核概率主元分析(kernel probabilistic principal component analysis,KPPCA)能够有效去除过程的非线性。但是KPPCA仅构造了生产过程的静态线性关系,处理具有较强动态特性的实际工业生产过程效果较差。为克服上述缺点,提出一种基于动态K...核概率主元分析(kernel probabilistic principal component analysis,KPPCA)能够有效去除过程的非线性。但是KPPCA仅构造了生产过程的静态线性关系,处理具有较强动态特性的实际工业生产过程效果较差。为克服上述缺点,提出一种基于动态KPPCA的过程监测方法,利用核函数将经过压缩的动态增广数据映射到高维空间,然后利用PPCA对满足线性关系的过程变量映射值进行监测。仿真结果表明:该方法监测指标对故障的灵敏度高,误报率和漏检率较小,故障状况与正常状况很明显的分离开来。展开更多
The original internal flooding probabilistic safety analysis （PSA） study of Krsko Nuclear Power Plant （two-loop Pressurized Water Reactor （PWR） plant of Westinghouse design） was performed in mid nineties and lim...The original internal flooding probabilistic safety analysis （PSA） study of Krsko Nuclear Power Plant （two-loop Pressurized Water Reactor （PWR） plant of Westinghouse design） was performed in mid nineties and limited to reactor core damage risk （Level 1 PSA）. In 2003, it was, together with other safety and hazard analyses, subject to the Periodic Safety Review （PSR）. In the PSR, it was stated that methodological PSA approaches and guidelines have evoluted during the past decade and several observations were provided, concerning the area screening process, residual risk and treatment of plant damage states and risk from radioactivity releases （i.e., Level 2 PSA）. In order to address the PSR observations, upgrade ofKrsko NPP internal flooding PSA was undertaken. The area screening process was revisited in order to cover the areas without automatic reactor trip equipment. The model was extended to Level 2. Residual risk was estimated at both Level 1 and Level 2, in terms of core damage frequency （CDF） and large early release frequency （LERF）, respectively.展开更多
文摘核概率主元分析(kernel probabilistic principal component analysis,KPPCA)能够有效去除过程的非线性。但是KPPCA仅构造了生产过程的静态线性关系,处理具有较强动态特性的实际工业生产过程效果较差。为克服上述缺点,提出一种基于动态KPPCA的过程监测方法,利用核函数将经过压缩的动态增广数据映射到高维空间,然后利用PPCA对满足线性关系的过程变量映射值进行监测。仿真结果表明:该方法监测指标对故障的灵敏度高,误报率和漏检率较小,故障状况与正常状况很明显的分离开来。
文摘The original internal flooding probabilistic safety analysis （PSA） study of Krsko Nuclear Power Plant （two-loop Pressurized Water Reactor （PWR） plant of Westinghouse design） was performed in mid nineties and limited to reactor core damage risk （Level 1 PSA）. In 2003, it was, together with other safety and hazard analyses, subject to the Periodic Safety Review （PSR）. In the PSR, it was stated that methodological PSA approaches and guidelines have evoluted during the past decade and several observations were provided, concerning the area screening process, residual risk and treatment of plant damage states and risk from radioactivity releases （i.e., Level 2 PSA）. In order to address the PSR observations, upgrade ofKrsko NPP internal flooding PSA was undertaken. The area screening process was revisited in order to cover the areas without automatic reactor trip equipment. The model was extended to Level 2. Residual risk was estimated at both Level 1 and Level 2, in terms of core damage frequency （CDF） and large early release frequency （LERF）, respectively.
