Using the Cournot Game Model, this paper has analyzed the motivation of the distributors' alliance to gain competitive advantage in marketing channel. At first, this paper separately analyzed the advantage of alli...Using the Cournot Game Model, this paper has analyzed the motivation of the distributors' alliance to gain competitive advantage in marketing channel. At first, this paper separately analyzed the advantage of alliance in the situation of oneshort game and infinitely repeated game, then, based on the analysis of distributors' betrayal of the alliance under infinitely repeated game, the conditions to maintain the distributors alliance are put forward and discussed.展开更多
At the present stage, The imported grape wine in China have hot market, imports increased year by year, high gross mar-gins, many brands, uneven quality, low market confidence, the price value of large deviations, imp...At the present stage, The imported grape wine in China have hot market, imports increased year by year, high gross mar-gins, many brands, uneven quality, low market confidence, the price value of large deviations, imperfect legislation, regulatory confusion and so on characters. The relevant departments and units should actively take a number of measures to improve the market of imported grape wine stably and healthy development. Believe in the future, its imports would continue to grow, the gross profit margin gradually would return to rational, the cost-effective products would be prevailing, the sales channels would be diversification, the enterprises in-volved would increase, and the industry competition would become increasingly fierce.展开更多
Manufacturers’channel competition with service is examined in this paper.Specifically,the authors consider channel competition within a supply chain comprising two manufacturers and one single retailer where each man...Manufacturers’channel competition with service is examined in this paper.Specifically,the authors consider channel competition within a supply chain comprising two manufacturers and one single retailer where each manufacturer can choose to sell its products either directly to the end market(online channel,say)or through the potential retail channel,based on the profit maximization criterion,which is influenced by exogenous market conditions,such as the degree of competition,etc.Furthermore,the retailer provides additional demand-enhancing service to promote the manufacturer’s products distributed via it.If only one of the manufacturers sells products through the retailer,its products will be promoted by the additional retail service,which poaches demand of products of the manufacturer who adopts direct online channel.Products of both manufacturers are supported by the retailer’s promotional service when both distribute their product through the common retailer.Finally,some managerial implications are derived from numerical analyses of our model,which explain the phenomena in practice and conclude the paper.展开更多
基金This work was supported by Natural science Foundation of China No. 70302017
文摘Using the Cournot Game Model, this paper has analyzed the motivation of the distributors' alliance to gain competitive advantage in marketing channel. At first, this paper separately analyzed the advantage of alliance in the situation of oneshort game and infinitely repeated game, then, based on the analysis of distributors' betrayal of the alliance under infinitely repeated game, the conditions to maintain the distributors alliance are put forward and discussed.
文摘At the present stage, The imported grape wine in China have hot market, imports increased year by year, high gross mar-gins, many brands, uneven quality, low market confidence, the price value of large deviations, imperfect legislation, regulatory confusion and so on characters. The relevant departments and units should actively take a number of measures to improve the market of imported grape wine stably and healthy development. Believe in the future, its imports would continue to grow, the gross profit margin gradually would return to rational, the cost-effective products would be prevailing, the sales channels would be diversification, the enterprises in-volved would increase, and the industry competition would become increasingly fierce.
基金partially supported by the National Science Foundation of China under Grant No.71090401/71090400
文摘Manufacturers’channel competition with service is examined in this paper.Specifically,the authors consider channel competition within a supply chain comprising two manufacturers and one single retailer where each manufacturer can choose to sell its products either directly to the end market(online channel,say)or through the potential retail channel,based on the profit maximization criterion,which is influenced by exogenous market conditions,such as the degree of competition,etc.Furthermore,the retailer provides additional demand-enhancing service to promote the manufacturer’s products distributed via it.If only one of the manufacturers sells products through the retailer,its products will be promoted by the additional retail service,which poaches demand of products of the manufacturer who adopts direct online channel.Products of both manufacturers are supported by the retailer’s promotional service when both distribute their product through the common retailer.Finally,some managerial implications are derived from numerical analyses of our model,which explain the phenomena in practice and conclude the paper.
