为解决电力系统暂态过电压风险评估中输入特征集构建合理性不足、强相关性差等问题,提出一种考虑新能源多场站短路比MRSCR(multiple renewable energy stations short circuit ratio)的暂态过电压风险评估方法。首先,通过分析暂态过电...为解决电力系统暂态过电压风险评估中输入特征集构建合理性不足、强相关性差等问题,提出一种考虑新能源多场站短路比MRSCR(multiple renewable energy stations short circuit ratio)的暂态过电压风险评估方法。首先,通过分析暂态过电压数学模型,发现MRSCR与暂态过电压呈负相关性;然后,综合考虑MRSCR与其他影响系统暂态过电压的关键因素,构建多维输入特征集;最后,通过卷积神经网络建立输入特征与暂态过电压的高维映射,实现系统暂态过电压风险的快速、准确评估,并通过算例分析验证了所提方法的有效性、可行性。展开更多
The original internal flooding probabilistic safety analysis （PSA） study of Krsko Nuclear Power Plant （two-loop Pressurized Water Reactor （PWR） plant of Westinghouse design） was performed in mid nineties and lim...The original internal flooding probabilistic safety analysis （PSA） study of Krsko Nuclear Power Plant （two-loop Pressurized Water Reactor （PWR） plant of Westinghouse design） was performed in mid nineties and limited to reactor core damage risk （Level 1 PSA）. In 2003, it was, together with other safety and hazard analyses, subject to the Periodic Safety Review （PSR）. In the PSR, it was stated that methodological PSA approaches and guidelines have evoluted during the past decade and several observations were provided, concerning the area screening process, residual risk and treatment of plant damage states and risk from radioactivity releases （i.e., Level 2 PSA）. In order to address the PSR observations, upgrade ofKrsko NPP internal flooding PSA was undertaken. The area screening process was revisited in order to cover the areas without automatic reactor trip equipment. The model was extended to Level 2. Residual risk was estimated at both Level 1 and Level 2, in terms of core damage frequency （CDF） and large early release frequency （LERF）, respectively.展开更多
文摘为解决电力系统暂态过电压风险评估中输入特征集构建合理性不足、强相关性差等问题,提出一种考虑新能源多场站短路比MRSCR(multiple renewable energy stations short circuit ratio)的暂态过电压风险评估方法。首先,通过分析暂态过电压数学模型,发现MRSCR与暂态过电压呈负相关性;然后,综合考虑MRSCR与其他影响系统暂态过电压的关键因素,构建多维输入特征集;最后,通过卷积神经网络建立输入特征与暂态过电压的高维映射,实现系统暂态过电压风险的快速、准确评估,并通过算例分析验证了所提方法的有效性、可行性。
文摘The original internal flooding probabilistic safety analysis （PSA） study of Krsko Nuclear Power Plant （two-loop Pressurized Water Reactor （PWR） plant of Westinghouse design） was performed in mid nineties and limited to reactor core damage risk （Level 1 PSA）. In 2003, it was, together with other safety and hazard analyses, subject to the Periodic Safety Review （PSR）. In the PSR, it was stated that methodological PSA approaches and guidelines have evoluted during the past decade and several observations were provided, concerning the area screening process, residual risk and treatment of plant damage states and risk from radioactivity releases （i.e., Level 2 PSA）. In order to address the PSR observations, upgrade ofKrsko NPP internal flooding PSA was undertaken. The area screening process was revisited in order to cover the areas without automatic reactor trip equipment. The model was extended to Level 2. Residual risk was estimated at both Level 1 and Level 2, in terms of core damage frequency （CDF） and large early release frequency （LERF）, respectively.
