This paper discusses some issues on human reliability model of time dependent human behavior. Some results of the crew reliability experiment on Tsinghua training simulator in China are given, Meanwhile, a case of ca...This paper discusses some issues on human reliability model of time dependent human behavior. Some results of the crew reliability experiment on Tsinghua training simulator in China are given, Meanwhile, a case of calculation for human error probability during anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) based on the data drew from the recent experiment is offered.展开更多
In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of ...In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.展开更多
Abstract Let X1, X2,... be a sequence of dependent and heavy-tailed random variables with distributions F1, F2,.. on （-∞,∞）, and let T be a nonnegative integer-valued random variable independent of the sequence {X...Abstract Let X1, X2,... be a sequence of dependent and heavy-tailed random variables with distributions F1, F2,.. on （-∞,∞）, and let T be a nonnegative integer-valued random variable independent of the sequence {Xk, k 〉 1}. In this framework, the asymptotic behavior of the tail probabilities of the quantities Sn = fi Xk and S（n） =∑ k=1 n 〉 1, and their randomized versions ST and S（τ） are studied. Some risk theory are presented. max Sk for 1〈k〈n applications to the展开更多
For a risk process R_u(t) = u + ct- X(t), t≥0, where u≥0 is the initial capital, c > 0 is the premium rate and X(t), t≥0 is an aggregate claim process, we investigate the probability of the Parisian ruin P_S(u, ...For a risk process R_u(t) = u + ct- X(t), t≥0, where u≥0 is the initial capital, c > 0 is the premium rate and X(t), t≥0 is an aggregate claim process, we investigate the probability of the Parisian ruin P_S(u, T_u) = P{inf (t∈[0,S]_(s∈[t,t+T_u])) sup R_u(s) < 0}, S, T_u > 0.For X being a general Gaussian process we derive approximations of P_S(u, T_u) as u →∞. As a by-product, we obtain the tail asymptotic behaviour of the infimum of a standard Brownian motion with drift over a finite-time interval.展开更多
文摘This paper discusses some issues on human reliability model of time dependent human behavior. Some results of the crew reliability experiment on Tsinghua training simulator in China are given, Meanwhile, a case of calculation for human error probability during anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) based on the data drew from the recent experiment is offered.
文摘In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 11171179)the Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China (No. 20093705110002)
文摘Abstract Let X1, X2,... be a sequence of dependent and heavy-tailed random variables with distributions F1, F2,.. on （-∞,∞）, and let T be a nonnegative integer-valued random variable independent of the sequence {Xk, k 〉 1}. In this framework, the asymptotic behavior of the tail probabilities of the quantities Sn = fi Xk and S（n） =∑ k=1 n 〉 1, and their randomized versions ST and S（τ） are studied. Some risk theory are presented. max Sk for 1〈k〈n applications to the
基金the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No. 200021140633/1)the project Risk Analysis, Ruin and Extremes (an FP7 Marie Curie International Research Staff Exchange Scheme Fellowship) (Grant No. 318984)Narodowe Centrum Nauki (Grant No. 2013/09/B/ST1/01778 (2014-2016))
文摘For a risk process R_u(t) = u + ct- X(t), t≥0, where u≥0 is the initial capital, c > 0 is the premium rate and X(t), t≥0 is an aggregate claim process, we investigate the probability of the Parisian ruin P_S(u, T_u) = P{inf (t∈[0,S]_(s∈[t,t+T_u])) sup R_u(s) < 0}, S, T_u > 0.For X being a general Gaussian process we derive approximations of P_S(u, T_u) as u →∞. As a by-product, we obtain the tail asymptotic behaviour of the infimum of a standard Brownian motion with drift over a finite-time interval.
