Game for Information Disclosure and the Auditing Institution

This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization, and the game strategy which revolves the information disclosure and hideaway to launch, and therefore can get the game way which causes the auditing institution. The equilibrium in game of the information disclosure causes the auditing institution, the expense and cost which the audit profession consumes is the company governs reduces the information not asymmetrical diligently center essential agency costs.

The Research to Quality Supervision and Management of Power Enterprises

Intensive in-depth development of resources, centralized purchasing and gradually expand under the category of environment, this paper studies how to use information technology tools to construction quality supervision and management system that focuses on the quality of supervision and project management, quality control process management, quality monitoring statistics report management, platform management-related content in four areas. Through the construction quality supervision and management system, to better enhance the quality of electric power enterprise management level, to ensure that the material quality, quantity of time and supplies. strengthening quality supervision and management can not only effectively reduce material procurement costs, but also enhance the competitiveness of enterprises.

Build Enterprise Technical Standards Work Pattern to Adapt to New Condition

With new requirements proposed for technical standards work under the new circumstances,the article combining with the practice of Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited(WISCO)points out that enterprises must improve the work pattern of standards development and revision,and strengthen the standards implementation management and product quality supervision,so that technical standards can serve as a bridge between technologies and industrialization,support the industrial upgrading and structural optimization,create conditions for promoting trade and unify the market and provides means for global competition,helping enterprises to better cope with the increasing market competition.

Discussion on the Enhanced Accounting Supervision System of Financial Management

Accounting supervision is a management activity to monitor and supervise the production, business operation, and budget implementation in enterprises, and a good accounting supervision plays an extremely important role in the social and economic development. In China, there are many accounting supervision problems in accounting practice at present, and a lot of the problems have exerted a negative impact on the social and economic life. Therefore, the causes for these problems are discussed and analyzed, so that the corresponding methods and measures are proposed for solving the existing problems and promoting the accounting supervision to play a better and greater role in the financial management of enterprises.

Discussion on the Enhanced Accounting Supervision System of Financial Management

Accounting supervision is a management activity to monitor and supervise the production, business operation, and budget implementation in enterprises, and a good accounting supervision plays an extremely important role in the social and economic development. In China, there are many accounting supervision problems in accounting practice at present, and a lot of the problems have exerted a negative impact on the social and economic life. Therefore, the causes for these problems are discussed and analyzed, so that the corresponding methods and measures are proposed for solving the existing problems and promoting the accounting supervision to play a better and greater role in the financial management of enterprises.

中央环保督察与空气污染治理——基于地级城市微观面板数据的实证分析

2015年中国建立了以“督政”为特征的中央环保督察制度,改变了2006年确定的以“督企”为特征的环保督查制度,创新了中国环境监管机制。那么,中央环保督察能否显著降低空气污染呢?针对这一问题,本文在数理模型构建的基础上提出研究假设,并利用中国288个地级城市2015年9月至2018年8月日度空气污染数据进行实证检验。结果表明:①首轮中央环保督察和“回头看”对AQI、PM2.5和PM10都具有显著的降低效应,稳健性检验也进一步证明了结论的可靠性。②与首轮中央环保督察相比,“回头看”对空气污染的降低效应依然显著但程度稍弱。③在中央环保督察结束后的短时间内,无论是首轮中央环保督察还是“回头看”,都对AQI、PM2.5和PM10具有显著的降低效应。④首轮中央环保督察和“回头看”对AQI、PM2.5和PM10的影响效应在城市空气质量、是否将PM2.5作为空气质量考核指标、“秦岭—淮河”一线南北两侧以及官员年龄等方面呈现出较强的异质性特征。本文研究结论为推进中央环保督察的常态化、确定中央环保督察的重点区域、建立中央环保督察的整体性评估框架,以及推广以“督政”为特征的督察机制提供了决策依据。