Citizens of liberal democracies hold that their theory of governance is the most just, the most consistent with freedom, and the most likely to promote human flourishing. Yet, Canada, one of the world＇s most liberal ...Citizens of liberal democracies hold that their theory of governance is the most just, the most consistent with freedom, and the most likely to promote human flourishing. Yet, Canada, one of the world＇s most liberal and progressive democracies, has consistently been unable to come to terms with the minority nations in its midst. Why would national minorities resist joining fully in a just liberal democratic state？ And in the face of this refusal, what sort of relationship should the majority establish with these national minorities？ I argue that their resistance stems from an axiom of mainstream liberalism, ＂the civic unity assumption,＂ which holds that, ideally, all citizens endorse a single, unified state. While seemingly innocuous, this assumption extinguishes First Nations and Qurbrcois＇ claims to sovereignty. I conclude that this assumption--that majority and minority nationals must all work within the boundaries of a single constitutional structure--is ultimately an assimilative one, demanding that minority nationals merge their political community into the civic project of the majority. Drawing from John Rawls＇ The Law of Peoples, I argue that minority nations are best characterized as ＂peoples＂--complete societies with their own unique moral, cultural, and political traditions. If we accept this claim, we will come to see the multinational state differently： not as a political project uniting all citizens, but as a pact between nations; equal sovereign peoples coming together in a spirit of reciprocity to work out fair terms of social and political cooperation.展开更多
This paper argues that there is no real nationalism in the Middle East and if is, then it is an instrumental. The historical process of the region which relates to nationalism has had three stages： （1） the European...This paper argues that there is no real nationalism in the Middle East and if is, then it is an instrumental. The historical process of the region which relates to nationalism has had three stages： （1） the European conquest that forced the indigenous people to battle both for freedom and confront a secular idea such as nationalism; （2） arbitrarily marked borders by the West disregarding ethnic religious and tribal lines and affinity; （3） the creation of Arab nation states with no solid infrastructure of shared national values. This perspective can help understand current political developments in light of the Arab spring upheavals, in Iraq, Syria and Libya.展开更多
In the last three decades, the rise of a populist challenge to the liberal political mainstream exposed how shallow the supposed victory of global liberalism was, even in its heartlands in Europe and North America. Ex...In the last three decades, the rise of a populist challenge to the liberal political mainstream exposed how shallow the supposed victory of global liberalism was, even in its heartlands in Europe and North America. Exclusive nationalism and nativism, identity politics, critiques of globaiisation and internationalism, and calls for democratic re-empowerment of the demos have converged politically on a new locus of inflated territorial, indeed ＇border＇ sovereignty, aligning the caU of ＇taking back control＇ on behalf of a radically re-defined community （＇we＇） with a defensive re-territorialisation of power along existing fault lines of nation-statism. In this paper, I argue that the very same call has become the new common political denominator for all populist platforms and parties across Europe. I argue that populists across the conventional left-fight divide have deployed a rigidly territo- rialised concept of popular sovereignty in order to bestow intellectual coherence and communicative power to the otherwise disparate strands of their anti-utopian cri- tiques of globalisation. In spite of significant ideological differences between so- called fight- and left-wing populism, in the short-term the two populist projects have sought to stage their performances of sovereigntism on, behind or inside the borders of the existing nation-states.展开更多
文摘Citizens of liberal democracies hold that their theory of governance is the most just, the most consistent with freedom, and the most likely to promote human flourishing. Yet, Canada, one of the world＇s most liberal and progressive democracies, has consistently been unable to come to terms with the minority nations in its midst. Why would national minorities resist joining fully in a just liberal democratic state？ And in the face of this refusal, what sort of relationship should the majority establish with these national minorities？ I argue that their resistance stems from an axiom of mainstream liberalism, ＂the civic unity assumption,＂ which holds that, ideally, all citizens endorse a single, unified state. While seemingly innocuous, this assumption extinguishes First Nations and Qurbrcois＇ claims to sovereignty. I conclude that this assumption--that majority and minority nationals must all work within the boundaries of a single constitutional structure--is ultimately an assimilative one, demanding that minority nationals merge their political community into the civic project of the majority. Drawing from John Rawls＇ The Law of Peoples, I argue that minority nations are best characterized as ＂peoples＂--complete societies with their own unique moral, cultural, and political traditions. If we accept this claim, we will come to see the multinational state differently： not as a political project uniting all citizens, but as a pact between nations; equal sovereign peoples coming together in a spirit of reciprocity to work out fair terms of social and political cooperation.
文摘This paper argues that there is no real nationalism in the Middle East and if is, then it is an instrumental. The historical process of the region which relates to nationalism has had three stages： （1） the European conquest that forced the indigenous people to battle both for freedom and confront a secular idea such as nationalism; （2） arbitrarily marked borders by the West disregarding ethnic religious and tribal lines and affinity; （3） the creation of Arab nation states with no solid infrastructure of shared national values. This perspective can help understand current political developments in light of the Arab spring upheavals, in Iraq, Syria and Libya.
文摘In the last three decades, the rise of a populist challenge to the liberal political mainstream exposed how shallow the supposed victory of global liberalism was, even in its heartlands in Europe and North America. Exclusive nationalism and nativism, identity politics, critiques of globaiisation and internationalism, and calls for democratic re-empowerment of the demos have converged politically on a new locus of inflated territorial, indeed ＇border＇ sovereignty, aligning the caU of ＇taking back control＇ on behalf of a radically re-defined community （＇we＇） with a defensive re-territorialisation of power along existing fault lines of nation-statism. In this paper, I argue that the very same call has become the new common political denominator for all populist platforms and parties across Europe. I argue that populists across the conventional left-fight divide have deployed a rigidly territo- rialised concept of popular sovereignty in order to bestow intellectual coherence and communicative power to the otherwise disparate strands of their anti-utopian cri- tiques of globalisation. In spite of significant ideological differences between so- called fight- and left-wing populism, in the short-term the two populist projects have sought to stage their performances of sovereigntism on, behind or inside the borders of the existing nation-states.
