United States （US）, which is a crucial stakeholder in creating a multipolar system. How is the BRICS represented in US foreign policy circles？ This article examines the state of the US debate on the BR/CS, drawing on the per- spectives from foreign policy officials, top think tanks, and academics. It argues that there is a considerable gap between BRICS＇ multipolar aspirations and the perceptions of the grouping＇s promise and potential in the US. The BRICS is often marginalized in the US as an entity, and---even if accepted as such--it is considered ineffective in terms of its results. However, the BRICS benefits US foreign policy development： it challenges US officials to clarify their message on multipolarity; it reframes the debate from bilateral China vs. US competition to multilateral processes of providing global public goods; it generates a subfield of BRICS studies, which internationalize the production and consumption of knowledge in the field of global politics.
文摘China＇s insistence on the non-interference principle has been increasingly inconsistent. While China＇s concern with sovereignty, regime security, and legitimacy, as well as its developing country identity, have pushed it to continue its insistence on the principle of non-interference, China＇s further adaptation to the international system, increasing engagement in intemational institutions, and new identity as a responsible power have led China to drag its feet on the same principle. To reconcile these competing forces, China has to make concessions, namely, setting preconditions to legitimize intervention, designing a sovereignty-first solution, and/or complementing the non-interference principle with alternative principles. China＇s application of the non-interference principle has thus been made contingent. It is more inflexible at one end of a spectrum and more flexible at the other end, with China＇s foreign policies shifting back and forth between them.
