A large magnitude-9.0 earthquake struck northeast Japan on March 11, 2011. Thirty minutes later, a tsunami reached Tokyo Electric Power Corporation （TEPCO）＇s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, and the emergen...A large magnitude-9.0 earthquake struck northeast Japan on March 11, 2011. Thirty minutes later, a tsunami reached Tokyo Electric Power Corporation （TEPCO）＇s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, and the emergency diesel generators submerged under water. Three units of the reactor experienced meltdown, and hydrogen explosions occurred at reactor houses. The RIKEN Nishina Center （RNC） contributed to the radiation screening effort by providing human resources, instruments, and transportation. The RNC also carried out extraction work and sample tests for soil contamination. Last summer, RIKEN was legally required to save 15% （equivalent to 3.3 MW） of its allocated electricity in its contract, making it extremely difficult to conduct experiments using accelerators. Accelerator operation was thus reduced to a minimum during the first half of the year. The RNC has a gas-turbine-based co-generation system （CGS） with an electrical capacity of 6.5 MW. The CGS was operated non-stop until the end of the year. RIKEN is constructing two sets of CGSs, each with a capacity of 1.5 MW to be commissioned this autumn.展开更多
On March 11, 2011, a simply unprecedented set of circumstances occurred in Northeast ]apan. Three disasters struck nearly simultaneously： a 9.0 earthquake, huge tsunami, and nuclear catastrophe. People and places wer...On March 11, 2011, a simply unprecedented set of circumstances occurred in Northeast ]apan. Three disasters struck nearly simultaneously： a 9.0 earthquake, huge tsunami, and nuclear catastrophe. People and places were forever changed. Using a series of vignettes, this paper personalized these numbers through a review of rebuilding efforts, voluntarism, consumer food impacts, and consumer behavior associated with the imperfect storm that destroyed more than 46,000 buildings, killed more than 12,000, and resulted in damages from the tsunami and earthquake alone of between 16 and 25 trillion yen. Possible implications of these results are advanced.展开更多
The seismic safety of nuclear power plan(tNPP)has always been a major consideration in the site selection,design,operation,and more recently recertification of existing installations. In addition to the actual NPP and...The seismic safety of nuclear power plan(tNPP)has always been a major consideration in the site selection,design,operation,and more recently recertification of existing installations. In addition to the actual NPP and all their operational and safety related support systems,the storage of spent fuel in temporary or permanent storage facilities also poses a seismic risk. This seismic risk is typically assessed with state-of-the-art modeling and analytical tools that capture everything from the ground rupture or source of the earthquake to the site specific ground shaking,taking geotechnical parameters and soilfoundationstructureinteraction (SFSI) into account to the non-linear structural response of the reactor core,the containment structure,the core cooling system and the emergency cooling system(s),to support systems,piping systems and non-structural components,and finally the performance of spent fuel storage in the probabilistically determined operational basis earthquake (OBE) or the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) scenario. The best and most meaningful validation and verification of these advanced analytical tools is in the form of full or very large scale experimental testing,designed and conducted in direct support of model and analysis tool calibration. This paper outlines the principles under which such calibration testing should be conducted and illustrates with examples the kind of testing and parameter evaluation required.展开更多
This study constructs a potential risk index(PRI) for the 65 U.S.-based commercial nuclear power plant(NPP) sites in relation to their surrounding populations. Four risk levels are defined: low risk, moderate risk,hig...This study constructs a potential risk index(PRI) for the 65 U.S.-based commercial nuclear power plant(NPP) sites in relation to their surrounding populations. Four risk levels are defined: low risk, moderate risk,high risk, and very high risk. Discrepancies that exist in the sociodemographic characteristics of the host communities’ populations are examined as sorted by risk-level category.It is found that a greater percentage of minority groups are exposed to the highest levels of risk. In addition, percent 'Hispanic' and percent 'Other,'a grouping that includes multiracial, mixed, interracial, as well as Hispanic and Latino groups(for example, Mexican, Puerto Rican,Cuban, or Spanish) are categories that show the greatest percent change in both the period 1990–2000 and2000–2010.展开更多
This study explores the potential risks associated with the 65 U.S.-based commercial nuclear power plants and the distribution of those risks among the populations of both their respective host communities and of the ...This study explores the potential risks associated with the 65 U.S.-based commercial nuclear power plants and the distribution of those risks among the populations of both their respective host communities and of the communities located in outlying areas. First, it starts by examining the racial/ethnic composition of the host community populations, as well as the disparities in socioeconomic status that exist, if any, between the host communities and communities located in outlying areas.Second, it utilizes two independent-sample T tests to identify any differences in the sociodemographic compositions of the two areas. Third, it explores regional demographic trends by looking at the percent change in demographic variables in the host communities and communities located in outlying areas in 1990–2000 and2000–2010. Findings reveal that during the past two decades more people were exposed to the risks as population living in the host communities increased.展开更多
