近年来,学者们开始借鉴高层梯队理论来分析管理者与内部会计控制系统之间的关系。基于高层梯队理论(Hambrick and Mason,1984),Crossland and Hambrick(2007,2011)以市场国家为研究背景,确立起"内控制度—高管权力—企业绩效"...近年来,学者们开始借鉴高层梯队理论来分析管理者与内部会计控制系统之间的关系。基于高层梯队理论(Hambrick and Mason,1984),Crossland and Hambrick(2007,2011)以市场国家为研究背景,确立起"内控制度—高管权力—企业绩效"的分析框架。现有研究一致认为,年轻有为新上任的CFO和有相关业务背景的高层管理人员有更多的创新或先进的内部会计控制系统经验。文章对高层梯队理论及内部会计控制研究的应用进行概述,对于读者深化认识管理层特征的范畴及其内部控制的有效性影响有一定作用。展开更多
本文以2012年至2022年间A股非金融上市公司为研究样本,研究高管合规背景对应计与真实盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果发现,企业高管中合规背景的比例越大,越有助于抑制应计盈余管理行为与真实盈余管理行为,且结果在经过增加控制变量和增...本文以2012年至2022年间A股非金融上市公司为研究样本,研究高管合规背景对应计与真实盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果发现,企业高管中合规背景的比例越大,越有助于抑制应计盈余管理行为与真实盈余管理行为,且结果在经过增加控制变量和增加高维固定效应两种方法稳健性检验后是可靠的。机制检验发现,诉讼威慑与高管合规背景存在替代效应,面临诉讼威慑越严重的企业,在后续财年的盈余管理方面越收敛。异质性分析发现,合规背景高管的比例越高,有助于压制国有企业的真实盈余管理行为与非国有企业的应计盈余管理行为;高管合规背景对盈余管理行为的约束作用,在内部控制质量较弱的企业发挥得更明显。本文结论表明高管合规背景在上市公司财务操纵方面能够发挥积极的治理效应,并佐证了加强对上市企业违法违规行为的“违法必究”政策对资本市场健康运行、保护投资者利益的积极意义。This paper takes A-share non-financial listed companies from 2012 to 2022 as research samples to study the impact of executive compliance background on accounting and real earnings management behavior. The research results show that the larger the proportion of compliance background among corporate executives, the more conducive to inhibiting accrual earnings management behavior and real earnings management behavior, and the results are reliable after the robustness test of increasing control variables and increasing high-dimensional fixed effects. The mechanism test found that there is a substitution effect between litigation deterrence and executive compliance background. The more serious the litigation deterrence, the more restrained the earnings management in the subsequent fiscal year. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the higher the proportion of executives with compliance background, it helps to suppress the real earnings management behavior of state-owned enterprises and the accrual earnings management behavior of non-state-owned enterprises. The restrictive effect of executive compliance background on earnings management behavior is more obvious in enterprises with weak internal control quality. The conclusion of this paper shows that the compliance background of senior executives can play a positive governance effect on the financial manipulation of listed companies, and proves the positive significance of strengthening the policy of “investigating violations of laws and regulations” for the healthy operation of the capital market and protecting the interests of investors.展开更多
文摘近年来,学者们开始借鉴高层梯队理论来分析管理者与内部会计控制系统之间的关系。基于高层梯队理论(Hambrick and Mason,1984),Crossland and Hambrick(2007,2011)以市场国家为研究背景,确立起"内控制度—高管权力—企业绩效"的分析框架。现有研究一致认为,年轻有为新上任的CFO和有相关业务背景的高层管理人员有更多的创新或先进的内部会计控制系统经验。文章对高层梯队理论及内部会计控制研究的应用进行概述,对于读者深化认识管理层特征的范畴及其内部控制的有效性影响有一定作用。
文摘本文以2012年至2022年间A股非金融上市公司为研究样本,研究高管合规背景对应计与真实盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果发现,企业高管中合规背景的比例越大,越有助于抑制应计盈余管理行为与真实盈余管理行为,且结果在经过增加控制变量和增加高维固定效应两种方法稳健性检验后是可靠的。机制检验发现,诉讼威慑与高管合规背景存在替代效应,面临诉讼威慑越严重的企业,在后续财年的盈余管理方面越收敛。异质性分析发现,合规背景高管的比例越高,有助于压制国有企业的真实盈余管理行为与非国有企业的应计盈余管理行为;高管合规背景对盈余管理行为的约束作用,在内部控制质量较弱的企业发挥得更明显。本文结论表明高管合规背景在上市公司财务操纵方面能够发挥积极的治理效应,并佐证了加强对上市企业违法违规行为的“违法必究”政策对资本市场健康运行、保护投资者利益的积极意义。This paper takes A-share non-financial listed companies from 2012 to 2022 as research samples to study the impact of executive compliance background on accounting and real earnings management behavior. The research results show that the larger the proportion of compliance background among corporate executives, the more conducive to inhibiting accrual earnings management behavior and real earnings management behavior, and the results are reliable after the robustness test of increasing control variables and increasing high-dimensional fixed effects. The mechanism test found that there is a substitution effect between litigation deterrence and executive compliance background. The more serious the litigation deterrence, the more restrained the earnings management in the subsequent fiscal year. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the higher the proportion of executives with compliance background, it helps to suppress the real earnings management behavior of state-owned enterprises and the accrual earnings management behavior of non-state-owned enterprises. The restrictive effect of executive compliance background on earnings management behavior is more obvious in enterprises with weak internal control quality. The conclusion of this paper shows that the compliance background of senior executives can play a positive governance effect on the financial manipulation of listed companies, and proves the positive significance of strengthening the policy of “investigating violations of laws and regulations” for the healthy operation of the capital market and protecting the interests of investors.
