The main challenge in AI governance today is striking a balance between controlling AI dangers and fostering AI innovation.Regulators in a number of nations have progressively extended the regulatory sandbox,which was...The main challenge in AI governance today is striking a balance between controlling AI dangers and fostering AI innovation.Regulators in a number of nations have progressively extended the regulatory sandbox,which was first implemented in the banking sector,to AI governance in an effort to reduce the conflict between regulation and innovation.The AI regulatory sandbox is a new and feasible route for AI governance in China that not only helps to manage the risks of technology application but also prevents inhibiting AI innovation.It keeps inventors'trial-and-error tolerance space inside the regulatory purview while offering a controlled setting for the development and testing of novel AI that hasn't yet been put on the market.By providing full-cycle governance of AI with the principles of agility and inclusive prudence,the regulatory sandbox offers an alternative to the conventional top-down hard regulation,expost regulation,and tight regulation.However,the current system also has inherent limitations and practical obstacles that need to be overcome by a more rational and effective approach.To achieve its positive impact on AI governance,the AI regulatory sandbox system should build and improve the access and exit mechanism,the coordination mechanism between the sandbox and personal information protection,and the mechanisms of exemption,disclosure,and communication.展开更多
China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the A...China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the Anglo-American model since 2002. This paper aims to reveal the effectiveness of SBs in coordination with ACs in China. The regulations for Anglo-American and Chinese systems are compared and further evidence is provided through interviewing two governors of all listed companies in the SSE and of 79 investment corporations in Hangzhou. Both statements indicate that China still faces difficulties and problems in meeting the two indexes of independence and expertise of supervision to give effective supervisory functions. Both opinions differed in terms of the co-ordination of SBs and ACs in the future. The evidence presented forms a basis for proposals of how key characteristics of effectiveness and co-ordination can be improved to make supervisory functions in China more effective.展开更多
文摘The main challenge in AI governance today is striking a balance between controlling AI dangers and fostering AI innovation.Regulators in a number of nations have progressively extended the regulatory sandbox,which was first implemented in the banking sector,to AI governance in an effort to reduce the conflict between regulation and innovation.The AI regulatory sandbox is a new and feasible route for AI governance in China that not only helps to manage the risks of technology application but also prevents inhibiting AI innovation.It keeps inventors'trial-and-error tolerance space inside the regulatory purview while offering a controlled setting for the development and testing of novel AI that hasn't yet been put on the market.By providing full-cycle governance of AI with the principles of agility and inclusive prudence,the regulatory sandbox offers an alternative to the conventional top-down hard regulation,expost regulation,and tight regulation.However,the current system also has inherent limitations and practical obstacles that need to be overcome by a more rational and effective approach.To achieve its positive impact on AI governance,the AI regulatory sandbox system should build and improve the access and exit mechanism,the coordination mechanism between the sandbox and personal information protection,and the mechanisms of exemption,disclosure,and communication.
文摘China＇s supervisory mechanism is peculiar in that it integrated the supervisory board （SB） of the German corporate governance （CG） model in 1993, and has simultaneously adopted the audit committee （AC） of the Anglo-American model since 2002. This paper aims to reveal the effectiveness of SBs in coordination with ACs in China. The regulations for Anglo-American and Chinese systems are compared and further evidence is provided through interviewing two governors of all listed companies in the SSE and of 79 investment corporations in Hangzhou. Both statements indicate that China still faces difficulties and problems in meeting the two indexes of independence and expertise of supervision to give effective supervisory functions. Both opinions differed in terms of the co-ordination of SBs and ACs in the future. The evidence presented forms a basis for proposals of how key characteristics of effectiveness and co-ordination can be improved to make supervisory functions in China more effective.
