Due to the fact that consumers'privacy data sharing has multifaceted and complex effects on the e-commerce platform and its two sided agents,consumers and sellers,a game-theoretic model in a monopoly e-market is s...Due to the fact that consumers'privacy data sharing has multifaceted and complex effects on the e-commerce platform and its two sided agents,consumers and sellers,a game-theoretic model in a monopoly e-market is set up to study the equilibrium strategies of the three agents(the platform,the seller on it and consumers)under privacy data sharing.Equilibrium decisions show that after sharing consumers'privacy data once,the platform can collect more privacy data from consumers.Meanwhile,privacy data sharing pushes the seller to reduce the product price.Moreover,the platform will increase the transaction fee if the privacy data sharing value is high.It is also indicated that privacy data sharing always benefits consumers and the seller.However,the platform's profit decreases if the privacy data sharing value is low and the privacy data sharing level is high.Finally,an extended model considering an incomplete information game among the agents is discussed.The results show that both the platform and the seller cannot obtain a high profit from privacy data sharing.Factors including the seller's possibility to buy privacy data,the privacy data sharing value and privacy data sharing level affect the two agents'payoffs.If the platform wishes to benefit from privacy data sharing,it should increase the possibility of the seller to buy privacy data or increase the privacy data sharing value.展开更多
基金The National Social Science Foundation of China(No.17BGL196)。
文摘Due to the fact that consumers'privacy data sharing has multifaceted and complex effects on the e-commerce platform and its two sided agents,consumers and sellers,a game-theoretic model in a monopoly e-market is set up to study the equilibrium strategies of the three agents(the platform,the seller on it and consumers)under privacy data sharing.Equilibrium decisions show that after sharing consumers'privacy data once,the platform can collect more privacy data from consumers.Meanwhile,privacy data sharing pushes the seller to reduce the product price.Moreover,the platform will increase the transaction fee if the privacy data sharing value is high.It is also indicated that privacy data sharing always benefits consumers and the seller.However,the platform's profit decreases if the privacy data sharing value is low and the privacy data sharing level is high.Finally,an extended model considering an incomplete information game among the agents is discussed.The results show that both the platform and the seller cannot obtain a high profit from privacy data sharing.Factors including the seller's possibility to buy privacy data,the privacy data sharing value and privacy data sharing level affect the two agents'payoffs.If the platform wishes to benefit from privacy data sharing,it should increase the possibility of the seller to buy privacy data or increase the privacy data sharing value.