文摘A large magnitude-9.0 earthquake struck northeast Japan on March 11, 2011. Thirty minutes later, a tsunami reached Tokyo Electric Power Corporation （TEPCO）＇s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, and the emergency diesel generators submerged under water. Three units of the reactor experienced meltdown, and hydrogen explosions occurred at reactor houses. The RIKEN Nishina Center （RNC） contributed to the radiation screening effort by providing human resources, instruments, and transportation. The RNC also carried out extraction work and sample tests for soil contamination. Last summer, RIKEN was legally required to save 15% （equivalent to 3.3 MW） of its allocated electricity in its contract, making it extremely difficult to conduct experiments using accelerators. Accelerator operation was thus reduced to a minimum during the first half of the year. The RNC has a gas-turbine-based co-generation system （CGS） with an electrical capacity of 6.5 MW. The CGS was operated non-stop until the end of the year. RIKEN is constructing two sets of CGSs, each with a capacity of 1.5 MW to be commissioned this autumn.
文摘On March 11, 2011, a simply unprecedented set of circumstances occurred in Northeast ]apan. Three disasters struck nearly simultaneously： a 9.0 earthquake, huge tsunami, and nuclear catastrophe. People and places were forever changed. Using a series of vignettes, this paper personalized these numbers through a review of rebuilding efforts, voluntarism, consumer food impacts, and consumer behavior associated with the imperfect storm that destroyed more than 46,000 buildings, killed more than 12,000, and resulted in damages from the tsunami and earthquake alone of between 16 and 25 trillion yen. Possible implications of these results are advanced.
文摘The seismic safety of nuclear power plan(tNPP)has always been a major consideration in the site selection,design,operation,and more recently recertification of existing installations. In addition to the actual NPP and all their operational and safety related support systems,the storage of spent fuel in temporary or permanent storage facilities also poses a seismic risk. This seismic risk is typically assessed with state-of-the-art modeling and analytical tools that capture everything from the ground rupture or source of the earthquake to the site specific ground shaking,taking geotechnical parameters and soilfoundationstructureinteraction (SFSI) into account to the non-linear structural response of the reactor core,the containment structure,the core cooling system and the emergency cooling system(s),to support systems,piping systems and non-structural components,and finally the performance of spent fuel storage in the probabilistically determined operational basis earthquake (OBE) or the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) scenario. The best and most meaningful validation and verification of these advanced analytical tools is in the form of full or very large scale experimental testing,designed and conducted in direct support of model and analysis tool calibration. This paper outlines the principles under which such calibration testing should be conducted and illustrates with examples the kind of testing and parameter evaluation required.
文摘This study constructs a potential risk index(PRI) for the 65 U.S.-based commercial nuclear power plant(NPP) sites in relation to their surrounding populations. Four risk levels are defined: low risk, moderate risk,high risk, and very high risk. Discrepancies that exist in the sociodemographic characteristics of the host communities’ populations are examined as sorted by risk-level category.It is found that a greater percentage of minority groups are exposed to the highest levels of risk. In addition, percent 'Hispanic' and percent 'Other,'a grouping that includes multiracial, mixed, interracial, as well as Hispanic and Latino groups(for example, Mexican, Puerto Rican,Cuban, or Spanish) are categories that show the greatest percent change in both the period 1990–2000 and2000–2010.
文摘This study explores the potential risks associated with the 65 U.S.-based commercial nuclear power plants and the distribution of those risks among the populations of both their respective host communities and of the communities located in outlying areas. First, it starts by examining the racial/ethnic composition of the host community populations, as well as the disparities in socioeconomic status that exist, if any, between the host communities and communities located in outlying areas.Second, it utilizes two independent-sample T tests to identify any differences in the sociodemographic compositions of the two areas. Third, it explores regional demographic trends by looking at the percent change in demographic variables in the host communities and communities located in outlying areas in 1990–2000 and2000–2010. Findings reveal that during the past two decades more people were exposed to the risks as population living in the host communities increased.
