In this paper I examine the following claims by William Eaton in his monograph Boyle on Fire： （i） that Boyle＇s religious convictions led him to believe that the world was not completely explicable, and this shows ...In this paper I examine the following claims by William Eaton in his monograph Boyle on Fire： （i） that Boyle＇s religious convictions led him to believe that the world was not completely explicable, and this shows that there is a shortcoming in the power of mechanical explanations; （ii） that mechanical explanations offer only sufficient, not necessary explanations, and this too was taken by Boyle to be a limit in the explanatory power of mechanical explanations; （iii） that the mature Boyle thought that there could be more intelligible explanatory models than mechanism; and （iv） that what Boyle says at any point in his career is incompatible with the statement of Maria Boas-Hall, i.e., that the mechanical hypothesis can explicate all natural phenomena. Since all four of these claims are part of Eaton＇s developmental argument, my rejection of them will not only show how the particular developmental story Eaton diagnoses is inaccurate, but will also explain what limits there actually are in Boyle＇s account of the intelligibility of mechanical explanations. My account will also show why important philosophers like Locke and Leibniz should be interested in Boyle＇s philosophical work.展开更多
文摘In this paper I examine the following claims by William Eaton in his monograph Boyle on Fire： （i） that Boyle＇s religious convictions led him to believe that the world was not completely explicable, and this shows that there is a shortcoming in the power of mechanical explanations; （ii） that mechanical explanations offer only sufficient, not necessary explanations, and this too was taken by Boyle to be a limit in the explanatory power of mechanical explanations; （iii） that the mature Boyle thought that there could be more intelligible explanatory models than mechanism; and （iv） that what Boyle says at any point in his career is incompatible with the statement of Maria Boas-Hall, i.e., that the mechanical hypothesis can explicate all natural phenomena. Since all four of these claims are part of Eaton＇s developmental argument, my rejection of them will not only show how the particular developmental story Eaton diagnoses is inaccurate, but will also explain what limits there actually are in Boyle＇s account of the intelligibility of mechanical explanations. My account will also show why important philosophers like Locke and Leibniz should be interested in Boyle＇s philosophical work.
