A two-period duopoly model is developed to examine the competitive effects of targeted advertising with customer recognition （TACR）. In the model, two competing firms sell goods to end consumers in the first period,...A two-period duopoly model is developed to examine the competitive effects of targeted advertising with customer recognition （TACR）. In the model, two competing firms sell goods to end consumers in the first period, during which customer recognition is obtained. In the second period, advertising can be targeted toward different consumer types. Advertising is assumed to be persuasive in the way that consumer valuation is increased. Equilibrium decisions and profits in each period are derived, showing that the firm who loses the current competition will win in the future. As a result, forward-looking firms price less aggressively so that their long-term profits can be enhanced with the help of TACR. Particularly, TACR improves profits through three important effects： valuation increasing, customer poaching, and anti-competition. Finally, this paper investigates the welfare issues, showing that firms enhance profits at the expense of consumer surplus. It is, therefore, suggested that public sectors take a step to protect consumers with the rapid development of targeting technology.展开更多
A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market. In the first period, two firms compete in price in order to recognize cu...A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market. In the first period, two firms compete in price in order to recognize customers. In the second period, targeted advertising plays an informative role and acts as a price discrimination device. The firms＇ optimal advertising and pricing strategies under imperfect targeting are compared with those under perfect targeting. Equilibrium decisions show that, under imperfect targeting, when the advertising cost is low enough, both firms will choose to target ads at the rivals＇ old segments. This equilibrium, which could not exist under perfect targeting, results in two opposite results. When cost is high, the effect of mis-targeting will soften price competition and increase profits; on the contrary, when cost is low enough, it will lead to aggressive price competition and profit loss with the increase of imperfect targeting, so firms may have incentives to reduce the mis- targeting degree.展开更多
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71071033)the Research and Innovation Project for College Graduates of Jiangsu Province(No.CXZZ-0186)
文摘A two-period duopoly model is developed to examine the competitive effects of targeted advertising with customer recognition （TACR）. In the model, two competing firms sell goods to end consumers in the first period, during which customer recognition is obtained. In the second period, advertising can be targeted toward different consumer types. Advertising is assumed to be persuasive in the way that consumer valuation is increased. Equilibrium decisions and profits in each period are derived, showing that the firm who loses the current competition will win in the future. As a result, forward-looking firms price less aggressively so that their long-term profits can be enhanced with the help of TACR. Particularly, TACR improves profits through three important effects： valuation increasing, customer poaching, and anti-competition. Finally, this paper investigates the welfare issues, showing that firms enhance profits at the expense of consumer surplus. It is, therefore, suggested that public sectors take a step to protect consumers with the rapid development of targeting technology.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71371050)
文摘A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market. In the first period, two firms compete in price in order to recognize customers. In the second period, targeted advertising plays an informative role and acts as a price discrimination device. The firms＇ optimal advertising and pricing strategies under imperfect targeting are compared with those under perfect targeting. Equilibrium decisions show that, under imperfect targeting, when the advertising cost is low enough, both firms will choose to target ads at the rivals＇ old segments. This equilibrium, which could not exist under perfect targeting, results in two opposite results. When cost is high, the effect of mis-targeting will soften price competition and increase profits; on the contrary, when cost is low enough, it will lead to aggressive price competition and profit loss with the increase of imperfect targeting, so firms may have incentives to reduce the mis- targeting degree.
