曹诏孙论“古谱残局”

三十年代后期,我与曹诏孙老先生在上海一起行医的时候,诊余之暇,他喜欢研究“古谱残局”,并经常有新的发现。 曹先生对“边兵”这个子最感兴趣,他说:“称为棋之王的‘七星聚会’,局中的边兵为大车杀灭,不起作用,而‘竹香斋’象棋谱上所刊的空庭积翠局中的边兵,原是一路雄师,却未能发挥。”为了进一步探讨,他将这局棋的诠语变化整理成稿寄给许弼德,当时许是新国报“象棋新趣残局”的主编。奈因限于篇幅(每天刊出三百字左右,曹文有一千余字),未能发表。

Cascading failure prevention of complex systems based on brittleness entropy game

A non-cooperative game model based on brittleness entropy is formulated for preventing cascading failure of complex systems.Subsystems of a complex system are mapped to the players of the game.The influence of collapsed subsystems to other subsystems is also taken into account in the definition of payoff function except for their own entropy increase.This influence is named brittleness entropy.Each player has two optional strategies;rational for negative entropy and irrational for negative entropy.The model is designed to identify the players who select an irrational strategy for negative entropy.The players who select the irrational strategy for negative entropy continue to compete for negative entropy after the recovery of ordered state and make other subsystems can' t get enough negative entropy to reduce entropy increase.It leads to cascading failure of the complex system in the end.Genetic algorithm is used to seek the solution of game model,and the simulation result verifies the effectiveness of the proposed model.The model provides a new way to prevent cascading failure of complex systems.

Coexistence and Extinction Pattern of Asymmetric Cyclic Game Species in a Square Lattice

The co-evolutionary dynamics of a cyclic game system is investigated in a two-dimensional square lattice with the asymmetrical rates for three species. Different with the well-mixed system, coexistence and extinction emerge alternately in the system, where a ＂zero-one＂ behavior is robust for a small population size, whereas, the system is predominated by coexistence for a big population one. We study in detail the influence about the fluctuation to the change of the state, and find that the difference between the maximal amplitude about the fluctuation and the average intensity determines which state the system is ultimately. In addition, we introduce Ports energy to explain the reason of the ＂zero-one＂ behavior. It is shown that the average Ports energy per site is the distance to the ＂zero-one＂ behavior in the model.

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Elastic Control in Software-Defined Networking

Elastic control could balance the distributed control plane in Software-Defined Networking(SDN). Dynamic switch migration has been proposed to achieve it. However, existing schemes mainly focus on how to execute migration operation, but not why. This paper designs a decision-making mechanism based on zero-sum game theory to reelect a new controller as the master for migrated switches. It first chooses a switch for migration in the heavy controller which invites its neighbors as the game players to compete for the master role of this switch in the game-playing field(GPF) which is an occasional and loose domain for game-playing. Second, based on the concept of GPF, we design a decentralized strategy to play the game and determine which player as the final master. We implement it by extending the Open Flow protocol. Finally, numerical results demonstrate that our distributed strategy can approach elastic control plane with better performance.

Study on Development Process and Mechanism of Ecological Compensation in Beijing and Hebei Province

The problem of water resources has become a bottleneck for the sustainable development of Beijing and Hebei Province (the two regions together are called "Jingji Region" for short).It is imperative to establish an effective and equitable water resources ecological compensation (eco-compensation) mechanism.The three stages of water resources eco-compensation are expatiated here namely the eco-compensation missing stage,ecocompensation start stage and the eco-compensation development stage.Through the establishment of eco-compensation game model based on the game theory,the reasons of the formation for the three stages were analyzed,as well as the conversion conditions from non-cooperative game to cooperative game among the related stakeholders including the central government,the water recipient government and the water source government.Furthermore,this study pointed out that the water resources eco-compensation in Jingji Region was not established based on the institution,but formed and developed in coping with the challenges of water crisis.However,institution construction is quite essential in game process for the water recipient government and the water source government.Finally recommendations in four areas including legalization of eco-compensation mechanism,setting up compensation standards,leading industrial upgrading and developing related incentives and constraints were concluded.

古人如何戍边

1200多年前,唐朝士兵是如何在"大漠孤烟直"的边塞戍守的?新疆文物考古研究所对克亚克库都克烽燧遗址的初步研究,正在解开这一谜团。"出土遗物和碳十四测年表明,烽燧遗址修筑于唐代,是焉耆镇为防止吐蕃入侵而修筑的军事设施。当年,应该是一处基层军事机构‘游弈所’的驻地。"考古学家说。

Stakeholder Contradictions and Win-win Strategies for Tourism along the Ancient Tea Horse Road in the South of Yunnan based on Game Analysis

With the emergence of the concept of cultural routes, researchers have increasingly turned their attention to the sustainable development of tourism along cultural routes. The needs for community participation and the ongoing provision of benefits of stakeholders are characteristics of cultural routes. Therefore, the importance of cooperative relations and systematic development among stakeholders in tourism activities along cultural routes has become a subject of interest. This paper selects local government, tourism enterprises and local community residents, all of which play a key role in the Ancient Tea Horse Road cultural route in the south of Yunnan, as the main stakeholders. We use game theory to construct a model to trace interactions between local government and tourism enterprises, between tourism enterprises and community residents, and between local government and community residents. The paper then analyzes the different interests of the three parties and key factors that influence them in the game process. This provided a certain scientific basis for the win-win decisions regarding tourism development made by the three parties. Our results show that the final decision choices of the three parties depend on the initial payoff matrix of the game, and the influence of key parameters. When making decisions about tourism, the government should respect the wishes of local residents, strengthen protections of local traditions, manage the unreasonable behavior of tourism enterprises as they develop tourism, and develop appropriate penalties for violations of regulations. When tourism enterprises carry out tourism development, they should let community residents take the initiative and fully participate in tourism activities, and be sure that income from tourism is fed back to local residents, to ensure that tourism is mutually beneficial. The study shows that conflicts among the three parties originated mainly from differences in interests, but that the three parties also shared common interests. With a goal of coordinating interests, we can establish relevant mechanisms, follow the principle of interest realization, attach importance to supervision and management, strengthen community participation and decision-making, and realize win-win results for the three parties.

A survey of static and dynamic potential games

Potential games are noncooperative games for which there exist auxiliary functions, called potentials,such that the maximizers of the potential are also Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. Some properties of Nash equilibria, such as existence or stability, can be derived from the potential, whenever it exists. We survey different classes of potential games in the static and dynamic cases, with a finite number of players, as well as in population games where a continuum of players is allowed. Likewise, theoretical concepts and applications are discussed by means of illustrative examples.

Linear quadratic stochastic integral games and related topics

This paper studies linear quadratic games problem for stochastic Volterra integral equations(SVIEs in short) where necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of saddle points are derived in two different ways.As a consequence,the open problems raised by Chen and Yong(2007) are solved.To characterize the saddle points more clearly,coupled forward-backward stochastic Volterra integral equations and stochastic Fredholm-Volterra integral equations are introduced.Compared with deterministic game problems,some new terms arising from the procedure of deriving the later equations reflect well the essential nature of stochastic systems.Moreover,our representations and arguments are even new in the classical SDEs case.