Regarding the Regulatory Sandbox Route and Mechanism for Governance of Artificial Intelligence

The main challenge in AI governance today is striking a balance between controlling AI dangers and fostering AI innovation.Regulators in a number of nations have progressively extended the regulatory sandbox,which was first implemented in the banking sector,to AI governance in an effort to reduce the conflict between regulation and innovation.The AI regulatory sandbox is a new and feasible route for AI governance in China that not only helps to manage the risks of technology application but also prevents inhibiting AI innovation.It keeps inventors'trial-and-error tolerance space inside the regulatory purview while offering a controlled setting for the development and testing of novel AI that hasn't yet been put on the market.By providing full-cycle governance of AI with the principles of agility and inclusive prudence,the regulatory sandbox offers an alternative to the conventional top-down hard regulation,expost regulation,and tight regulation.However,the current system also has inherent limitations and practical obstacles that need to be overcome by a more rational and effective approach.To achieve its positive impact on AI governance,the AI regulatory sandbox system should build and improve the access and exit mechanism,the coordination mechanism between the sandbox and personal information protection,and the mechanisms of exemption,disclosure,and communication.

Effectiveness of Supervisory Boards in Coordination With Audit Committees in China

China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the Anglo-American model since 2002. This paper aims to reveal the effectiveness of SBs in coordination with ACs in China. The regulations for Anglo-American and Chinese systems are compared and further evidence is provided through interviewing two governors of all listed companies in the SSE and of 79 investment corporations in Hangzhou. Both statements indicate that China still faces difficulties and problems in meeting the two indexes of independence and expertise of supervision to give effective supervisory functions. Both opinions differed in terms of the co-ordination of SBs and ACs in the future. The evidence presented forms a basis for proposals of how key characteristics of effectiveness and co-ordination can be improved to make supervisory functions in China more effective.

Game for Information Disclosure and the Auditing Institution

This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization, and the game strategy which revolves the information disclosure and hideaway to launch, and therefore can get the game way which causes the auditing institution. The equilibrium in game of the information disclosure causes the auditing institution, the expense and cost which the audit profession consumes is the company governs reduces the information not asymmetrical diligently center essential agency costs.

On Governance of Celebrity Endorsements in False Advertising

incidents of extreme hyperbole and fraud in celebrity advertisements have occurred repeatedly because advertising participants are driven by commercial interests and it is also relevant to the deep social and cultural background. Therefore, great and prolonged efforts should be made to govern celebrity advertising in a multi-pronged way： strengthening legal supervision on the basis of clearly defined false advertising; establishing early warning and punishing systems including pre-qualification system, filing system and banning system; promoting public interest litigation system; increasing consumers＇ media literacy.